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ABSTRACT

A CROSS-BOUNDARY PEOPLE: THE COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES, SOCIAL
NETWORKS, AND TRAVEL WRITINGS OF JAPANESE AND TAIWANESE SEKIMIN IN
THE SHANTOU TREATY PORT (1895−1937)
by
LIN-YI TSENG

Adviser: Professor Helena Rosenblatt

This dissertation explores Japanese imperial history in East Asia and focuses on a group of
“cross-boundary people”—Taiwanese sekimin (Taiwanese who registered as Japanese subjects)
and Japanese—who went to the treaty port of Shantou in southern China during the period
between 1895 and 1937. The starting time point (i.e., 1895) corresponds to the signing of the
Treaty of Shimonoseki, by which Japan acquired Taiwan as a colony and informal privileges in
Chinese treaty ports. The ending time point (i.e., 1937) corresponds to the decline that Shantou’s
Japanese community experienced owing to the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War on
July 7, 1937. By examining the official documents of the Taiwan General Government,
commercial reports of Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and major newspapers and travel
writings published in colonial Taiwan, I explore the connections among the Japanese homeland
!
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(the metropole), the Japanese formal empire in Taiwan, and the Japanese informal empire in
Shantou in terms of commercial activities, human resources, and networks of words.
Concerning commercial activities, I argue that Shantou was an important market for both
Japanese and Taiwanese goods, and that the commercial network comprising the Japanese
metropole, colonial Taiwan, and the Shantou treaty port was significant for Japanese imperial
formation in East Asia. Moreover, by analyzing the Japan-China co-invested Dadong Ice-making
Company in Shantou, I explore the complicated competitive and cooperative relationships
among three notably different ethnic groups there: Taiwanese sekimin, local Chinese, and
Japanese in Shantou. By examining the Japan-founded educational institution known as —the
Tōē School in Shantou, I clarify two important points: (1) the Taiwan General Government
established a network of human resources for the Japanese homeland, colonial Taiwan, and the
Shantou treaty port; and (2) this particular school’s Japanese and Taiwanese teachers produced
writings published in major Taiwanese periodicals, signifying a network of “words” between an
element of Japan’s formal empire (Taiwan) and an element of Japan’s informal empire
(Shantou).
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Chapter 1: Introduction: Empire, Migration and Local Society
1.1 Prelude
In 2008, a movie called Cape No. 7 directed by the young Taiwanese director Te-Sheng Wei
became a blockbuster in Taiwan. Even without a strong promotional campaign, Cape
No. 7 became the second highest grossing film in Taiwan’s cinematic history, only behind
1997’s Titanic directed by James Cameron. At the start of Cape No. 7, a Japanese teacher in
1940s southern Taiwan falls in love with a Taiwanese girl whose Japanese name is Tomoko.
After the surrender of Japan in 1945, the Japanese teacher is forced to return to his Japanese
homeland. While aboard the repatriating Japanese boat Takasagomaru on his trip back, he
composes seven letters expressing his love for Tomoko. He encloses the letter in an envelope
addressed to “Cape No. 7,” the girl’s home address in southern Taiwan. As the years go by, the
Japanese teacher and Tomoko, the former residing in Japan and the latter in Taiwan, enter into
their respective marriages. The passage of a half-century brings with it change: the Japanese
teacher has passed away, and his daughter finds the love letters and send them to Taiwan.
However, the address “Cape No. 7” was an address used only during the Japanese colonial
period in Taiwan, and the mailman has no idea where he should deliver the article of mail. After
!
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a complicated process involving appearances by many other figures, Tomoko, now an old
grandmother, receives the love letters. The film end with a scene in which the elderly Tomoko
tenderly touches letters and recalls her time with the Japanese teacher over a half-century earlier.
After the film’s blockbuster success in Taiwan, many scholars and critics explored why the
film had been so popular there. A widely applauded theory was that the film had aroused
complex Taiwanese emotions toward Japan, which had colonized the island for fifty years prior
to the succeeding governance of Chiang Kai-shek’s Guomintang. In some ways, the movie
reflected the complicated and entangled histories of Taiwan, Japan, and China in the twentieth
century. The Japanese teacher in Cape No. 7 is undoubtedly a cross-boundary person who has
crossed not only the geographical boundary between his Japanese homeland and colonial Taiwan,
but also

by falling in love with Tomoko

the ethnic boundary separating the colonizing

Japanese from the colonized Taiwanese. The Japanese empire’s expansion in East Asia between
the late nineteenth century and the end of the Second World War created a situation where many
migrating Japanese, Taiwanese, and Koreans, and others became cross-boundary people, like the
Japanese teacher in Cape No. 7. My dissertation focuses on a specific population of these
cross-boundary people, that is, Taiwanese and Japanese who migrated to a treaty port named
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Shantou in southern China during the early to mid-twentieth century. From the experiences and
stories of these migrants, I explore the connections among the Japanese homeland, colonial
Taiwan, and southern China during the Japanese colonial period in Taiwan.

1.2 Migration: The Cross-boundary People
Japanese Migration
Concerning the issue of Asian migration, Adam McKeown analyzes the complicated
relationship between Asian migration and the establishment of modern sovereignty, challenging
the conventional Euro-central concept of globalization.1 His research has inspired me to think
about the complicated relationships of migration under the Japanese empire. In the field of
Japanese imperial studies, some scholars have applied the approach of “migration” to studies on
the Japanese empire, that is, by examining “Japanese” (including Koreans and Taiwanese)
people’s interactions with local places, researchers can strengthen studies on the Japanese empire.
Most previous studies in this field explored migration of people from the Japanese homeland to a
diverse set of acquisitions: Japan’s formal colonies of Taiwan and Korea, Japan’s puppet state of
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1

Adam McKeown, Melancholy Order: Asian Migration and the Globalization of Borders. New York: Columbia
University Press, 2008.
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Manchukuo, Japan’s informal imperial conquests in China (namely Chinese treaty ports), and
areas in Southeast Asia.
Concerning Japanese immigrants in northeast Asia, Erik Esselstrom explores the activities
of Japanese police officers whom Japan’s Foreign Ministry assigned to Manchuria and Korea,
and he argues that these officers’ migration played an active role in facilitating Japanese imperial
expansion in northeast Asia.2 Joshua Fogel examines the Japanese communities in Harbin
between 1898 and 1930, and notes three important points: (1) most Japanese immigrants in the
area were from Kyushu, searching for better opportunities; (2) by the 1910s, the Japanese
communities of Harbin had produced local social, educational, economic, and religious
institutions functioning to support the Japanese people there; and (3) Japanese communities,
while establishing many self-supporting institutions, underwent a certain level of ethnic
integration and assimilation. Many Japanese learned Russian, wore Western-style clothing, and
frequently interacted with both indigenous and foreign communities. Japanese communities’
integration into Harbin’s local communities was much deeper than the corresponding integration

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2

Erik Esselstrom, Crossing Empire’s Edge: Foreign Ministry Police and Japanese Expansionism in Northeast Asia.
Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2009.
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of the Jewish communities.3 Barbara Brooks discussed the migration of millions of Japanese
“proletarian colonizers” (including farmers, workers, and prostitutes) to Korea and Manchurian
during the Japanese imperial period. Concerning their social and economic status, these
proletarian colonizers were not significantly different from local residents. Moreover, the
Japanese government encouraged Japanese women residing in colonies to marry local men
(chiefly Koreans and Russians), and praised Japanese prostitutes as vanguards of the Japanese
empire. Brooks argued that gender functioned as an instrument in the Japanese empire’s
penetration of and expansion throughout various colonial acquisitions.4
Mark Peattie’s research compares Japanese immigrants with British immigrants in Shanghai,
Hankou, Tianjin, Amoy (Xiamen), and Fuzhou, and identifies four important points: (1) most
Japanese immigrants came from Kyushu and western Japan; (2) the formation of Japanese
immigrants in China was similar to the corresponding formation in the main colonies of Taiwan
and Korea, with the formations covering all social classes, from high-ranking officials to the
bourgeoisie (like small shopkeepers) to the lower classes (like common laborers and prostitutes),
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3

Joshua Fogel, “The Japanese and the Jews: A Comparative Analysis of Their Communities in Harbin, 1898−1930,”
in Robert Bickers & Christian Henriot, eds., New Frontiers: Imperialism’s New Communities in East Asia,
1842−1953. New York: Manchester University Press, 2000, pp. 88−108.
4
Barbara J. Brooks, “Reading the Japanese Colonial Archive: Gender and Bourgeois Civility in Korea and
Manchuria before 1932” in Barbara Molony and Kathleen Uno, eds., Gendering Modern Japanese History.
Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2005, pp. 295 325.
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and for the most part, Japanese immigrants had a modest lifestyle, in contrast to the luxurious
lifestyles of, for example, the British taipan; (3) Japanese communities were self-sufficient and
isolated; and (4) Japanese immigrants made a greater effort than did their British counterparts to
accommodate the Chinese community and Japanese had fewer problems in matters of
accommodation. In addition, Peattie points out that the Japanese government was the only
“treaty port”-based foreign power that officially supported China-related research institutions.5
Research conducted by Christian Henriot examines the Japanese communities in Shanghai
between 1875 and 1945. He argues that commercial opportunities were the primary force that
attracted Japanese to Shanghai both before and after 1937 (the outbreak of the Second
Sino-Japanese War). The Japanese residents here were made up of many small shopkeepers and
employees. They concentrated in certain quarters, resulting in a kind of urban isolation and were
the most regulated and organized of Shanghai’s foreign communities. Because of their isolation,
Japanese were rarely in touch with local Chinese and had a strong sense of Japanese identity.6

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5

Mark Peattie, “Japanese Treaty Port Settlements in China, 1895−1937,” in Peter Duus, Ramon Myers, and Mark
Peattie, eds., The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895−1937. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989, pp.
166−209.
6
Christian Henriot, “Little Japan in Shanghai: An Insulated Community, 1875−1945,” in Robert Bickers &
Christian Henriot, eds., New Frontiers: Imperialism’ s New Communities in East Asia, 1842−1953. New York:
Manchester University Press, 2000, pp. 146−169.
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Concerning Japanese immigrants in southeast Asia, Mark Peattie explores the Japanese
immigrants in Micronesia. His research tells of many Japanese businessmen who operated in
Micronesia and who included the pioneer and patriot Koben Mori
Haruji Matsue

and the “sugar king”

. Readers also learn about both the Micronesia policies adopted by

different Japanese political regimes and everyday Micronesian life as experienced by Japanese
immigrants, including Okinawan and Korean immigrants.7 Hiromitsu Iwamoto examines
Japanese who stayed in New Guinea between the 1890s and 1949, including the businessman
Isokichi Komine

, who later became a famous planter in both German and Australian

New Guinea. However, Japanese in New Guinea faced severe challenges after Australia formally
regarded Japan as an enemy in 1942.8

Taiwanese Sekimin Migration
Taiwan had been under Japanese colonization for fifty years, from the signing of the Treaty
of Shimonoseki in 1895 to the end of the Second World War in 1945. Many scholars conducted

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7

Mark R. Peattie. Nan’yo: The Rise and Fall of the Japanese in Micronesia, 1885−1945. Honolulu: University of
Hawaii Press, 1988.
8
Hiromitsu Iwamoto, Nanshin: Japanese settlers in Papua and New Guinea, 1890−1949. Canberra: Journal of
Pacific History, Australian National University, 1999.
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studies exploring the history of Taiwan under Japanese colonial period.9 Leo Ching’s
research analyzes Taiwanese literature during the Japanese colonial period and argues that the
formation of Taiwanese identity was part of a triangular relationship involving Japanese
colonialism and Chinese nationalism. The neo-nationalism or proto-nationalism of Taiwanese
was shaped under Japanese colonial rule.10 Faye Yuan Kleeman examines the concept of “the
south” from the perspective of literature and the portrait of the South Pacific and Taiwanese
aborigines in both political novels and popular media, emphasizing how these texts reflect the
symbolic meaning and impact of “the south” in the Japanese colonial context.11 Research edited
by David Der-wei Wang

and Ping-hui Liao

examines colonial Taiwan’s

literature and, in particular, discusses how the Japanese colonial government developed a
mechanism of governance by means of connections between power and knowledge.12
Concerning the kōminka

(Japanization) movement in Taiwan, Wan-Yao Chou

suggests that wartime pressures demanded the mobilization of all colonial sources and manpower.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9

For example, Harry Lamley, “Taiwan Under Japanese Rule, 1895-1945: The Vicissitudes of Colonialism,” in
Murry A. Rubinstein, ed., Taiwan: A New History, pp. 201-60. New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1999.
10
Leo T. S. Ching, Becoming “Japanese”: Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation. Berkeley and
Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2001.
11
Faye Yuan Kleeman, Under an Imperial Sun: Japanese Colonial Literature of Taiwan and the South. Honolulu:
University of Hawaii Press, 2003.
12
Ping-hui Liao and David Der-wei Wang eds., Taiwan Under Japanese Colonial Rule, 1895−1945: History,
Culture, Memory. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006.
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The kōminka movement served as a means of mobilization. The Japanese authorities wanted to
turn Koreans and Taiwanese into loyal imperial subjects by, for example, building Japanese
shrines, instituting oaths to the Japanese state, and assigning Japanese names to non-Japanese.13
Sociologist Ming-Chang Lo

demonstrates the mutual relationships between the

professional identity and the ethnic identity of Taiwanese doctors under the Japanese colonial
empire, and she argues that Taiwanese doctors’ attitudes toward the colonizers grew more
positive as the doctors increasingly perceived themselves less and less as national physicians (a
perception common in the 1920s) and more and more as medical modernists (a perception
common during the kōminka period , 1937-1945).14
Concerning the issue of migration, in addition to examining people from the Japanese
homeland, some scholars have focused on the migration of Taiwanese sekimin. The term
‘Taiwanese sekimin’

is a Japanese one indicating “Taiwanese who registered as

Japanese citizens.” The term commonly appeared in official Japanese documents during the
Japanese colonial period (1895−1945), when many Taiwanese sekimin sojourned specifically to
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13

Wan-Yao Chou, “The Kōminka Movement in Taiwan and Korea: Comparisons and Interpretations,” in Peter
Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. Peattie eds., The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931−1945. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1996, pp. 40−68.
14
Ming-cheng Lo, Doctors within Borders: Profession, Ethnicity, and Modernity in Colonial Taiwan. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2002.
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southern China. There, they undertook a variety of occupations: for example, some were
businessmen in search of new opportunities; others were teachers assigned by the Taiwan
General Government to teach at Japanese-funded schools in China. Moreover, some Taiwanese
sekimin travelled for personal reasons, like sight-seeing or reunions of family and friends. In this
sense, research on Taiwanese sekimin’s migrations in China has enriched studies on the broader
topic of the Japanese empire.
Concerning previous studies on Taiwanese sekimin, Japanese scholar Takashi Nakamura
has put out perhaps the most important research in this area, beginning with several
papers in the 1980s. Some of his research addresses the Taiwan General Government’s
management of certain southern Chinese sites, encompassing the Japanese management of
hospitals, schools, the press, and the like. Moreover, he focuses on the activities of Taiwanese
sekimin in Fuzhou and Xiamen, but the research seldom addresses sekimin in Guangdong
Province’s Shantou area.15 Masami Kondō

analyzes schools, hospitals, and the press,

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15

Takashi Nakamura, Taiwan sekimin wo meguru sho mon dai
(On issues related to
Taiwanese sekimin), Tōnan ajia kenkyū
, vol. 18: 3 (December 1980), pp. 66−89; “Fukushū no
Taiwan sekimin”
(Taiwanese sekimin in Fuzhou), Nanpō bunka
, vol. 10 (October
1983), pp. 160−172; “Kamon no Taiwan sekimin to san dai sei”
(Taiwanese sekimin in
Xiamen and the three big family names), Nanpō bunka
, vol. 12 (November 1985), pp. 115−137; “Kamon
oyobi fukushū hakuai kai iinn no sei ritsu: Taiwan sōtokufu no bunka kōsaku”
—
(The establishment of Xiamen and Fuzhou hakuai hospitals: The cultural work of the
Taiwan General Government), Nanpō bunka
, vol. 15, (November 1988), pp. 1−57; “Swatō hakuai kai iin
!
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the so-called three cultural facilities of the Taiwan General Government during the Taishō period
(1912−1926) and argues that the expenses of the Taiwan General Government’s ventures in
southern China and southeastern Asia occupied a significant proportion of the Taiwan General
Government’s overall expenses.16
Among Taiwanese scholars, Hua-huang Liang

stands out as one of the earliest

scholars to pay attention to the sekimin issue. He demonstrates the Japanese colonial
government’s discriminatory treatment of Taiwanese by examining the government’s passport
policy for Taiwanese traveling to China. For example, when Taiwanese sekimin would board a
ship leaving Taiwan for China, they had to hand over their passports to law-enforcement officers
who would collect all the passports and submit them to the Japanese consulate in China. The
consulate would keep the passports belonging to the Taiwanese sekimin until their return to
Taiwan. However, Japanese immigrants who were passengers aboard a ship bound from the
Japanese homeland to China did not have to hand over their passports to Japanese authorities.17
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
no sei ritsu”

(The establishment of Shantou’s hakuai hospital), Tenri daigaku gakuhō
, vol. 162 (October 1989), pp. 15−28; “Ka nan ni okeru Taiwan sekimin”
(Taiwanese sekimin in southern China), Nanpō bunka
, vol. 17, (November 1990), pp. 127−150; vol. 18,
(November 1991), pp. 247−280.
16
Masami Kondō, Sōryoku sen to Taiwan: nihon shokumin chi hōgai no kenkyū
(Total War and Taiwan: Research on the Collapse of the Japanese Colonies). Tokyo: Tōsui shobō
, 1996.
17
Torajirō Inoue
, “Xiamen de Taiwan jimin went”
(The issue of Taiwanese
!
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In this sense, Japan’s passport-control policies for Taiwanese subjects differed substantively
from those for Japanese subjects.18 Hsueh-chi Hsu
sekimin in Manchukuo, which

she argues

explores the activities of Taiwanese

was a haven for Taiwanese pursuing new

opportunities. She focuses on a group of Taiwanese students who, after attending medical
schools in Manchukuo, practiced their respective professions there. Some of these medical
specialists even served as the last emperor Puyi’s private doctors and went into exile with the
emperor.19 Shu-ming Chung

approaches the issue of Taiwanese sekimin from the

perspective of commercial history. She argues that sekimin excelled in the ice-making business
and the cold-refreshment business in Xiamen, and that these entrepreneurs actively participated
in the establishment of public utilities, like water and electricity.20
Some scholars have addressed the social history of Taiwanese sekimin, arguing that “hei
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
sekimin in Amoy) (1926) in Mintai Guanxi Dangan Ziliao
(Archive of the relationship
between Fujian and Taiwan). Fujian: Lujiang chuban she, 1993, pp. 15 28.
18
Hua-huang Liang, “Ri ju shi dai tai min fu hua zhi lu juan zhi du”
(The
passport system for China-bound Taiwanese during the Japanese colonial period) in Taiwan Fengwu
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bang ji min”

(the sekimin gangs), whose members engaged in drug trafficking,

prostitution, and other illegal activities were an offshoot of Japan’s southern strategy. The
Taiwan General Government turned a blind eye to sekimin’s illegal actives because Japanese
officials regarded the activities of sekimin gangs as a way to enlarge Japanese influence in
China.21 Some Japanese scholars have focused on Taiwanese sekimin’s ethnic and national
backgrounds and have attempted to identify relationships between sekimin and imperial Japan.22
Most American scholarship has not touched on the issue of Taiwanese sekimin, but recently
some American scholars have opened up the possibility of further exploration in this area.
Barbara Brooks argued that colonial citizenship, which spanned multiple imperial fields, serves
as a way for historians to explore the issue of identity in the Japanese empire. Meanwhile,
imperial Japan’s policies concerning ethnicity and nationality demonstrate the different positions
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of colonized peoples (e.g., Taiwanese and Koreans) within the empire.23
Research by Man-hong Lin

is a combination of overseas Chinese history and

commerce studies. She takes the sekimin Chunyang Guo

in Indonesia as an example

and argues that overseas Chinese merchants adopted multiple nationalities, including the
Japanese nationality, to reduce commercial risks and to seek out economic benefits. Actually, by
means of deliberate falsification, many Chinese in Fujian Province acquired sekimin status in
order to enjoy extraterritorial privileges.24 Kenichi Gotō

, who is famous for

conducting research about the relationship between imperial Japan and Indonesia, relates the life
history of Taiwanese sekimin in southeastern Asia. He uses the sekimin Dai Ke

to depict

sekimin who diligently reclaimed wasteland in Java but whom local Javanese governments not
only regarded as citizen of an enemy country after the outbreak of the Great East Asian War but
indeed subjected to property confiscations and internment in concentration camps.25
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Moreover, Lori Watt and Tessa Morris-Suzuki explore the issue of migration in postwar
Japan. Watt’s scholarship addresses Japan’s policy of hikiage

(repatriation) and

deportation in the postwar period under the instruction of the Allied Powers. The former policy
concerned the repatriation of Japanese from all of Japan’s former colonies to the Japanese
homeland whereas the latter concerned the dispersal of Japan-based ex-colonial peoples (e.g.,
Taiwanese and Koreans) from the Japanese homeland back to their region of origin. Watt argues
that both repatriation and deportation significantly shaped the reconfiguration of postwar Japan.26
Morris-Suzuki explores the story of mikkōsha

(stowaways), most of whom were

Koreans who entered Japan between 1946 and the 1970s for economic reasons. She attempts to
fill in the “blank space” (1945−1980) in Japanese immigration history and argues that the
numbers of illegal immigrants, in reality, were much higher than the Japanese official statistics
showed. In some cases, would-be immigrants who were not lucky enough to get a residence
permit were confined in detention camps and suffered dehumanizing treatment.27
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In conclusion, the abovementioned scholars have explored Japanese imperial history and
post-war Japanese history in reference to migration and migrants. The scholars’ findings help
clarify the Japanese empire’s diverse makeup and have inspired me to analyze the relationship
among the Japanese homeland, colonial Taiwan, and the Shantou treaty port, with a specific
focus on both the Japanese and Taiwanese immigrants.

1.3 The Significance of Local Chinese Society
A local society is a group of interacting people sharing an urban or rural environment. Recent
studies on the matter have stressed the agency of local societies and the interactions between
local societies (small) and the state (large).
According to Max Weber’s research, China never developed “urban community” or “urban
autonomy.” Cities in imperial China were static, merely centers of bureaucracy. By contrast,
Western European cities represented freedom, equality, rationality, and capitalism.28 In the
1970s, William Skinner first challenged Weber’s argument and provided macro-region theory,
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core-periphery theory, and central-place theory in studying Chinese cities.29 Later, many
scholars of Chinese history applied Skinner’s theories to various strands of research. For
example, William Rowe’s research about Hankow suggests that early modern China developed a
national market, at the center of which was Hankow, possessing modernity, urban autonomy, and
urban community akin to the character of nineteenth-century Paris.30 Adopting Skinner’s
theories, Mary Rankin in her research on nineteenth-century-Zhejiang argues that the gap
between core and periphery in Skinner’s theory is more significant than the traditional
urban-rural dichotomy in Weber’s theory, and that the growth of the “public sphere”31 enabled
Zhejiang elites to play a more active role in social and political life.32
Richard Lufrano examines the late imperial Chinese world from the perspective of merchants
and commerce. He challenges Western scholarship’s traditional conclusion that Confucian
thought has been a major obstacle to Chinese economic development. From his examination of
merchant manuals (e.g., travel guides, practical instructions, and moral instructions) published in
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the late Ming to the mid-Qing period, he argues that merchants absorbed many Confucian values
(e.g., self-discipline and frugality) and emphasized self-cultivation, reciprocity, and
rationalism.33
Examining local society in 1920s Beijing, David Strand’s study argues that a public sphere
there occupied a space between the state and society. Citizens (including laborers) discussed
political issues in temples, tea houses, bathhouses, theaters, brothels, and many other public
places.34 Richard Belsky’s research concerns the influence that both hui guan
(native-place lodges) and sojourners in Beijing had on the city’s urban ecology in the early
twentieth century. On the one hand, the sojourners made use of hui guan to communicate with
other countrymen in Beijing and to influence the imperial bureaucracy; on the other hand, the
state used hui guan to balance different local powers and to maintain the security and operations
of the imperial bureaucracy.35 Ruth Rogaski’s research on Tianjin explores how wei sheng
(hygiene) became representative of Chinese modernity in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
Tianjin experienced the presence of foreign powers on its soils after the 1850s, and during the
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1930s and 40s, it was controlled by Japanese. Her study essentially opens a window through
which we can understand the complexity of a Chinese treaty port’s local society.36
Concerning local society in Chinese cities, many scholars have focused on Shanghai because
of its status as the “key to modern China”37; in other words, knowledge of Shanghai can shed
considerable light on not only China but also China’s encounters with modernity, which were
rooted in urban settings. Diverse scholars have conducted research on Republican Shanghai from
different angles: (1) Christian Henriot’s and Frederic Wakeman’s work concerning the
relationship between Shanghai and state-influenced social control;38 (2) Bryna Goodman’s and
others’ examinations of the immigrants in Shanghai and their identities;39 (3) research by
Hanchao Lu

examining Shanghai residents’ everyday life;40 (4) Shanghai’s urban life

and cultural industry, especially the printing culture, as seen from the perspectives of Leo Ou-fan
Lee

and Christopher Reed;41 (5) Emily Honig’s and Elizabeth Perry’s discussions
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about workers in Shanghai;42 (6) Christian Henriot’s and Gail Hershatters’ findings concerning
prostitution in Shanghai;43 (7) Frederic Wakeman’s treatment of terrorism and crime in
Shanghai;44 and (8) Shanghai’s economic sentiments, researched by Wen-hsin Yeh

.45

If we turn our eyes to the study of local society in southern China during this period, we can
see that Hua nan xue pai

(the Hua nan school of thought) contributed greatly to this

field. The school consists of scholars from the Chinese University of Hong Kong, Sun Yat-sen
University in Guangzhou, and Xiamen University. Having inherited anthropologist Maurice
Freedman’s theoretical concept of linage in southern China, the scholars emphasize an approach
steeped in historical anthropology, paying particular attention to religion, village-level lineage in
southern China, and interactions between the state system and local society.
David W. Faure examines the relationship between state and society, and he argues that
under the Ming dynasty, with the institutionalization of lineage (i.e., ritual and group ownership
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of property), southern China melded into imperial China.46 Helen Siu

and Zhiwei Liu

argue that cultural identity in the Pearl River Delta of southern China has never been
fixed and has continually adapted itself to diverse interactions between local society and state.
They explore the ethnic identity of both the Danjia

, a minority in Chinese society, and the

Han, and argue that ethnic identity has fluctuated, often in relation to language and lineage.47
Research

conducted by Chun-sheng Chen

centers on the Guangdong area,

emphasizing religious belief and lineage in local Chaozhou society.48 Mei-bao Cheng
explores the formation of the so-called Guangdong culture and the transformation of the
Guangdong language in different places.49 Zhen-man Zheng

has collected a great

amount of information pertaining to genealogies in Fuzhou villages, and explores how
institutionalized lineage has functioned in local society.50 Scholarship by a research partner of
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Zhen-man Zheng, Michael Szonyi integrates new sources (e.g., stone inscriptions) and
genealogies from Fuzhou villages, and argues that the lineage (and the compiling of genealogies)
was actually a strategic practice characterized by flexibility and negotiation.51 Chi Cheung Choi
addresses the Chaoshan area’s commercial activities and pays particular attention to
influence exerted by Chaoshan businessmen over kinship in order to explore business in southern
China, East Asia, and Southeast Asia.52 In addition to the abovementioned scholars, the local
governments of Chaozhou and Shantou developed offices responsible for recording local history
and collecting related materials, thereby helping to reconstruct the Chaoshan area’s past from
local perspectives.
Some scholars have explored local history from the angle of Christianity. Research
overseen by Joseph Tse-Hei Lee

concerns the role of Christianity in the Chaoshan area.

His work examines the missionary efforts of both American Baptists and English Presbyterians
in Chaozhou villages during the period between 1860 and 1900, with an emphasis on
missionaries’ creation of Christian villages in local Chinese society and the power relationships
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between Christian and non-Christian villagers.53
Michael Szonyi’ study of Quemoy

draws out the significance of local society during

the Cold War of the 1950s. Quemoy is a small island currently belonging to Taiwan and located
in the Taiwan Straits. The location of Quemoy made the island suitable as a buffer between
Chiang Kai-shek’s Guomintang in Taiwan and Mao Tse-tung’s Chinese Communist Party in
China. Szonyi explores how the Cold War transformed the local society and the lives of the
residents on this small island.54
The abovementioned research about local Chinese society (cities and villages) inspired me to
examine Japanese communities in the Shantou treaty port.
Although people are used to regarding Shantou (Swatow) and Chaozhou as a single region and
frequently refer to it as the “Chaoshan” area, the two places differ from each other in many
significant ways. One of the most significant of these lies in Chaozhou’s status as a historical
city, where lineage was well institutionalized by the nineteenth century; by contrast, Shantou was
traditionally a fishing village and its rapid modernization was in large part a response to the
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Second Opium War. In 1860, Shantou was formally opened as a treaty port.55 In this sense, most
residents in Shantou were immigrants from other places, and the specific manifestations of
institutionalized lineage (e.g., ancestral shrines) were much weaker than those in Chaozhou.
Geographically, Shantou has consisted of three parts: Shantou Town was an old urban area
hosting prosperous commercial activities; Qilu

was east of Shantou Town and, after the

designation of Shantou as a treaty port, became the site of Western consulates, foreign
companies, wharfs, warehouses, churches, schools, and hospitals; Queshi
in Japanese)

(or Kakuseki

an island opposite Qilu was basically an English settlement.

After Shantou opened as a treaty port, Western powers entered it one by one, and among the
newcomers were British, American, German, Russian, Dutch, and Belgians. Japan entered
Shantou after the First Sino-Japanese War in 1895, thirty years later than the Western powers.
The Western and Japanese powers established consulates, companies, schools, hospitals, and
churches in Shantou, and thus, the city became one of China’s international metropolises. It is
interesting to note that, regarding government levies on traded goods, both the Chinese
government’s customs agency (chang guan,

) and foreign governments’ customs agency
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(yang guan,

) co-existed in Shantou. The Qing government established Shantou’s Chinese

customs agency (Chaozhou shin guan,

) in 1853; in 1860, the Sino-British Tianjin

Treaty opened up the possibility of foreign customs agency (Chao hai guan,
city. Ma yu dao

) in the port

, a small island near Shantou was the site of these agencies’ customs

buildings. In the mid-1860s, the customs agencies relocated their operations to Shantou city itself.
The co-existence of both Chinese and foreign customs in Shantou was brought to an end by the
Boxer Protocol of 1901, which demanded that the Qing government renounce the right of
Chinese customs to operate on Chinese soil. From that time forward until 1949, foreign powers
exercised exclusive control of customs in Shantou.
During the period between the early 1900s and the 1930s, Shantou accommodated many
foreigners and experienced commercial prosperity. The freight-handling capacity of Shantou
ranked third in China, behind only Shanghai and Guangzhou, and served as a nexus for east
Guangdong Province, southwest Fujian Province, and southeast Jiangxi Province. Moreover,
Shantou was the hometown of many workers laboring in Southeast Asia, and served as a window
of exchange with markets farther south in China via the South Seas. However, Shantou was not a
place of political stability and had been a battlefield in the various Chinese civil wars waged by
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competing warlords. Meanwhile, Shantou exhibited some of the most pronounced anti-foreign
currents in Republican China (mainly anti-British and anti-Japanese). Different political powers,
including the Guomindang, Soviet advisors, and Chinese communists were keen to mobilize
anti-British and anti-Japanese protests. In this sense, when exploring the Japanese empire’s
management of companies, schools, and hospitals, and the activities of both Japanese and
Taiwanese sekimin in Shantou, one should rigorously account for Shantou’s local society,
including its economy, politics, and international dimensions.
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Fig. 1-1 Shantou Customs in the 1920s.
[Illustration] The building on the right is Bell Tower, which was constructed in 1919 and finished in 1921. (Source:
Photo by Lin-Yi Tseng at Chao shan li shi wen hua yan jiu zhong xin
Research Center of
Chaozhou and Shantou History and Culture.)

Fig. 1-2 Shantou Customs Museum.
[Illustration] Shantou Customs (the Bell Tower) is a historical spot, which was preserved by the Shantou
Government in 1994. Later, the building was renovated and opened to public as the Shantou Customs
Museum in 2008. (Source: Photo by Lin-Yi Tseng, 2013.)
!
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1.4 The Approaches and Arguments in My Dissertation
My dissertation explores the Japanese imperial formation in East Asia by analyzing the
commercial trade, educational activities, and social networks of both Japanese and Taiwanese
sekimin communities in the Shantou treaty port during the period between 1895 and 1937.56
Concerning the theoretical framework of my dissertation, I have drawn considerable
inspiration from several important scholars. First, I was inspired by Peter Duus who
conceptualized China as Japan’s “informal empire.” He argues that before the Manchurian
Incident in 1931, Japanese imperialism in China was informal and that this informality was
connected with the unequal treaty system. After the Manchurian Incident, with Japan’s
strengthened military forces, Japanese control over China evolved into a formal system. Duus
suggests that Japan was interested in China in terms of trade rather than territory and that, thus,
Japan’s informal empire in China enabled Japan to acquire economic benefits while saving on
the costs of formal colonization. Japan’s informal colonies in China accounted for more of
Japan’s trade than did all of Japan’s other colonies combined.57 I think that this concept
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rigorously illustrates Japanese management in Shantou because the importance of Shantou for
the Japanese empire lay chiefly in commercial interests.
Second, I was inspired by Ann Laura Stoler whose concept of “imperial formations”
promotes historical research that pays significant attention to imperial actors

to “people on the

fringes of empires as well as at their centers, to designated subjects as well as colonial
administrators, to those with companion and countervailing motivations to empire, and to those
who reside at the categorical edges of the imperial.”58 I think that the concept of imperial
formations provides a persuasive theoretical framework for discussing the mobility and the
networks of Taiwanese sekimin under imperialism because Taiwanese sekimin were people on
the fringes of not only the empire but the colonized populations, as well.
Concerning my application of research approaches to the topic of imperial Japan's extension
in East Asia, I was influenced by Joshua Fogel, Mark Peattie, Christian Henroit, Takashi
Nakamura, Hsueh-chi Hsu, Shu-min Zhong, and many others who explored “Japanese”
(including Taiwanese) immigrants in China. On the one hand, I treat the Japanese and Taiwanese
sekimin immigrants in Shantou as a window through which to perceive Japanese imperial
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formation in East Asia; and on the other hand, I pay attention to the significance of local Chinese
society, and consider the political, economic, and social dimensions of Shantou.
The majority of materials in this dissertation are Japanese sources, including commercial
reports issued by Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, newspapers published in colonial Taiwan
(such as Taiwan nichi nichi shinpō), official reports of the Japanese consul in Shantou, official
reports of Japanese teachers who taught in the Japanese-funded Tōē School in Shantou, and
Taiwan General Government officers’ travelogues. I have used these records to represent the
imperial gaze informing many Japanese peoples’ perceptions of Shantou and to represent
Taiwanese people’s self-positioning in this curious contact zone of Shantou, where Japanese,
Taiwanese, and local Chinese interacted. I have not used Shantou municipal archives or
Anglo-American foreign-office reports on Japan in this dissertation because my key concerns
have been (1) the management of Shantou by the Japanese empire—not by native or Western
forces and (2) the perceptions of cross-boundary Japanese and Taiwanese in Shantou. However, I
must admit that my heavy reliance on Japanese primary sources may have created some
methodological problems because the Japanese government, whether in Tokyo or in Taipei, not
only produced these records but often censored them as well. Anyone considering this research
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should keep these unavoidable complexities and possible gaps in mind.
Based on the abovementioned theoretical frameworks and approaches, my dissertation
consists of four chapters, as will be discussed in the following section.
Chapter Two: The Commercial Activities and Networks of Japanese Merchants and
Taiwanese Sekimin Merchants in Shantou
In this chapter, I explore the commercial relations among the Japanese homeland, colonial
Taiwan, and the treaty port of Shantou by examining Japanese commercial reports, such as
Tsūshō kōhō

. The records show that Shantou was an important market for both

Japanese and Taiwanese goods, including coal, seafood, molasses, and alcohol. Shantou’s
Taiwanese sekimin merchants and Shantou-based Japanese companies (e.g., the Mitsui Company,
Taiwan Bank, and the Osaka Shipping Company) contributed significantly to the commercial
network comprising the three abovementioned places.
In studying this commercial network in East Asia, I drew inspiration from the “network
mode” and “inter-port mode” concepts developed by Japanese scholar Takashi Hamashita
, who provided a new approach to exploring Asian history. His focus is not on a
specific national history (which traditional Oriental studies have favored) but on the important
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waterway connections among different ports and regions. For example, he argues that to analyze
the connections among ports yields more details than would a traditional examination of the
historical relationships among nations.59 In my case, examination of Japanese matches sold in
Shantou clarify the relationships among the Japanese city of Kobe, the Taiwanese city of
Keelung, British Hong Kong, and Shantou in southern China.
Chapter Three: Competition and Cooperation: The Case of the Dadong Ice-making
Company and Relations among Japan, China, and Taiwan

In this chapter, I explore the cooperation and competition, conflict and compromise among
Shantou’s Taiwanese sekimin merchants, local Chinese merchants, and the Japanese imperial
consulate in Shantou by examining the Sino-Japan co-invested Dadong Company in Shantou.
The Dadong Ice-making Company was initiated by Shin Huang, a Tainan-based Taiwanese
member of the gentry and entrepreneur who collected funds from both his relatives in Tainan and
Taiwanese sojourners in Shantou to establish the company. In response to Japan’s Sino−Japanese
friendship, Shin Huang invited some Chinese to invest in the company, not just Taiwanese.
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Among these Chinese investors, the chief councilor of Shantou City, Zi-bin Zheng, was the most
important. Over its history, the Dadong Ice-making Company faced at least two major crises: the
first one was brought on by the obstructionist actions of the Japanese consul in Shantou, and the
second one took place in the severely anti-Japanese atmosphere of Shantou, where the Chinese
businessman Zi-bing Zheng attempted to expel Taiwanese shareholders from the Dadong
Ice-making Company. In the first crisis, Taiwanese shareholders cooperated with Chinese
merchants to resist the Japanese consul’s oppression; and in the second crisis, Taiwanese
shareholders cooperated with the Japanese authority in Shantou to expel the Chinese shareholder
Zheng from the company. I will use the case of the Dadong Company to explain the history of
these complexities in a Chinese treaty port, where ethnicity, nationality, identity, and commercial
interests were prominent factors.
Chapter Four: The Educational Network Encompassing the Japanese Homeland, Colonial
Taiwan, and the Shantou Treaty Port—The Tōē School in Shantou
In this chapter, I have focused on a Japanese-funded Tōē School in Shantou. I have
explored two aspects of the Tōē School in Shantou: (1) the “network of human resources,”
regarding which I will discuss some Japanese and Taiwanese teachers whom the Taiwan General
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Government assigned to the Tōē School in Shantou; and (2) the “network of words,” regarding
which I will analyze teachers’ travel writings and reports published in colonial Taiwanese
periodicals, including Taiwan kyōiku

(Taiwan Education). By analyzing their words,

I will explore these teachers’ perceptions of the educational affairs in Shantou, and specifically
the perceptions of European- and American-funded schools in the city. In sum, from both the
network of human resources and the network of words in this particular setting, we will see how
an educational network established itself among those from the Japanese homeland, colonial
Taiwan, and the Chinese treaty port of Shantou.
Chapter Five: The Image of Shantou in Japanese Writings (1910s−1930s)
In this chapter, I examine Japanese texts describing Shantou during the period from the
1910s to the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in July 1937. I find substantial evidence
that Japanese travelers and residents’ most striking impression of Shantou was of the city’s
strident anti-Japanese climate, which would take such forms as restrictions on Japanese citizens’
movements and boycotts on Japanese goods. My paper in some degree responds to Karl Gerth’s
research about the relationship between Chinese nationalism and the culture of consumption
prevalent during the National Products Movement from 1900 to 1937. He argues that by
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promoting the purchase of national products as opposed to foreign products, the movement
offered people of all classes an opportunity to resist imperialism and express nationalist
sentiments. Boycotts of foreign goods took place mainly during the period extending from 1905
to the 1930s, and most of the boycotts during the movement targeted Japanese products.
Boycotts contributed to the growth and proliferation of movement organizations.60 My study
here indicates that most Japanese travelers were very alarmed by Shantou’s anti-Japanese
movements.
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Chapter 2: The Commercial Activities and Networks of Japanese Merchants
and Taiwanese Sekimin Merchants in Shantou

Fig. 2-1 The Chinese Treaty Ports.
!
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[Illustration] Shantou, or Swatow, is in southern China, near Xiamen (Amoy), Tainan (on Taiwan Island),
Kowloon (in Hong Kong), and Guangzhou (Canton).(Source:
http://www.mappery.com/maps/China-Treaty-Ports-Map.jpg, modified by Lin-Yi Tseng)

2.1 The Japanese Empire’s Interests in Shantou: Trade
In the 1870s, Meiji Japan’s overarching national goal was fukoku kyōhei

(wealthy

nation and strong army). By the 1890s, a new slogan had risen in popularity: shōkō rikkoku
(build the nation through commerce and industry). Both of the slogans revealed that a
developing economy was Meiji Japan’s priority. Some scholars have contended that economic
interest best explains the expansion of the Japanese empire. According to Akira Iriye, the
Japanese empire initially placed as much weight on economic matters (through trade and
immigration to ensure Japan’s elevated status in the world) as on military and territorial matters
(direct control over overseas resources). However, after the economic crisis in 1929,
impediments to economic development compelled Japan to seek a military-territorial solution to
domestic problems, and this strategic shift led to Japan’s occupation of Manchuria.61 The
economic crisis in 1929 caused a decline in exports of Japanese silk and cotton cloth,
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contributing to Japan’s inability to afford imports of coal, iron, and other natural resources.
These circumstances provided Japanese militarists an excuse to occupy Manchuria, which was
rich in such natural resources. Like Japan, Germany took a path to war that was deeply rooted in
economic concerns: both the indemnity that Germany had to pay after the First World War and
French occupation of German industrial centers prevented Germany from experiencing a robust
post-war economic recovery. The economic crisis in 1929 justified for many Germans their
country’s subsequent implementation of large-scale military expansion, which dramatically
reduced domestic unemployment there and which made possible Germany’s military conquests
of neighboring countries as a way to resolve domestic economic problems.
Peter Duus proposed that before the Manchurian Incident in 1931, Japanese imperialism in
China had been informal and that this informality had reflected the unequal treaty system. After
the Manchurian Incident, with Japan’s strengthened military forces, Japanese control over China
evolved into a formal system. Duus suggested that Japan’s interest in China had emphasized
trade over territory and that, thus, Japan’s informal empire in China had enabled Japan to acquire
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economic benefits while avoiding the various costs of formal colonization.62 In other words,
these scholars suggested that Japanese imperialism, which initially manifested itself in the First
Sino-Japanese War in 1894, was economic imperialism. Japan needed China’s resources and
markets, and the Treaty of Shimonoseki made Japan’s penetration of China possible.
In the early twentieth century, Shantou was an important commercial port-city of China.63 In
1904, the value of Shantou’s trade reached 70 million yen (about 53 million Haikwan tael),
which was twice the-value in Xiamen.64 In 1925, Shantou’s volume of trade reached 83 million
Haikwan tael, the seventh-highest ranking amount of all the port cities in China. Among the port
cities in southern China, Shantou trailed behind only Guangdong and boasted trade values much
higher than Xiamen’s and Fuzhou’s. The great wealth of trade stemmed from the importation of
foreign goods. The characteristics of trade in Shantou were such that the monetary value of the
city’s imports was much greater than (sometimes double) the monetary value of the city’s
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exports. The economic balance of Shantou was sustained by the significant remittances from
Shantou’s overseas workers. Shantou was a chief source of overseas workers from China, and
approximately 100,000 Shantou coolies went abroad yearly. For example, in 1926,
approximately 160,000 Shantou coolies went abroad, and the main destinations were Siam,
Singapore and Vietnam.65
Another characteristic of trade in Shantou was that this city was the import and export hub
for the region’s large hinterland, including the cities of Chaozhou, Chenghai, Chaoyang. And the
larger the hinterland, the larger the markets. Compared with the relatively modest regional
expanses in southern China’s treaty ports of Amoy and Fuzhou, Shantou’s vast expanse of
territory and people gave this treaty port a competitive edge for amassing wealth. The great
volume of imported foreign goods served not only Shantou’s local needs, but also consumers
demand in many other Chinese cities and even in Southeastern Asia. Many foreign goods were
imported through Shantou and then transported to cities inside Guangdong Province. From the
perspective of Japan, Shantou symbolized an entrance for Japanese imports, which could then
saturate Chinese markets while making inroads in Southeast Asia, where many Shanou coolies
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worked and resided. In this sense, Shantou was on the periphery of Japan’s informal empire in
China and, yet, possessed great economic importance to the empire.
Records indicate that by December 1898, a Japanese merchant was residing in Shantou.66
Later, in the early 1910s, other Japanese merchants migrated to Shantou. For example, Sadami
Hikosaka

opened a photo shop in April 1902. Urai

and Kawafuru

first

co-invested in the glass-making shop known as the Urakawa Company in October 1903. Manjirō
Hiruta

opened the grocery store Kazukiyo

Evidence shows that Manjirō Hiruta opened the Taisei
1902.68 Tamesaburō Yanagita

Company in January 1904.67
Company, dealing in tobacco in

opened the grocery and medicine store Tōkashō

Company in 1906.69 Concerning Taiwanese sekimin merchants in Shantou, Guang-qin
Tzeng

was probably one of the earliest. He opened the Ekian

Company, which
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sold grocery items and provided private banking services as early as 1899.70 Later, a steady
stream of sekimin came to Shantou for business and most of them dealt in the grocery business
and private banking. By the end of 1903, Shantou was home to 18 Taiwanese sekimin and 12
Japanese.71 Most of them were merchants and their families.
A rapid increase in both Japanese and Taiwanese residents in Shantou took place after 1904,
when the Japanese Sango Company (

)72 started overseeing the construction of the

Chaoshan Railroad,73 and when the Taiwan General Government started assigning Japanese and
Taiwanese technicians to Shantou. In order to serve the needs of these individuals and their
families, Japanese restaurants, laundries, and accommodations started to open in Shantou, and
thus, a primary Japanese community emerged there. Furthermore, it was in 1904 that Japan used
the construction of the Chaoshan Railroad as a pretext to establish a branch office of the Xiamen
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Japanese consulate in Shantou. Three years later, in 1907, Japan established the independent
Shantou Consulate. The Chaoshan Railroad offered its first transport services in November 1906.
The total length of the railroad was 39 km, comprising 8 stops: Anbu
Caitang

, Quechao

line extended to Yixi

, Fuyang

, Fengxi

, Huamei

, and Chaozhou

,

. In 1908, the

, and the total length of the railroad reached 42 km. The time it would

take to get from the first departure point to the last stop was 80 minutes. Early in the railroad’s
operations, all the stationmasters, trainmasters, and technicians were Japanese and Taiwanese.74
Later, Chinese took over the positions. In sum, we could say that the construction and operation
of the Chaoshan Railroad provided Japan an opportunity to expand its influence in Shantou,
where a Japanese community formed in the late 1900s.
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Fig. 2-2 Shantou Station, 1906.
(Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a6/SwatowStation-1906.jpg)

Fig. 2-3 Opening Day for the Chaoshan Railway, November 1906.
(Sources: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/58/Swatow-Rly-Opening1.jpg)
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With the formation of this community in Shantou, the commercial relationship between
Japan and Shantou grew closer. In the mid-1910s, Japanese trade occupied 70% of Shantou’s
foreign trade, and Japanese goods were the most important foreign goods in Shantou’s market. In
the trading circuit between the Japanese homeland and Shantou, Hong Kong was an important
intermediary. Many Chinese merchants who resided in Kobe and Yokohama exported Japanese
goods to Shantou through Hong Kong. Aware of this trading circuit, Masasuke Kishi

,

the manager of the Taiwan Bank’s branch office in Shantou, suggested that a strictly statistical
analysis of the volume of Japan−Shantou trade or of Taiwan−Shantou trade might lead one to
underestimate the real volume of trade between Japan or its colonies and Shantou chiefly
because most Japanese goods entered Shantou through Hong Kong, thus distorting the origins
and the destinations of the traded goods. Kishi suggested that according to the reports of the
Japanese merchants who had traveled throughout Shantou and observed Shantou’s grocery
markets, 70% to 80% of their grocery-related goods had been from Japan. All of these statistics
suggest that under both Shantou’s anti-Japanese atmosphere and the British competition, the
trade between Japan and Shantou was significant and Shantou was a powerful market consuming
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Japanese products.75 The majority of Japanese goods came to Shantou mainly through Hong
Kong, but some of the Japanese goods went through Taiwan. For example, in 1917, insufficient
tonnage and growing transportation charges promoted an influx of Japanese goods to Shantou
through Taiwan, instead of through Hong Kong or Shanghai. The increase in Japanese goods
through Taiwan prompted sekimin merchants to open stores in Shantou. In 1917, there were
eleven Taiwanese sekimin stores in Shantou, and three more stores were preparing to open.76
What were the main Japanese goods imported to Shantou? Of great importance were
Taiwanese molasses77 and alcohol. Shantou imported alcohol from three places, Taiwan, Java,
and Germany. In Taiwan, the two major exporters of molasses and alcohol to Shantou were
Taiwan Seitō Kaisha (the Taiwan Sugar-Making Company) and Kagi Seishū Kaishua (the Jia-yi
Wine-Making Company). Shantou merchants mixed Taiwanese alcohol with water to make
Shantou wine, and exported it to Southeastern Asia for consumption by overseas Chinese.
Shantou merchants mixed sorghum liquor from Tianjin with Taiwanese alcohol for purchase by
Shantou consumers. The stores selling Taiwanese molasses and alcohol in Shantou were the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
75

Masaaki Kishi
, “Swatō no kinyū jijō to kakyō mondai”
(The financial
affairs of Shantou and issues of overseas Chinese), Taiwan jihō
, (July 8, 1939), pp. 202−211.
76
Taiwan gingō shiten hōkoku
(Report of the Taiwan Bank Branch Office), “Taigan ippan
shōkyō”
(The general commercial situation of China), Taiwan shōkō geppō
, no. 96,
p. 21 (April 25, 1917).
77
Taiwanese molasses is a by-product of the refining of sugarcane. It is a viscous and dark-brown colored fluid.
!

46!

Japanese-run Mitsui Company, the Taiwanese-run Sanrin Company, and four Chinese-run
companies: the Guan Te-fa
Shun-tai

Company , the Zhou Yuan-cheng

Company and the Guang-ri

Taiwanese sekimin Bing-rin Luo

Company, the

Company. The owner of the Sanrin Company,

, understood the complicated customs of Chinese

merchants in trading and thus earned trust both from Chinese and Japanese sides.78
Japanese coal was an important good for Shantou. The yearly demand for coal in Shantou
was around 100 thousand tons, including 70 thousand tons of coal dust and 30 thousand tons of
coal chunks. The major sources of coal came from Kaiping
Wakamatsu

in Kyūshū Japan, Keelung

in Guangdong Province,

in Taiwan, and Hong Gai

in Vietnam.

In the mid-1910s, Shantou imported 20 thousand tons of coal from Wakamatsu. The main stores
selling Wakamatsu coal in Shantou were the Japanese-run Mitsui Company and the English-run
Bradley & Co.

(Tey-kee). In the late 1910s, the extraction of coal in Keelung was a

prosperous endeavour, and Shantou imported Keelung coal in place of Wakamatsu coal. In the
mid-1920s, the coal used for lamps, waterways, railroads, and factories in Shantou were mainly
from Keelung. The main stores selling Keelung coal in Shantou were the Taiwanese-run Sanrin
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, no. 82, pp. 18−21 (February 25,
(The status of
, no. 88, pp. 28−30 (August 25, 1916).

Company, the Japanese-run Mitsui Company, the Suzuki Company, and the English-run Bradley
& Co.79
Seafood in Shantou was comprised, for the most part, of Japanese products. In the mid-1910s,
Japan exported a great volume of seafood (200 million haikwan tael) to Shantou both for local
needs and for export to inner China and Siam. Five-sixth of the total volume of Japanese seafood
arriving in Shantou went through Hong Kong and Shanghai, and one-sixth went through Keelung.
One reason for this imbalance was that remittance through Shanghai and Hong Kong was
advantageous to trade. Second, merchants in Hong Kong and Shanghai traded with Hokkaidō,
which was a direct−and therefore relatively inexpensive−exporter of seafood. In this sense, the
price of seafood in Shantou directly reflected prices in Hong Kong and Shanghai, rather than
prices from Japanese sources. The main seafood items in demand were fish, dried shrimp,
abalones, shark’s fins, shellfish, sea cucumbers, agars, mushrooms, and kelp. The main stores
selling Japanese seafood in Shantou were the Japanese-run Mitsui Company, the Taiwanese-run
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Sanrin Company, and the Taiwanese-run Mangen Company.

80

In the latter half of the 1930s, Shantou was still an important market for Japanese seafood.
Miyagami Kameshichi

, a Japanese official at the Taiwan General Government’s

Bureau of Colonization and Industry regarded Shantou as the best location for developing
southern China’s seafood industry because Shantou had larger hinterlands than did Xiamen and
Fuzhou, hence symbolizing a larger consumer market.81
Japanese cotton cloth and cotton products were important products in China at that time.
Shantou was the largest market for cotton cloth among all the treaty ports in southern China. And
although Shantou imported most of its cotton cloth from India as well as from Japan, Indian
cotton cloth and cotton products (like handkerchiefs, towels, and socks) constituted 20% of the
imported cotton products in Shantou whereas Japanese products constituted 80% of the market.
Japanese cotton cloth started arriving in bulk in Shantou mainly after 1896, the second year of
Japanese colonization in Taiwan, and most of these products went through Hong Kong, with a
much smaller volume of products going through Keelung. That is, the Chinese merchants in
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Shantou did not trade directly with Kobe and Osaka, but indirectly via the chief intermediary of
Hong Kong. Japanese cotton cloth served not only Shantou’s local residents, but also the Hakka
people residing in Jiaying Prefecture (

), where these cotton materials were transformed

into products for export to other Chinese ports and to Southeast Asia. The main stores selling
Japanese cotton cloth in Shantou were the Taiwanese-run Rikyō
Japanese stores: the Mitsui Company, the Kōsaka
/

Company, and the Maeda

Company and four

Company, the Junatendō/ Yamaguchi

Company.82

Concerning the match market in Shantou, the imported matches in Shantou were all Japanese
products that arrived in the city through Hong Kong and Keelung. Compared with the cost of
other goods there, the market price of matches seldom changed, being influenced by the market
price back in the Japanese homeland. The main stores in Shantou selling Japanese matches were
the Japanese-run Mitsui Company, the Taiwanese-run Sanrin Company, and the Taiwanese-run
Mangen Company. Japanese medicine came to Shantou mainly through Hong Kong and
constituted 50−60% of Shantou’s imported medicine. The main stores selling Japanese medicine
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were concentrated on Yu-shan Street (
Yamato

), where one could find the Taiwanese-sekimin

Pharmacy and three Japanese stores: the Kōsaka Company, the Kōkandō

Company, and the Junatendō/ Yamaguchi Company. Another Japanese store dealing in
medicinal products was the Nichiryū

Company located on Yong-ping Road (

).83

In addition to the abovementioned goods, Japanese sugar made up 40% of Shantou’s foreign
sugar market, and most Japanese sugar came to Shantou through Hong Kong and Keelung.
Japanese glass made up 50% of this market in Shantou, and in particular, 80% of the port’s
window glass came from Japan. Both Japanese glass and glass-containing products came to
Shantou through Hong Kong. The English-run Bradley Company and the Japanese-run Kōkandō
Company dealt in Japanese glass in Shantou. Imports of paper in Shantou were mainly from
Japan and Germany. After the First World War, Japanese paper made up the whole of Shantou’s
foreign-paper market, which—like so many of the city’s other markets—depended on the
intermediary locations of Hong Kong and Keelung. Goods like umbrellas and stationery in
Shantou were all Japanese imports. Japanese porcelain made up 60−70% of the market in
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Shantou. Japanese clothes and clothing accessories (e.g., hats, gloves, buttons) made up 50−60%
of Shantou’s clothing market. Enamel products and toys in Shantou tended to be German imports,
but Japanese goods substituted for German goods after the start of the First World War. Japanese
clocks made up 60−70% of this market in Shantou owning to their competitive pricing: the
products effectively underpriced American and British clocks that might otherwise have
dominated the market. Japanese cosmetics made up 50−60% of this market in Shantou. All these
Japanese imports, yet again, made their way to Shantou through Hong Kong and Keelung.

84

The abovementioned records strongly indicate that Shantou was an important market to
Japan and that the Japanese goods entering Shantou came mainly by way of Hong Kong and
Keelung. The records also provid evidence that Japanese products served not only Shantou’s
local needs but also−by way of this city− those of other Chinese cities and of populations
throughout Southeast Asia.
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2.2 Japanese Merchants in Shantou
The first large-scale Japanese company to open its doors in Shantou was the Mitsui
Company. In 1876, the Mitsui Company began doing business in the Japanese homeland and,
twenty years later, in 1896, established branch offices in Taiwan. As a company supported by the
Taiwan General Government, the Mitsui Company had became one of the largest enterprises in
Taiwan, monopolizing the island’s trade in camphor, tea, coal, and opium. Serving as a
component of the Taiwan General Government’s south-expansion policy, the Mitsui Company
established branch offices in treaty ports in southern China, including the Amoy branch office in
1901. In March 1906, the Mitsui Company’s Shantou branch office opened and set out to
achieve its primary objective: to sell Japanese goods to China. Mitsui’s Shantou branch office
dealt with the imports of molasses and alcohol from Taiwan, coal from Keelung, cotton cloth and
matches from Osaka and Kobe, seafood from Hokaidō, and ginseng from Korea. Among these
items, cotton cloth and matches were the most important, reaching an approximate value of 700
thousand silver dollars annually and constituting half of the volume of Mitsui’s trade by late
1910s. It was not uncommon for shoppers in Shantou marketplaces to see items bearing the
Japanese brand-names of Gekkin

!

and Jūrō
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. In addition to Japanese goods, Mitsui’s

Shantou branch office imported some non-Japanese goods to Shantou, selling them to the local
Chinese retail market or transporting them to other cities. For example, Mitsui’s Shantou branch
office imported cotton cloth from Shanghai and India, flour from Shanghai, tin from Singapore
and Hong Kong, soybean from Dalian, rice from Saigon, and sugar from Java. Moreover,
beginning in 1918, the Taiwan General Government requested that Mitsui’s Shantou branch
office spend 200 thousand fu yearly to buy leaf tobacco in Jiangxi Province and then transport it
to Taiwan.85
It is worth noting that although Shantou’s volume of exports and imports was substantial,
and Mitsui’s Shantou branch carried out transactions involving many goods, the company still
faced difficulties in the region. First, the currency risk in Shantou was high because the values of
popular currencies there were in a near-constant flux. In order to lower the risks associated with
this problem, in 1912, Mitsui contracted with Taiwan Bank to ensure that the former’s business
would take place at a fixed currency value. Nevertheless, several secondary, though important,
factors led to the idea that the branch office in Shantou was, on balance, counterproductive: the
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alleged duplicity of Shantou’s Chinese merchants, the severity of Shantou’s anti-Japan
atmosphere, and noted corruption linked to the branch officers themselves. These factors
prompted, in 1926, the directors of Mitsui’s branch offices to consider whether they should
dissolve the Shantou branch office or at least send an officer to the Shantou branch, where he
could supervise its operations while, himself, submitting to supervision from Mitsui’s Amoy
branch office.86
In addition to the Mitsui Company, Taiwan Bank was an important Japanese company with
an official presence in Shantou. The Japanese government established Taiwan Bank in 1899, and
it served as Taiwan’s most influential financial institution during the Japanese colonial period.
Responding to Japan’s intended objective of expanding commercial relations with China and
Southeast Asia, Taiwan Bank in 1900 started to establish branch offices in such southern
Chinese cities as Amoy (1900), Hong Kong (1903), Fuzhou (1905), Shantou (1907), and
Guangdong (1910). The establishment of the Shantou branch office took place in 1900, when the
Amoy branch office opened; in fact, the first president of Taiwan Bank, Jūichi Soeda
and the bank’s director Hiromi Kawasaki

visited Amoy and paid visits to Fuzhou and
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Shantou. After inspecting the new sites, Soeda and Kawasaki perceived the necessity of
establishing a branch office in Fuzhou and another one in Shantou. The functions of Taiwan
Bank’s Shantou branch office were (1) to provide loans to both Japanese and Taiwanese
merchants, (2) to promote Sino-Japanese economic cooperation, and (3) to assist Shantou’s
development of public construction. For example, Taiwan bank provided a loan to the Mitsui
Company and several loans to Shantou’s Chinese merchants for the construction of Shantou’s
electrical infrastructure and sewer system. Moreover, Taiwan Bank’s Shantou branch office
issued currencies. For example, the bank issued silver certificates (
Shantou certificates (

) in 1909, and issued

) in 1913.87

Taiwan Bank was significant for Shantou City, as well. Taiwan Bank’s Shantou branch
office was the city’s only branch office of a foreign bank to deal with “general affairs” in
addition to overseas remittances. Some foreign banks had “agencies” rather than “branch offices”
in Shantou, and these agencies dealt specifically with overseas remittance. For example, the
Chinese Yuanxing

Company was an agency belonging to Dutch Bank and Guang Yi-yu

Private Bank was an agency belonging to Singapore’s Sze Hai Tong Banking &
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Insurance Co.88 One example will suffice to illustrate the importance of Taiwan Bank’s Shantou
branch office. When the Chinese Revolution occurred in 1911, the Revolutionary Army attacked
two Chinese banks Daqing Bank (

) and Jiaotong Bank (

), which dealt with

Shantou Customs’ tariff duties and, in the process, plundered 9,700 haikwan tael. Later, the
Revolutionary Army proclaimed that the tariff duties of Shantou would help cover the expenses
of maintaining Shantou’s security. The director of Shantou Customs discussed the matter with
representatives from seven foreign countries that had acquired certain guarantees regarding tariff
duties, and specially, the discussions took place with Japanese, British, and American consuls
among others. In the end, the Shantou Customs director decided to entrust the tariff duties to
Taiwan Bank’s Shantou branch office. In order to preserve the guarantees regarding tariff duties,
Taiwan Bank’s Shantou branch office established a new treasury and remitted tariff duties by
telegraph to Shanghai every month until 1916, when Taiwan Bank ceded these business
responsibilities to China Bank (

). The example illustrates foreign countries’ trust in

Taiwan Bank and Taiwan Bank’s important role in Shantou.89
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From 1907 to August 1937, when Taiwan Bank was forced to close owing to the outbreak
of the Second Sino-Japanese War in July 1937, the bank remained in operation in Shantou for
thirty years. The reopening of Taiwan Bank took place during the Japanese occupation of
Shantou in June 1939. Most directors of Taiwan Bank’s Shantou branch office had been born
and educated in the Japanese homeland, and had then worked at Taiwan Bank for several years
before being assigned to branch offices in China. For example, Mimaki Toshio

, the

director of the Shantou branch office between 1915 and 1916, was born in Yamaguchi Prefecture,
Japan. In 1904, he graduated from Kyoto Imperial University and went to work at Taiwan Bank
in Taiwan. Before his assignment to Shantou, he served as the director of the Taizhong branch
office in central Taiwan in 1914.90
Other directors of Taiwan Bank’s Shantou branch office went through an experience similar
to Mimaki’s. The directors of Taiwan Bank’s Shantou branch office usually were leaders of the
Japanese Association in Shantou. For example, Chikara Uchimi

served as director of

Taiwan Bank’s Shantou branch office and as the president of the Japanese Association in
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Shantou in the early 1920s.91 Mineji Takefuji

was the director of Taiwan Bank’s

Shantou branch office and simultaneously headed the Japanese Association in Shantou in the
1920s.92

Fig. 2-4 Taiwan Bank’s Shantou Branch Office.
[Illustration] Since the early twentieth century, the pictured building has served as the Taiwan Bank’s
Shantou branch office. Many Japanese and Taiwanese sekimin conducted business in the area
neighboring the branch office. The building has been preserved and currently is the site of the Shantou
Open Port Cultural Exhibition. (Source: Shantou Open Port Cultural Exhibition.)
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Shantou was home to many Japanese civil merchants, as well as to companies with a degree
of official status. For example, Yu-shan street in Shantou City was home to the Japanese
companies Kōsaka

, Juntendō

, and Kōkandō

established in March 1916 by Michisuke Kōsaka

. The Kōsaka Company was
, a native of Yamaguchi Prefecture.

The company supplied Shantou’s residents with medicine and products like toys, socks, and coal;
moreover, the company was the Japanese Navy’s designated supplier of articles for daily use.
While managing this company, Michisuke Kōsaka managed the Kōsaka Hotel, which was
located in Yu-shan Street. In 1921, Michisuke Kōsaka served as a member of appraisal meetings
for the Japanese Association in Shantou. During the Shanghai Incident in 1932, when many
Japanese stores were forced to close because of the severely anti-Japanese atmosphere in
Shantou, Kōsaka nevertheless continued to do business in China.
In August 1906, an Osaka merchant Kikumatsu Yamaguchi

established

Juntendō in Shantou, which would become one of the most prosperous pharmacies and general
stores in Shantou. In July 1918, Yamaguchi invested in the Shantou Hotel which was located on
Hai-an Street. In 1920, Yamaguchi extended his business to Korea and opened a branch office of
Juntendō in Keijō (today’s Seoul). After the Shanghai Incident in 1932, Yamaguchi terminated

!
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his business in Shantou. In 1911, Kōkandō, whose head office was in Amoy, opened a branch
store in Shantou. The company dealt in general and pharmaceutical products. The director of the
Shantou branch office was initially Kisaku Takakuwa
Takabayashi

and later Gisaburō

. The company sold glass, toys, socks, fountain pens, and insurance

plans to Shantou residents.

93

Several Japanese merchants opened stores on Zhenbang Street (
(

), and Yongping Road (

opened the Nikka

), Wanan Street

). In 1915, Osaka merchant Taizō Yamamoto

Company, dealing in general and medicinal products. In 1918, the

Suzuki Company, run by Kuninosuke Hiruta

, opened up for business in Shantou,
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importing Japanese cotton cloth, Javanese sugar, Shanghai flour (wheat from Wuxi, or

),

and Singaporean tin to Shantou. In 1924, the Suzuki Company made a contract with Taiwan
Renwa Kaisha

(the Taiwan Brick Company) to import 30 thousand tons of brick

to Shantou. In 1918, Seigorō Kuramoto
as the Nichi Ryu

opened a general store pharmacy—known

Company—in Shantou. In 1920, Teikichi Maeda

opened the

Maeda Company in the same city, spending an initial capital outlay of 80 thousand yuan to do so.
The company was co-run by three Maeda brothers and was the strongest general store-pharmacy
in Shantou. The items for sale there included socks, umbrellas, cotton products, pottery, electric
appliances, and aluminum products. The Maeda Company established branch offices in other
Chinese cities: Shanghai, Hankou, Nanjing, and Wuhu. In Osaka, Maeda established a soap
factory.94

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
94

Taiwan ginkō chosa ka
, Nanshi nanyō ni okeru hōjin no jōkyō
(The Japanese situation in southern China and the South Seas). Taihoku: Taiwan ginkō chosa ka, 1919, pp. 235,
239; Taiwan sōtokufu kanbō chsaka
, Swatō teikoku ryōji kannai jijō
(The circumstances inside the Shantou imperial consulate). Taihoku: Taiwan sōtokufu kanbō chsaka, 1922, pp.
27, 110, 196, 219; Kamesaburō Anjū
, Swotō shōfu
(Shantou Treaty Port). Taihoku: Nanyō
kyōkai Taiwan shibu
, 1922, pp. 104−105; Taiwan nichi nichi shinpō
, no. 8764,
daily news (October 7, 1924); Gorō Uchida
, Shin Swatō
(New Shantou). Taihoku: Nanyō
kyōkai Taiwan shibu
, 1927, pp. 11−12; Xue-ying Xie
, Shantou zhinan
(A
guidebook to Shantou). Shantou: Shantou shishi tongzun she, 1933, p. 367; Nanyō kyōkai Taiwan shibu
, Nan shina no shōgyō
(Commerce in southern China). Taihoku: Nanyō kyōkai Taiwan
shibu, 1938, p. 66; Hideo Kobayashi
, Nihonjin no kaigai katsudō ni kansuru rekishi teki chōsa
(Historical surveys of the overseas activities of Japanese). Tokyo: Yumani shobō
, 2000, p. 452.
!

62!

The abovementioned Shantou-based Japanese companies and merchants replied significantly
on shipping companies to transport goods. The most important Japanese shipping company in
Shantou was the Osaka Shosen Kaisha

(the Osaka Shipping Company). Before

the Osaka Shipping Company assigned special correspondents to Shantou in January 1920,
Bradley &Co. served as the Osaka Shipping Company’s contact there, assisting the arrangements
of passengers and commodities. In March 1926, the burgeoning prosperity stemming from
Sino-Japanese trade and the rapid increase in travelers back and forth led the Osaka Shipping
Company to establish a branch office on Shantou’s Haikwan Road.95
The Osaka Shipping Company opened a route to Shantou in response to the Taiwan General
Government’s policy of meirei kōro

(command of the sea routes). The

command-of-the-sea-routes policy rested on the Taiwan General Government’s subsidization of
the Osaka Shipping Company in exchange for the right to designate sea routes, the number of
vessels on the high seas, their tonnage, and even the velocity. In order to expand Japanese
influences in southern China, the Taiwan General Government requested that the Osaka
Shipping Company open a route connecting colonial Taiwan to treaty ports in southern China.
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On April 2, 1899, the Osaka Shipping Company opened the Tansui−Hong Kong line (involving
the two ships the Sumida Maru and the Maitsuru Maru), which featured weekly stops in Amoy
and Shantou. In 1900, the company established the Anping−Hong Kong line and the Hong
Kong−Fuzhou line, both featuring a layover in Shantou. In 1907, the Anping−Hong Kong line
changed to the Takao−Hong Kong line, and in 1911, again changed to the Takao-Guangzhou line
(Takao being today’s Kaohsiung). In April 1915, the Tanshui−Hong Kong line changed to the
Keelung−Hong Kong line (involving the two ships the Kaijō Maru and the Taijin Maru). The
Osaka Shipping Company faced severe competition in managing the sailing lines between
Taiwan and southern China, with the stiffest competition coming from the British Douglas
Company, which had managed similar routes many years earlier than the Osaka Shipping
Company. In order to overcome the competition, the Osaka Shipping Company adopted several
strategies, such as decreasing its transportation fees and shipping at frequent, regular intervals.
These strategies were successful, and in 1904, the British Douglas Company withdrew from the
shipping lanes between Taiwan and southern China.96
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In addition to the Taiwan General Government’s command of various sea routes, some
Japanese goods came to Shantou by way of the Kobe−Hong Kong line and the Osaka−Hong
Kong line. Some Japanese goods made their way to Shantou aboard vessels operated by other
Japanese shipping companies, like Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha
Mail Boat Company) and Yamashita Kisen Kaisha

(the Japan
(the Yamashita Steamship

Company). For example, Yamashita Kisen Kaisha managed the Keelung−Haiphong line (using
the ship the Daika Maru), which completed its circuit once every two weeks with stops in Amoy,
Shantou, Hong Kong, and several ports in Vietnam.97 But in general, the Osaka Shipping
Company was the most important Japanese shipping company that transported Japanese and
Taiwanese goods to Shantou.
The Osaka Shipping Company, like the Taiwan Bank, was a so-called kokusaku kaisha
(National-Policy Company). In other words, the companies were supported by and,
indeed, demanded by the Taiwan General Government. In Shantou’s Japanese communities,
directors of the Osaka Shipping Company’s Shantou branch office often served as directors of
the Japanese Association in Shantou. For example, both Shunzō Kodama

and Kiichi
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Mori

were directors of the Osaka Shipping Company’s Shantou branch office and

directors of the Japanese Resident Association in Shantou in the 1920s.98
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Fig. 2-5 The Map of Shantou City Painted by Japanese in the 1920s.
!
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[Illustration] On the right side of the figure, the bold black line along the coastline is Wai Road (
).
Most foreign institutions were along this road: for example, the American, French, Germany, and
Japanese consulates, as well as the Japanese-funded hospital (Hakuai Hospital), Japanese-funded schools
(Tōē School, the Japanese Elementary School), and a Japanese-run hotel (the Shantou Hotel). On the left
side of the figure, a fan-shaped area with many bold black lines represents the main commercial area,
including the Shantou Customs, Sheng-ping Road (
), Yong-ping Raod (
), Yu-shan Street
(
), and Zhen-bang Street (
). Most Japanese and Taiwanese companies were established in
this area. Today, these street names remain in place in Shantou. (Source: Gorō Uchida, Shin Swatō.
Taihoku: Nanyō kyōkai Taiwan shibu, 1927.)

2.3 Taiwanese Sekimin Merchants in Shantou
The previous paragraphs introduced the management practices typical of Japanese
companies and merchants in Shantou. In this section, I want to explore the question of when the
Taiwanese sekimin merchants entered Shantou and how they maintained and expanded their
businesses.
A useful primary source regarding Taiwanese sekimin merchants in Shantou is Tsūshō Isan
, a published volume containing collected economic reports issued by overseas
Japanese consulates to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Japan. One report notes that, in
September 1899, a Taiwanese sekimin named Guang-qin Tzeng
Company (

!

opened the Ekian

) in Shantou. The company sold grocery items and provided private banking
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services. Tzeng was probably the first Taiwanese sekimin to settle in this area.99 By 1904, when
Japan established a primary imperial consulate in Shantou, the Chaoshan area was home to only
14 Taiwanese sekimin, including 4 members of the Chaoshan Railroad staff and 10
businessmen.100 In 1905, the area was home to 57 Taiwanese sekimin, including 33 businessmen
and their family members.101 In 1907, the year in which a formal Japanese Imperial Consulate
was established in Shantou, the population of Taiwanese sekimin was 113, including 94 shop
owners and clerks living in the area and dealing in such markets as clothing, private banking,
groceries, rice, sugar, and straw bags.102 In 1916, the population of Taiwanese sekimin was
151.103 In 1917, the population of Taiwanese sekimin jumped to 217, including 148 males and
69 females.104 By the end of 1918, the population of sekimin was 269.105 In the latter half of the
1920s, Japanese “nationals” constituted the largest foreigner group in Shantou. For example, in
1927, Shantou was home to about one thousand foreigners, among whom were 568 Japanese
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“nationals,” including 377 Taiwanese, 173 Japanese inlanders, and 18 Koreans. The Japanese
“nationals” constituted almost 60% of the foreign population in this area and Taiwanese sekimin
constituted the largest group.106
The Japanese inlanders in Shantou were hōkyū seikatsu sha

(salaried

workers), working in Japanese governmental institutions, like the branch office of the Taiwan
Bank, the Japan-funded Hakuai Hospital, the Tōē School, and the Japanese elementary school in
Shantou; in contrast, most Taiwanese sekimin in this area were merchants and shop clerks.107
Why did the majority of Taiwanese sekimin conduct business in Shantou? The reason is likely
complex: First, sekimin, as Japanese nationals, enjoyed most-favored-nation privileges, which
included exemption from paying taxes to the Qing government. Second, Shantou featured many
markets of both Japanese and Taiwanese goods (e.g., Japanese coal, Keelung coal, Japanese
matches, Japanese silk, Japanese seafood, Taiwanese sugar, and Taiwanese alcohol). Third, the
local language of Shantou was Chaozhouness, which was very similar to the Minnan language,
the most popular language in Taiwan. The reason for this similarity can be traced back to
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, p. 164 (March 3,

historical migration patterns: the ancestors of a majority of Taiwanese had migrated from south
Fujian Province (Minnan) to Taiwan in the seventeenth century. Therefore, Taiwanese sekimin
enjoyed the convenience of a familiar language and familiar social networks when conducting
business in Shantou.
By 1922, according to a report issued by Shantou’s Japanese consul Shōroku Uchida
, the five most powerful sekimin merchants in Shantou were Bing-zhang Luo
who owned the Sanrin Company , Chuan-zhi Lin
Company, Guang-shu Chen

,

, who owned the Rikyō Textiles

, who owned the Kōgen Company, Zhen-xian Wang

, who owned the Kanki Company , and Zhen-guo Lin

, who owned the Fuji

Company.108
Bing-zhang Luo’s family was registered in Taipei, but he had in fact been born in Zhejiang
Province in 1878, when Taiwan was under Qing governance. When Japan governed Taiwan, Luo
served as an interpreter for the Japanese Navy and helped Japan conduct surveys along the
Taiwan coast. In February 1898, Luo started to work in Taipei City’s post office. A
contemporary news report in Taiwan nichi nichi shinpō entitled “dojin ni mezurashiki koin”
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(a rare native employee) suggested that Luo was a rare “native” (Taiwanese)
employee of the post office and was good at translating Japanese. The report further suggested
that Luo was cautious, and had acquainted himself with finer aspects of money remittance and
financial deposits. He was a model employee who, unaffected by the less-than-ideal
circumstances of his residential neighborhood (on Mengjia’s Xiashin Street), concentrated on his
work.109
In 1904, after six years working in the post office, Luo went to Shantou as a staff member
for the Chaoshan Railroad Company. Apparently, he was not a technician and probably served as
an interpreter. Later, Luo started to conduct business, importing liquor, seafood, matches, and
groceries into Shantou. In November 1916, Luo established the Sanlin Company on Wai-ma
Road, where the most prosperous establishments had set up shop. The name ‘Sanlin’ literally
meaning “three lins,” probably was an homage to his three sons, whose names were Bing-lin
, Zhen-lin

, and Zhao-lin

. The Sanlin Company imported Keelung coal,

Taiwanese liquors and molasses , seafood, matches, and flour to Shantou.110
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About the importation of alcohol, the sixth article of Guang dong quan sheng jiu shui zhang
cheng

(the alcohol tax for the whole of Guangdong Province) prohibited

the scale of blended liquors (i.e., of alcohol blended with water) throughout Guangdong Province.
Transgressors would be fined between ten and one hundred yuan. This article triggered many
disputes between Japanese merchants, Taiwanese merchants, and Chinese officials because of
the prohibition’s ambiguous terminology. However, “Taiwanese sekimin Bing-zhang Luo
understood local affairs in various regions of China, and thus he could mitigate various obstacles
presented by complicated Chinese business customs, and the result was the ongoing importation
of Taiwanese alcohol into Shantou.”111
In addition to the importation of Japanese and Taiwanese goods, Bing-zhang Luo was an
agent for Teikoku Seimei Hoken Kaisha

(Imperial Life Insurance

Company), which is today’s Asahi Seimei Hoken Sōgō Kaisha

(Asahi

Life Insurance Company).112 The company was established in Tokyo in 1888, and with Japan’s
expansion in East Asia, the Imperial Life Insurance Company expanded its business to Japan’
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colonial and semi-colonial holding, including Taiwan (colony) and the Chinese treaty ports
(semi-colonies). For example, when Imperial Life Insurance expanded their business in colonial
Taiwan in 1918, the main subjects of insurance were Japanese officials and their family members.
Concerning the insurance business in Shantou, Japan assigned technicians and staff to the
Chinese city beginning in 1904 to facilitate the construction of the Chaoshan Railroad. Later,
with the formation of a primary Japanese community in Shantou, more and more Japanese
officials and merchants relocated there, despite facing many risks including dangerous work and
local diseases, such as cholera. In addition to Japanese residents, some Taiwanese residents in
Shantou expressed demand for insurance, as well. In this sense, the demand for insurance was
significant, and Bing-zhang Luo—as an agent for Imperial Life Insurance—responded to this
demand.
In general, several factors explain Bing-zhang Luo’s business success. First, he spoke both
Japanese and Mandarin, and this bilingual ability facilitated his business. Second, he was trusted
by both the Japanese and Chinese communities for his credit worthiness. Third, he was well
versed in the Chinese customs surrounding trade. Because of Luo’s success in business,
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moreover, he had been the vice-director of the Japanese Association in Shantou.113 In the
Personal Matters section of the November 7, 1924 issue of the Taiwan nichi nichi shinpō, a
report stated that Bing-zhang Luo had arrived in Taipei from Shantou on November 5, 1924.114
Taiwan nichi nichi shinpō was the official newspaper of the Taiwan General Government and
was the most important newspaper in colonial Taiwan. The report of Baing-zhang Luo’s voyage
to Taipei indicates that he was an important figure whose activities were newsworthy.
Chuan-zhi Lin was the second most powerful Taiwanese sekimin merchant according to
Japanese consul Uchida’s report. The household register for Chuan-zhi Lin listed a residence in
Taipei, but he had been born in Shantou. After Japan’s governance of Taiwan commenced in
1895, Lin registered as a Japanese citizen, but not before starting up a business that would
eventually import towels, socks, and cotton products into Shantou. In September 1913, Lin
co-invested with a Chaoyang merchant Feng-wu Fan
Company (

in establishing the Likyō Textiles

), which was located on Sheng-ping Street (

) in Shantou. The

company specializing in making socks and rested on capital value at 50 thousand yuan, with
most of the investments coming from Chuan-zhi Lin. In 1914, with its factory complex finally
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constructed, Likyō Textiles Company started to operatations.
The Likyō Textiles Company imported Japanese materials and, processing them with 29
American-made machines, put out 160 dozen products daily. The socks exported to Singapore
served the needs of Chinese workers there. The Likyō Textiles Company was the largest
manufacturer in Shantou in 1914. At that time, there were two soy-bean factories, two canning
factories, one roof-tile factory, and two ramune (soft drink) factories in Shantou. All these
factories were much smaller than the factory used by the Likyō Textiles Company.115
In 1918, Likyō Textiles Company expanded its facilities, no longer limiting itself to the
production of socks. The company manufactured cotton cloth, towels, handkerchiefs and other
cotton-made products. In the rush seasons, the company would hire as many as 180 employees,
and even in the slack seasons, the company hired approximately 130 employees. It was regarded
as the most prosperous Japanese (and Taiwanese) business in Shantou.116
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Chuan-zhi Lin spoke both Japanese and Nankinese and was regarded as a trustworthy man
in both the Japanese and Chinese communities in Shantou. He was appointed to a position on an
appraisal board of the Japanese Association in Shantou, and was active in the Japanese
communities in Shantou.117
Guang-shu Chen was the third most powerful sekimin merchant in Shantou. The household
registration of Guang-shu Chen listed him as residing in Taipei (the Da dao cheng area). He was
born in Chaozhou in 1856. In 1876, when he was twenty years old, he went to Shantou, Amoy,
and other places in southern China with his father while conducting business in the tea trade.
When Japan began governing Taiwan in 1895, Chen registered as a Japanese citizen and kept
conducting the tea business in Chaozhou, Shantou, and Taiwan. The Chen family grew very rich,
as it ranked in profits from tea shops in Taipei, Siam, Shantou, and many other places. In Taipei,
Guang-shu opened a baozhong tea shop (

) named Mei sheng shu ji

,

conducting business with Siam.118
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During the Qing period, the machines used for weighing of baozhong tea were hand-crafted
according to subjective standards, not universal ones. In 1907, the Taiwan General Government
undertook the task of designing and producing universal weighing machines in conjunction with
universal standard for packaging tea. However, some tea stores in Taipei (mainly in Da do cheng)
disobeyed the Taiwan General Government’s policy. Guang-shu Chen was one the most
powerful tea-shop owners who resisted the Taiwan General Government’s calls for the
unification of standards. The Taiwan nichi nichi shinpō published a news report that, criticizing
Guang-shu Chen, galvanized other tea merchants’ decision to violate governmental orders and
measure tea with non-standard counterweights and scales.119 Being very active in the circle of
tea business in Taipei, Guang-shu Chen in 1908 and 1910 was elected to the position of
executive secretary of the Taipei Tea Merchants Guild, and in 1915, he became a member of an
appraisal board for the Guild.120
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In 1918, Chen opened the Kōgen Tea Store on Sheng-ping Street in Shantou. The venture
became the most important Japanese (and Taiwanese) tea company in the city. In March of every
year, which was a peak period in the purchase of tea, Guang-shu Chen assigned between thirty
and forty Shantou-based employees to Taiwan, where they would appraise and purchase tea.
Chen’s fluency in Japanese and mandarin earned him the trust of both the Japanese and Chinese
communities in Shantou.121
Zhen-xian Wang made the list of important Taiwanese merchants in Shantou at the time. He
was born in Tainan and received a bachelor’s degree from the Japanese university. In 1919, he
opened Kanki Company (

) on Yong-he Street in Shantou, dealing in the excavation and

sale of mineral substance. His wife graduated from the feminine school in Kobe, and was known
for her graceful and diplomatic social skills. Zhen-xian Wang received an appointment to the
appraisal board of the Japanese Association in Shantou.122
Zhen-guo Lin was the last important Taiwanese merchant mentioned in Japanese Consul
Unida’s report. The household register of Zhen-guo Lin listed him as residing in Taipei. It is not
clear where he was born. In January 1920, Lin opened the Fuji Company on Sheng-ping Street in
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2 (A survey report on

Shantou, where the business imported and sold seafood and groceries. He understood the
Japanese language and served as a member of an appraisal board at the Japanese Association in
Shantou.123
Sekimin merchants outside those mentioned in Japanese Consul Uchida’s report, excelled at
conducting business in Shantou since the 1910s. The Chen Family stood out in this regard,
owing largely to their oversight of the Mangen Company (
of Tainan merchant Guan-ying Chen

), which was the brainchild

, (1880−1926) in Shantou. Guan-ying Chen was a

comprador of sugar and rice who established the Chen Wanyuan

Company in 1906 in

Tainan, dealing in those same two products. Later, he established the Douliu Sugar Company
(

) and was a supervisor of the Tainan Sugar Company (

participated in the Tainan Prefecture Conference (

). Chen also

) from 1921 to 1925.124 In

December 1916, the Mangen Company opened on Sheng-ping Street in Shantou, and sold
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imported alcohol, molasses, seafood, pineapples, matches, and flour from Japan and Taiwan.125
The Mangen Company’s capital was valued at 50 thousand yuan during the primary stage of
operations, and in 1919, three years after the opening of the company, the value of the capital
had reached 70 thousand yuan. In the same year, the Mangen Company made a contract with the
Osaka Suzuki Ekiji Company (

), exporting tungsten to Japan. It was said that the

annual volume of tungsten trade was valued at 500 thousand yuan. Early in the company’s
history, Zun-ding Chen
Chen

was responsible for operations. In the early 1920s, Fan-shu

became the director of the Mangen Company, and later, Guan-ying Chen’s

nephew Qi-hui Chen

became the director.126

Qi-hui Chen was very active in Shantou’s Taiwanese communities. He served as the
secretary in charge of the Taiwanese Association in Shantou in the late 1910s. In the early 1930s,
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when the Tainan gentry and entrepreneur Shin Huang established the Dadong Ice-making
Company (

)127 in Shantou, Qi-hui Chen ranked as one of the most important

shareholders in the venture. Later, owing to the dispute between the Japanese consul in Shantou
Kumakichi Befu and the Dadong Ice-making Company, Befu issued orders of deportation to
Qi-hui Chen and other important Taiwanese shareholders in the company (see Chapter three for a
more detailed discussion of the dispute). Nevertheless, the dispute was settled and Qi-hui Chen
was able to remain in Shantou with his family until the end of the Second World War. Qi-hui
Chen, his wife Shu-qing Lin, and their daughter Hui-juan Chen returned to Taiwan in 1946 as
“non-guilty Taiwanese residents in Shantou.”128
Xin-dong Xiao’s

was an important Taiwanese investor in Shantou. Born in 1887,

he hailed from a rich family of Hakka ethnicity in southern Taiwan’s Pingdong area (Jiadong). In
1906, he graduated from the Taiwan General Government’s Japanese Language School (
).129 Later, he attended the Tokyo Engineering School (today’s Japan Engineering School)
specializing in machinery. After studying in Japan, Xiao returned to Taiwan and became active
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in business circles. Xin-dong invested in several companies, including in light-rail and
ice-making companies. In 1912, Xin-dong—along with another local gentry A-bing Dai
130

—proposed a plan to the Taiwan General Government for constructing the light-rail Neipu

Ahou Line in the Pingdong area for transporting rice from Neipu and Chaozhou (in Taiwan), two
rice-production cites, and after being accepted, designated, constructed, the new contributed
significantly to local prosperity.131
In addition to the light rails, Xin-dong invested in at least four ice-making companies,
including the Kagi Ice-making Company (

), for which he served as a manager

director in 1913; the Shinkō Ice-making Company (

), for which he served as

supervisor in 1915 and 1916; and the Takao (today’s Kaohsiung) Ice-selling Company (
), for which he served as director in1921.132 When I visited Xiao’s house in Pingdong, I
found a financial statement for the Nittō Ice-making Company (

) dating from
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1919, and Xin-dong was listed as a shareholder in possession of 97 shares.133
Xin-dong’s investment ambitions expanded to Shantou. In 1915, he invested in the
construction of Shanzhang Light Rail (
(

), and Zhanglin (

), which connected Shantou, Denghai

) to one another covering a total length of 18.5 kilometers. In January

1923, the line between Shantou and Denghai started to operate. It featured trolley-style cars, a
style popular in southern Taiwan during the Japanese colonial period. The Shanzhang Light Rail,
as well as the Chaoshan Railroad, played an important role in promoting the commerce and
transportation in the Chaoshan area.134
In 1916, Xin-dong invested 800 thousand yuan in establishing the Shantou-based Eiwa
Company (

), which dealt in exports of tungsten. Since the outbreak of the First World

War, tungsten had become an important strategic material. In 1918, Xin-dong bought a
tungsten-rich strip of land in Longfeng

, located in Guangdong Province. Xin-dong

exported tungsten to Japan and to the United States. In May 1918, Xin-dong transported tungsten
from Shantou to Keelung and Hong Kong by means of the Osaka Shipping Company. For
example, 37 packages of tungsten were shipped to Keelung on May 1, 23 packages of tungsten
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were shipped to Keelung on May 6, 2 packages of tungsten were shipped to Hong Kong on May
15, and 90 packages of tungsten were shipped to Keelung on May 20. These preliminary
numbers suggest that Xin-dong transported most of the tungsten to Keelung and only a small part
to Hong Kong. He entered into a contract with the Kobe Kyūgen Company (

) to

export a volume of tungsten equivalent to 100 thousand yuan monthly. In this sense, the tungsten
was probably transported from Shantou to the United Sates through Keelung and Japan.135
However, the business did not make Xin-dong rich because when the tungsten finally arrived in
the United States, the First World War had already ended (on November 11, 1918).136
I had the opportunity to go through Xin-dong’s private letters in his house in Pingdong, and I
took note of a letter that, sent from Kitōta Amano

, identified engine production as a

possible lucrative field for Xin-dong’s investments. According to the letter, Amano went to
Shantou in March 1924; and on October 3, 1924, he returned to Kaohsiung, and promptly visited
the Ogiwara Shipyard (

) established in March 1901 in Kaohsiung. The letter goes on

to state that Amano heard from the Japanese workers in the shipyard that China had recently
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ordered two new ships (40 and 25 horsepower respectively), and that Amano later heard about
Xin-dong’s involvement in the engineering of ships from various Taiwanese sources at the
Ogiwara Shipyard; thus, Amano wanted to meet Xing-dong as soon as possible. This letter
indicates that Xin-dong might have invested in the Ogiwara Shipyard’s manufacture of modern
ocean-going vessels outfitted with powerful engines.
Xin-dong resided on Shantou’s Yu-shan Street for many years until the end of Second World
War.137 He had no offspring and adopted his brother’s son Dao-ying Xiao
and his son Kai-ping Xiao
Wei-zhen Rao

. Dao-ying

were both famous forensic medical experts in Taiwan.
was an important Taiwanese sekimin merchant in Shantou beginning

in the 1920s. Wei-zhen Rao was originally from the Xinzhu (Toufen) area in northern Taiwan. In
the mid-1920s, Wei-zhen Rao opened the Shinshū Company (

) on Shantou’s

Zhen-bang Street. The company’s capital had a value exceeding 10 thousand yuan, derived
chiefly from such products as medicine, liquor, tobacco, and canned food. After the outbreak of
the Shanghai Incident on January 28, 1932, many Japanese stores were forced to close because
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of the severe Sino-Japanese tensions, but the Shinshū Company continued to operate as usual.138
Wei-zhen Rao also operated the Shinshū Hotel, a Chinese-style hotel in Shantou located on
the third floor of the Guangdong Bank on Yong-ping Road, a prosperous area of Shantou. The
hotel, whose facilities were top of the line, was one of the best Chinese-style hotels in Shantou.
Wei-zhen Rao operated another hotel, the Kaan Hotel (

), which was, in fact, not far

from the Shinshū Hotel. However, the Kaan Hotel was less ritzy than the Shinshū Hotel.139
Rao’s family members resided on Shantou’s Yu-shan Street, and the children received their
education in Shantou. For example, Wei-run Rao
Elementary School (

, born in 1913, attended the Zheng-shi

) and then the First Junior School in Shantou. Wei-shin Rao

, born in 1915, was a student at Ling-dong Commercial School.140 The Rao family stayed
in Shantou until the end of the Second World War. Wei-yun Rao
, and their daughter Mei-hui Rao

, his wife Duan Lin

returned to Taiwan as “non-guilty Taiwanese
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residents of Shantou.” Wei-zhen Rao’s name appeared on Shantou shi tai qiao shen qing liu shan
ju zhu xing ming ce

(the roster of Taiwanese residents who

applied to stay in Shantou City).141
Hailing from Taiwan, the members of the Yu family who owned the Yūtai Company (
) in Shantou also had a Hakka ethnic background. The Yu family’s main residence in
Taiwan was in the Taoyuan (Zhong-li) area in northern part of the island. In 1916, A-cen Yu
graduated from the Industrial Training Institution in Taiwan, which was affiliated with
Taiwan General Government.142 And thereafter, he became active in his hometown’s business
circels. In February 1918, the Taiwan Minerals Company (

) held its founding

meeting at Zhong-li Christian Church, and in attendance were many Japanese officials, such as
the director of the Industrial Training Institution and the director of Taoyuan’s General Affairs
Section. A-cen Yu was appointed a member of the standing committee of the Taiwan Minerals
Company. Meanwhile, the Japanese government grant A-cen permission to excavate coal in
Taoyuan’s xincheng

area.143 In 1925, A-cen took the lead role in founding the Zhong-li
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Joint Electricity Company.144 In 1927, the Yu family opened the Yūtai Company in Shantou,
and Yuan-mei Yu

, a woman, was the registered owner. The Yūtai Company facilitated

the import of machines, chemical materials, medicines, and groceries from Japan and Taiwan to
Shantou. The capital of the company was valued at over 10 thousand yuan in the 1930s. Later, in
the 1930s, A-cen ascended to the top position in the company.145
Born in 1907, A-cen Yu’s wife, Mei-xiang Lin
graduated from Shanghai Dong-nan Medical School (

, was a native of Chaozhou. She
) and then traveled to

Japan for further studies. She came back to China as a reconstructive surgeon. Their son
Zheng-xiong Yu

was born in 1931 and eventfully served as the chairman of the Taiwan

Galleria Company (

).146 A-cen, Mei-xiang, and Zheng-xiong resided in

Shantou until the end of the Second World War.147
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Many sekimin merchants, in addition to the aforementioned, conducted business in Shantou
during the Japanese colonial period in Taiwan. For example, several sekimin merchants
participated in business related to sea transport. Kun Lin
(

), specializing in ship repairs. Han Yang

Company (

operated the Kengen Keisei

) in Shantou and the Tōgen Company (

contributing to marine transportation. Wen-teng Tsai
(

operated the Daishin Ironworks

) in Taiwan, each

operated the Jisei Company

), dealing in sea-transportation and deep-sea fishing. He-qing Zhang

Kenmo Company (
Xiao

ran the

), dealing in imports of seafood and groceries. Headed by Jin-hai

, the Mika Company (

) imported seafood and dyes. Textiles and tobacco

were important products throughout the region. Concerning the manufacture of textiles,
Taiwanese sekimin Ji-pu Liu
(

oversaw operations at the Liu Mei-tai Company

), which specialized in lace. Dealing in the manufacture of ramie fabrics, the Tokumi

Company (

) was overseen by Xue-liu Tsai

.148
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As for the tobacco industry, Huang-xuan Xu
(

operated the Kokushin Company

) on Haikwan Road, which dealt not only in tobacco leaves but also in dyes, industrial

medicine, and electric materials. Shen-lai Hong

operated the Taihan Company

(

), selling processed tobacco. Located on Yong tai Street, the Fukuki Company

(

)—under You-fu Zheng

Company (

—sold processed tobacco, as did the Yōsōhō

), which also dealt in alcohol, silks, satins, and general goods, owing in large

measure to the diversifying efforts of the company’s head Zi-de Ye
Concerning the business of alcohol, Zhi-fang Lin
Kyūki Company (
Kengen Company (

was a sekimin who headed the

), selling alcohol and general goods. Ming-qin He

) was under Zhu Pan

specialized in alcohol and molasses. Guang-de Zhou

(

!

, and also

took charge of the Heian

), which sold alcohol and coal. Overseeing two ventures, Ming Liu

was known for directing both the Meihatsu Company (
Company (

ran the

), which specialized in three rather disparate products: molasses,

alcohol, and pottery. The Giri Company (

Company (

.

) in the brick business. Qi Zhou

) and the Renhatsu

operated the Gensei Company

) on Yong-he Street, where he oversaw the business’ role in importing soy beans and
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matches.149

2.4 Brief Conclusion
In studying this commercial network in East Asia, I drew inspiration from the “network
mode” and “inter-port mode” concepts developed by Japanese scholar Takashi Hamashita
, who provided a new approach to exploring Asian history. His focus is not on a
specific national history (which traditional Oriental studies have favored) but on the important
waterway connections among different ports and regions. For example, he argues that to analyze
the connections among ports yields more details than would a traditional examination of the
historical relationships among nations.150 In my case, an examination of Japanese goods sold in
Shantou can clarify the relationships among the Japanese city of Kobe, the Taiwanese city of
Keelung, British Hong Kong, and Shantou in southern China.
Beginning in the early twentieth century, Japan established closer commercial relations with
Shantou. Shantou was an important market for both Japanese and Taiwanese goods, including
coal, seafood, molasses, and alcohol. The Japanese and Taiwanese goods served not only
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Shantou’s local needs but also those of other Chinese cities and of various regions in Southeast
Asia. In Shantou, three Japanese companies with a certain degree of government sponsorship
were the Mitsui Company, Taiwan Bank, and the Osaka Shipping Company. Japanese
companies that profited without as much governmental assistance included Kōkandō, the Kōzaka
Company, and the Nikka Company. Moreover, Taiwanese merchants played a crucial role in
Shantou’s business circles. The sekimin merchants established tea shop, textile company, mining
company, pharmacies and groceries. Most Japanese and Taiwanese companies concentrated in
Shantou City’s Qilu area (

), a coastal and prosperous commercial area. Specific sites for

these businesses were Wai-ma Road, Zhen-bang Street, Yu-shan Street, and several other
noteworthy thoroughfares. Here, Western, Japanese, Taiwanese, and Chinese merchants would
gather and interact. In this chapter, I have argued that a cross-boundary commercial network
emerged among the Japanese homeland, colonial Taiwan, and Shantou in southern China and
that the network was a consequence chiefly of interactions between Japanese officials and
Taiwanese merchants whose commercial activities were of great significance.
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Chapter 3: The Case of the Dadong Ice-making Company and Relations
among Japan, China, and Taiwan
3.1 Prelude

In this chapter, I explore the cooperation and competition, the conflict and compromise
among Shantou’s Taiwanese sekimin merchants, local Chinese merchants, and the Japanese
imperial consulate in Shantou, a major city connected to other cities in the Chaoshan area151 by
both railways and waterways. Specifically, I explore the Sino-Japanese co-investment Dadong
Ice-making Company in Shantou (

).

This chapter enters into a dialogue with research conducted by Timothy Brook and Fu
Poshek

, who tried to revise the conventional nationalist discourse emphasizing the

resistance and hardships of the Chinese people during the Sino-Japanese War. Brook
concentrates on the initial period of the occupation (mainly 1937−8), and on five different
locations, all within the Yangtze delta, and investigates wartime collaboration between Chinese
local elites and Japanese army agents. In sum, Brook suggests that the line between resistance
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and collaboration is not, in fact, an easy one to draw.152 Poshek Fu’s research explores how
Chinese intellectuals in Shanghai reacted to the Japanese occupation during the period between
1937 and 1945, and records their choices of retreating from, resisting, or cooperating with Japan,
all while facing the dilemma between remaining loyal to China and confronting hard, unpleasant
realities.153 Both Brook’s and Fu’s studies indicate that the interactions between Japanese and
Chinese and on some important occasions, Taiwanese during the wartime period were much
more complicated than traditional perceptions have suggested.
Moreover, Karen Laura Thornber examines the literary output of writers in Japan’s colonies,
semi-colonies in China, and Manchukuo, illustrating how these writers translated, adapted, and
reinterpreted Japanese literature. Her study indicates that the boundaries, cooperation, and
resistance characterizing relationships between colonizers and colonized under the Japanese
empire were blurred.154 In this chapter, I will use the case of the Dadong Ice-making Company
to explain the interactions among Japanese, Taiwanese, and local Chinese in Shantou between
late the late 1920s and the mid-1930s, to illustrate the complexities in a Chinese treaty port,
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where ethnicity, nationality, identity, and commercial interests were prominent factors.

3.2 Nanshin

policy and nisshi shinzen

The Dadong Ice-making Company was one of the most important Taiwanese- invested
industries in Shantou. The main founder, Shin Huang

, was a famous entrepreneur and

politician from Tainan. In response to the Taiwan General Government’s nanshin policy
(southward expansion), around 1926, Huang collected money both from his countrymen in
Tainan and from Taiwanese sekimin in Shantou to establish the company. In 1928, the
company’s founding conference was formally held in Tainan. Dadong was not only a reaction to
Japan’s nanshin policy, but also a product of Japan’s policy of nisshi shinzen (Japan−China
friendship), promoting Japanese and Chinese co-investment in companies and other institutions,
like schools and hospitals. In addition to Japanese (in this case, Taiwanese) shareholders,
10−20% of the Dadong Ice-making Company’s funds stemmed from Chinese investors. In 1930,
the company started to operate in Shantou.155
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Shin Huang,156 the main founder of the Dadong Ice-making Company, was a prominent
figure in Taiwanese history during the Japanese colonial period. He graduated from the Japanese
Language School (

), an elite school affiliated with the Taiwan General Government.

He worked at Tainan Hospital after graduation, and then, like many Taiwanese elites, Huang
went to Japan in pursuit of higher education. In 1914, he came back to Taiwan with a bachelor’s
degree of law from Meiji University. Later, he played an active role in Taiwan’s business circles.
He occupied numerous high-ranking positions, including executive director of the Taiwan Seishi
(Taiwan paper-making company) in 1917, inspector of the Tainan Jidōsha
(Tainan Automobile Company) in 1919, director of Kagi Bank
of the Taiwan Seien
Taiwan Keitetsu

in 1919, inspector

(Taiwan salt-making company) in 1919, and director of the
(Taiwan Light Rail Transit Company) in 1927.

Moreover, Huang earned permission from the Monopoly Bureau of the Taiwan General
Government to sell tobacco and opium in Taiwan. Huang played an active role not only in
business circles but in the political arena, as well. He participated in the Tainan Prefecture
Conference (

) in 1920, and was a member of the Council of the Taiwan General
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and the Japanese name

Nanmei

Government (

) in 1921; and in the same year, he was granted shinshō

, an

honorary title bestowed by the Taiwan General Government on Taiwanese local elites. In short,
Shin Huang was one of the most powerful men in southern Taiwan during the Japanese colonial
period.157
In contrast to Shin Huang’s outgoing personality, his younger brother Xi-quan Huang
(1891−1960) was an introvert and moderate in his goals. Xi-quan had no interest in
serving public office and preferred spending most of his time in composing poems. Actually the
Huang brothers were key figures in Nansha

, a major circle of poets in Tainan.158 In spite

of these significant personalities differences between the two Huang brothers, they were very
close to each other and when Shin Huang decided to establish the Dagong Ice-making Company,
Xi-quan supported his brother completely.
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Fig. 3-1 Shin Huang. (Source: Taiwan jinshi kan, A list of famous Taiwanese. Taihoku: Taiwan
shinminpōsha, 1934, p. 124.)

As mentioned, the Dadong Ice-making Company was a product of Japan’s nanshin policy.
In the early Taishō period (1912−1926), the Taiwan General Government encouraged Taiwanese
to explore nanshi (southern China) and nanyō (southeastern Asia) to strengthen the Japanese
influence in these areas. As an influential figure in Tainan, in December 1924, Shin Huang
received an appointment from the Taiwan General Government to undertake his own
explorations in nashi and nanyō. He travelled in Indochina, Dutch Indonesia, British Hong Kong,
British Singapore, Siam (modern-day Thailand), Guangdong Province, and Yunnan Province.159
He probably visited Shantou in this trip. Taiwan nichi nichi shinpō, a major official newspaper in
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colonial Taiwan, indicated that Shin Huang had been active in Shantou since 1925.160 By 1928,
the Huang brothers, having already collected funds from multiple shareholders, decided to
establish an ice-making company named “Dadong.”161
Among the various fields of business they could have entered, why did the Huang brothers
choose the ice-making business? A news report in Taiwan nichi nichi shinpō offered an
explanation.

“When Taiwanese are competitive to promote developing overseas, as the pioneer
of Taiwanese, (they) plan to do business in southern China. Shantou is located in
east Guangdong province. The population is large. The residents are rich. Moreover,
the weather is warm. Thus, the ice-making business could be managed.”162

In the late 1920s, the population of Shantou numbered approximately 120,000. The nearby
cities included Chaozhou, with a population of approximately 150,000; Chaoyang
population of approximately 120,000; Jieyang

, with a population of 100,000; Anbu

with a population of approximately 50,000; and Chenghai

/ Dahao
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,

, with a population

of approximately 30,000. All these cities were connected to Shantou by both railways and
waterways, helping extend the great political and economic circles that took Shantou as their
center to some 500,000 people.163 The significant size of this population and the warm weather
in the region explain the demand for ice, especially during the summer season. In addition,
before the Dadong Ice-making Company entered the picture, Shantou had only one ice-making
company, Wutunji

, operated by a Taiwanese named Tian Wang

.164 These factors

are likely reasons for Shin Huang’s decision to establish an ice-making a promising business in
Shantou.
The list of Dadong Ice-making Company’s shareholders covered most of the powerful
Taiwanese sojourners in Shantou, and many of them were originally from Tainan, Shin Huang’s
hometown. In addition to Shin Huang, four important Taiwanese who took the position of
executive directors merit our attention here:
Executive director 1: Mu-yi Huang

(1901−?) was a teacher at a junior high school

in Tainan. In 1927, Mu-yi resigned from his teaching job and moved to Shantou after receiving
an invitation from Shin Huang to be the manager of the Dadong Ice-making Company. In the
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early 1930s, conflicts between the Japanese consulate in Shantou and the Dadong Ice-making
Company prompted the consul Befu to order Mu-yi back to Taiwan (the conflict is explained in
the next section). However, Mu-yi later returned to Shantou, and in addition to investing his
personal wealth in the Dadong Ice-making Company, he served as the general manger of the
Baixing Company (

), a large company that dealt with Sino-Japan trade, was

headquartered in Shanghai, and had branch offices in Xiamen (Amoy), Shantou, Guangzhou,
Hong Kong, and Nanjing.165
Executive director 2: Chi-hui Chen

was the nephew of Guan-ying Chen

,166 a prestigious merchant in Tainan.167 On the basis of his family’s abundant financial
support, Chi-hui went to Shantou in the 1910s and eventually started the Wanyuan Company
(

), a large company established in 1916 with funds exceeding ten thousand yuan. The

Wanyuan Company participated in the trade of seafood, pineapples, matches, flour, alcohol, and
syrup among Japan, colonial Taiwan, and Shantou. In 1919, the Wanyuan Company entered into
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a contract with the Suzuki Ekiji Company (

) in Osaka, exporting tungsten from

Shantou to Japan. Chi-hen was active in Shantou’s Taiwanese circles and was the secretary of
the short-lived Taiwanese Association of Shantou, an organization that operated between 1918
and 1919.168
Executive director 3: Chang-sheng Chen
School (

graduated from the Japanese Language

) of the Taiwan General Government and then taught in Tainan. In 1921,

Chang-sheng and his wife Yin-zhi Zheng Chen

were assigned by the Taiwan General

Government to teach at Tōē School in Shantou, a Japanese-funded educational institution
accommodating both the children of Taiwanese residents and the children of local Chinese. The
Chens worked at Shantou Tōē School from 1921 to 1927. They then resigned from their teaching
jobs and started to pursue business opportunities,169 including investments in the Dadong
Ice-making Company. It is worth mentioning that Chang-sheng was the father of famous
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Taiwanese anthropologist Chi-lu Chen
Executive director 4: Yong-lu Jian

, an academician at Academia Sinica.
was different from the abovementioned

executive directors who were originally from Tainan, as Jian was originally from Taizhong
Prefecture. After graduating from the Medical School of the Taiwan General Government,170
he worked at Taipei Hospital. In the 1920s, he operated Yamato Hospital (
and was a respectable doctor in Taiwanese circles.

) in Shantou

171

In addition to these four executive directors, the list of shareholders of the Dadong
Ice-making Company included some Taiwanese doctors in Shantou. For example, Ji-yu Jian
, originally from Taizhong Prefecture, was a graduate of the Taipei Medical Professional
School. Later, he went to Shantou and worked at Yamato Hospital (

).172 He was
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probably from the same family as Yong-lu Jian. Ji-yu Jian stayed in Shantou until the end of
World War Two, at which time the ROC Government decided not to prosecute him for
complicity with the Japanese enemy.173 Zhen-qian Wang

, a Taiwanese doctor in

Shantou, was another shareholder of the Dadong Ice-making Company. Originally from
Kaohsiung, Wang graduated from the Medical School of the Taiwan General Government and
later operated a private Zhen-qian Clinic in Shantou.174
Because Dadong was a product of nisshi shinzen

(Japan−China friendship),

Shin Huang invited some Chinese to invest in the company, not just Taiwanese. Among these
Chinese investors, the chief councilor of Shantou City Zi-bin Zheng

(1887−1944) was

the most important one. He was born in Chaoyang City in Guangdong Province, and in 1905, the
18−year−old Zheng went to Siam as a coolie, as many of his hometown were doing. Several
years later, he operated two pawnshops and a liquor store in Bangkok, and became a rich
Chinese merchant.175 Because of Zheng’s wealth and power, Shin Huang invited him to invest
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in the Dadong Ice-making Company. In total, the Chinese stockholders’ investments reached
10−20% of the Dadong Ice-making Company’s total capital.176
To harmonize with Japan’s policy of southward expansion and Japan−China friendship,
Shin Huang raised funds from both Taiwanese residents of Shantou and local Chinese merchants
to establish the Dadong Ice-making Company. The total capital outlay for this venture was
90,000 yuan. The factory was located in Qilu, an area home to many foreign companies and
institutions. The expected amount of production daily was twenty tons ice.177
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3.3 The Order of Deportation Incident (

)

Because the Dadong Ice-making Company was a product of Japan’s policy of southward
expansion and of Japan−China friendship, the Japanese consulate should have protected and
promoted the business venture in Shantou. However, actual events were starkly inconsistent with
the aforementioned agenda. In the initial stage of the Dadong Ice-making Company’s operation,
a conflict arose between the Japanese consul in Shantou whose name was Kumakichi Befu
and the shareholders of the Dadong Ice-making Company; indeed, the conflict was so
severe that the company almost failed to open its doors for business.

Fig. 3-2 The Japanese Consulate in Shantou in the 1920s. (Source: Uchida Gorō, Shin Swatō, Taihoku:
Taiwan sōtokuhu kōnai nanyō kyōkai Taiwan shibu, 1927. National Taiwan Library.)
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Fig. 3-3 The Building That Served as Shantou’s Japanese Consulate from 1904 to 1945.
[Illustration] The buililding that served as the Japanese consulate from 1904 to 1945 in Shantou has beem
preserved and currently is part of the Shantou Entry-Exit Inspection and Quarantine Bureau (
) (Source: Photo by Lin-Yi Tseng, 2010.)

In 1929, after Shin Huang had collected enough funding to establish the ice-making
company, he went to the Japanese consulate in Shantou, requesting a business permit. Consul
Befu told Shin Huang that the consulate had issued a business permit several years earlier to
Riichirō Taenaka

, a Japanese resident in Hong Kong whose intention had also been

to open an ice-making company in Shantou. Moreover, a Taiwanese man by the name of Tian
Wang

had already been operating the Wutunji

Ice-making Company in Shantou.

Consul Befu told Shin Huang that “Japanese” should not compete with each other. Thus, Befu
!
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suggested that Shin Huang purchase the previously issued business permit from Taenaka at the
price of 6,000 yuan. After negotiations, a deal was struck for the price of 600 yuan.178
In 1930, the construction of the Dadong Company’s ice-making facilities reached
completion, and operations were ready to begin. Suddenly, consul Befu requested that Shin
Huang name Taenaka the manager of the Dadong Ice-making Company. Shin Huang refused this
proposal furiously. From the perspective of Shin Huang and other shareholders in the Dadong
Ice-making Company, the completed payout of 600 yuan to Taenaka in exchange for his
business permit was a done deal. Moreover, Taenaka has proven to be a rather inept manger, so
Dadong has no reason to appoint Taenaka to any kind of managerial position in the Dadong
Ice-making Company. It seems that the head of the Taiwan Bank’s branch office in Shantou
attempted to mediate the dispute, specifically suggesting that the Dadong Ice-making Company
hire Taenaka for three years at a salary of 50 yuan per month. Not surprisingly, Shin Huang
rejected the suggestion. Consul Befu was indignant at the Dadong Ice-making Company’s
actions. When the company started operations, Befu made straight for the factory and demanded
that it shut down immediately. Facing Befu’s arbitrary action, the shareholders of the Dadong
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Ice-making Company decided to go to the Shantou City Government, registering Dadong as a
Chinese company. As a company registered with the ROC Government, Befu had no authority to
stop operations, and the ice-making business maintained its work schedule.179
Surprisingly, on May 3, 1930, Shin Huang who was in Tainan at the time received a
telegram from Shantou. The telegram reported that four Taiwanese executive directors of the
Dadong Ice-making Company, Qi-huei Chen
, and Mu-yi Huang

, Yong-lu Jian

, Chang-sheng Chen

had earlier been handed an “order of deportation” (

) from the Japanese consulate in Shantou. Consul Befu argued that these four individuals were
interfering with the peace of the Japanese community in Shantou and that they, should be
ordered back to Taiwan. Regarding their details, the deportations affecting these four men varied
from one to the other. Doctor Yong-lu Jian, the owner of Yamato Hospital (
Qi-huei Chen, the owner of the Wanyuan Company (

), and

), were ordered to leave Shantou

within two months, and were prohibited from returning to Shantou for one year. Chang-sheng
Chen and Mu-yi Huang, the two previously mentioned teachers from Tainan, were ordered to
leave Shantou within two weeks and were prohibited from returning to Shantou for two years.
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These deportations were obviously acts of revenge on the part of Consul Befu. No evidence
has surfaced suggesting that these four individuals had been “disturbing the local peace.” Doctor
Yong-lu Jian had resided in Shantou over many years, and was a respected leader in the area’s
Taiwanese community. Qi-huei Chen, the owner of the Wanyuan Company, was a successful
businessman who had facilitated trade among Shantou, Taiwan, and the Japanese homeland.
Furthermore, Mu-Yi Huang and Chang-sheng Chen had been pivotal in getting the Dadong
Ice-making Company’s operations underway. Befu had made an unjust series of accusations,
acting on a personal grudge while exerting power in an official capacity.180
On May 14, 1930, both Chang-sheng Chen and Mu-yi Huang arrived at Taiwan’ Keelung
Port within two weeks of having been expelled from Shantou. The incident attracted public
attention in Taiwan, and on the following day (May 15), Tainan shipō published an interview
with Chen and Huang. In the first part of the interview, they made the following statement:

A few days ago, the Japanese Consulate suddenly demanded that we show up there
for a meeting.[Consul Befu] harshly scolded us and denounced our decision to start
operations without authorization, since the negotiations with Taenaka had not yet
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been settled. [Consul Befu] wanted us to choose between accepting deportation back
to Taiwan and closing the factory down. We convened an emergency meeting of the
Chinese shareholders, and sent out an emergency telegram to shareholders in
Taiwan. The Chinese shareholders Zi-bin Zheng and Qi-yun Xie were very angry
with the attitude of the Japanese consul. Having no choice, however, we received
permission [by telegram] from the shareholders in Taiwan to change the register
owner from a Taiwanese individual to a Chinese individual.! 181!
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This interview shows that the registered owner of the Dadong Ice-making Company had not been
Chinese. After all, the Chinese shareholders had accounted for only 10-20% of the total
investment, so it would generally be unreasonable to register a Chinese individual as the owner
of the company. However, oppressive actions targeting the Taiwanese shareholders had left them
no choice but to register—under the name of a Chinese individual—the Dadong Ice-making
Company with the Shantou City Government.
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In the latter part of the interview, Chen and Huang offered further insights into the affair:

The Japanese consul demanded that the two of us as well as Yong-lu Jian, Qi-hui
Chen, and Fan-shu Chen—five in total—come to the consulate. [Befu] handed Jian
and the two Chens their deportation orders. They objected, arguing that they three
were members of the local gentry and that it was extremely unreasonable to demand
their deportation on received only a yushi taikyo (suspendable order). However, we
two received formal, legally binding orders of deportation. We objected, but had no
resources: we had to return to Taiwan by Kōdōmaru [a Japanese steamship].182
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The interview confirms that, on this occasion, but five people visited the Japanese consulate,
including Fan-shu Chen who—like Qi-hui Chen—was a representative of Wanyuan
Company.183 Befu had issued orders of deportation to five people and they all had objected. In
response to the objections, Befu partly conceded by issuing two different kinds of orders. On the
one hand, Doctor Jian and the two Chens of the Wanyuan Company received comparatively light
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orders of deportation that could be suspended at a future date. On the other hand, Chang-sheng
Chen and Mu-yi Huang received formal orders of deportation. The two kinds of orders reflected
the different degree of involvement of these five people in Shantou. Jian and the two Chens of
the Wanyuan Company were much more involved in Shantou than were Chang-sheng and Mu-yi.
Mu-yi Huang had come to Shantou only in 1927, after Shin Huang had invited him to work at
the Dadong Ice-making Company.
Facing Befu’s oppressive vindictiveness, Shin Huang decided to fight back. We should not
forget that Shin Huang was a powerful entrepreneur and politician in Taiwan. He exercised
political relationships and personal networks asking for assistance. First, he asked Chief of
Police Ishii

and Director-general Gotō Fumio

(1884-1980), both in the Taiwan

General Government, to negotiate with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan for a
cancellation of the orders of deportation. Second, he visited Chief Officer Ishii of the Taiwan
General Government’s Hygiene Section and Chief Officer Yamauchi

of the Taiwan

General Government’s Safety Section for their support of a petition. Third, he employed a
lawyer to submit an administrative petition to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Fourth,
because Chang-sheng Chen and Mu-yi Huang were Tainan residents, Shin Huang submitted a
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petition to the Mayor Nagayama

of Tainan Prefecture, asking for a cancellation of the

orders of deportation. Shin Huang decided that if the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan would
not solve this problem to his satisfication, he would politicize the issue. He suggested that it was
even worth exhausting the Dadong Ice-making Company’s funds to pursue justice in this
matter.184
Three months passed and the problem had yet to be settled. On August 30, 1930, a news
report in Taiwan shinminpō stated that the Taiwan General Government was sorry for Consul
Befu’s brusk actions, and that it had tried to negotiate with Befu in pursuit of a cancellation of
the deportation orders. However, Consul Befu had ignored the Taiwan General Government’s
request and the negotiations had gone nowhere.185
The news report identified a political ambivalence between the Taiwan General
Government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Consul Befu answered to the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of Japan, and only the higher authority of gaimushō (Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Japan) could result in a cancellation of his orders. If gaimushō kept silent on the matter,
the Taiwan General Government would be powerless even to modify the orders.
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The orders of deportation greatly annoyed Chang-sheng Chen. He had resided in Shantou
with his wife since 1921, after the Taiwan General Government had assigned the couples to
teaching positions at Tōē School. Later, he had resigned from his teaching job to become a
businessman. In addition to his investments in the Dadong Ice-making Company, Chang-sheng
Chen’s business ventures included the construction of the Dapu Bridge (
County (

) in Chenghai

), an area near Shantou. The price of the construction of Dapu Bridge reached

120,000 yuan. By May 1930, 90% of the bridge’s construction was complete. However, because
of Befu’s order of deportation, Chen was forced to leave Shantou, bringing the construction to a
standstill. On July 6, a flood occurred in Chenghai County, and the existing bridge construction
suffered serious damage. The Bureau of Construction of Guangdong Province assigned
commissioners to investigate the damage to the bridge and asked Chen to come back and
supervise the continuation of the construction. It was assumed that if Chen could not come back
to Chenghai as soon as possible, the oversight of the construction would probably transfer to
other parties. Chen was deeply concerned about this turn of events because he had already
invested a great amount of money in the construction and could not easily sustain a complete
loss.
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In response to this situation, Chang-sheng Chen went to the Tainan Prefecture Government,
asking for a temporary travel permit to Shantou. The Tainan Prefecture Government
sympathized with Chen’s position and was willing to issue a temporary travel permit. However,
the Taiwan General Government took a different stance, contending that issuance of the travel
permit depended on Consul Befu’s approval. Not surprisingly, Befu did not reply to the Taiwan
General Government’s request for his approval, and thus, the temporary travel permit was not
issued. Adding to his woes were letters that Chang-sheng Chen received from his family in
Shantou, informing him that some relatives were ill. The bad news convinced Chen that he had
to smuggle himself back into Shantou. In mid-September of 1930, Chen secretly took a
steamship to Moji

in Kyushu, Japan and then proceeded to Shanghai, finally arriving in

Shantou. Afraid of being deported by Consul Befu, Chen stayed in Chaozhou, an inland city near
Shantou. However, not long thereafter, Befu received information of Chen’s arrival and set about
to deport him once again. Chen could no longer tolerate these oppressive tactics from the
Japanese consulate anymore, and he made a firm decision: he would abandon his Japanese
nationality. In January 1931, Chen submitted an application to the Minister of Domestic Affairs
of the ROC government to register as a Chinese citizen. In April, Chen formally acquired
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national citizenship with the ROC and, meanwhile, renounced his Japanese nationality. From
then on, Chang-sheng Chen operated the Dadong Ice-making Company as a “Chinese”
shareholder, free from the constraints of the Japanese consulate.186
Chang-sheng Chen’s change of nationality, from Japanese to Chinese attracted public
attention in Taiwan. On June 27, 1931, a news report in Taiwan shiminpō declared, “The
Shantou Dadong Ice-making Company’s executive director Chen renounced his Japanese
nationality to carry on in the position. The renunciation stemmed from the Japanese consulate’s
oppressive actions toward Chen, who was left with no other choice. Where happened to the
southern development to be undertaken by the Taiwan authority?” The last part of the news
report stated the problem in the form of a question:

How did the Taiwan authority, which constantly advocates development
in southern China and the South Seas, perceive this problem? The authority
has spent immense sums of money every year on the pretense of subsidizing
development in southern China and the South Seas. However, the fact of the
matter is that people’s suspicions are targeting just how sincere the authority
really is. Therefore, from now on, we hope that the Taiwan authority acts with
the utmost sincerity and generosity, advising the Japanese consulates in China
never again to make a similar mistake.187
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It would seem that there was considerable public criticism of Taiwan General Government’s
weak position in dealing with the problem between Consul Befu and the Dadong Ice-making
Company. The passive attitudes of the Taiwan General Government prompted Chang-sheng
Chen to denounce his Japanese nationality and become a “Chinese” citizen. A popular feeling, as
expressed in the above quote, was that the Taiwan authority truly wanted to develop southern
China, no similar case should ever arise again.
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Fig. 3-4 News Report on Tainan Shinpō.
[Illustration] The news report criticized the order of deportation issued by Shantou’s Japanese consulate
forcing Taiwanese in Shantou return to Taiwan. (Source: Tainan shinpō, evening wews, May 7, 1930 and
daily news, May 8, 1930.)
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Fig. 3-5 News Report on Taiwan Shinminpō.
[Illustration] A news report stating that Cheng-sheng Chen’s renunciation of his Japanese nationality
stemmed from the Shantou Japanese consulate’s oppressive actions toward Chen. (Source: Taiwan
shinminpō, June 27, 1931.)
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3.4 The Conflict between Taiwanese and Chinese Shareholders
A product of Japan−China friendship, the Dadong Ice-making Company benefited from the
co-investment of by both Taiwanese and Chinese shareholders, with the former accounting for
80−90% of the funds and the latter accounting for 10−20% of the funds. In the initial stage of
operations, interference by the Japanese Consul Befu prompted the registered owner of the
company to change his national status from Japanese to Chinese. Thereafter, the Dadong
Company did good business, divvying up profits among the Chinese and Taiwanese shareholders.
However, with the outbreak of the Shanghai Incident on January 28, 1932, anti-Japanese
sentiment gripped all of China, and Shantou was no exception. Under this circumstance, the
position of Taiwanese who were Japanese subjects became nearly untenable, and more
specifically, conflicts between the Dadong Ice-making Company’s Taiwanese and Chinese
shareholders became more frequent and more intense. The Chinese shareholder Zi-bin Zheng
decided to drive out Taiwanese shareholders and to monopolize the company by taking
advantage of the severe anti-Japanese atmosphere in Shantou. Early on in this struggle for
control, Taiwanese shareholders endured the maneuverings of Zheng out of the fear that their
status as Japanese subjects might put them at risk of even worse outcomes. However, Zheng’s
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actions became so severe that the Taiwanese found it impossible to continue enduring the
ruthless plotting. In early April of 1933, under Taiwanese shareholders’ request, Shin Huang
came to Shantou to supervise the business of the Dadong Ice-making Company and especially to
investigat Zi-bin Zheng’s action. He exposed the conspiracy of Zi-bin Zheng and other Chinese
individuals who, associated with the company, sought to monopolize their control over it. It was
a difficult problem to deal with because Zi-bin was the registered owner of Dadong and the
anti-Japanese atmosphere was very intense in Shantou then. Aware of these diverse factors, Shin
Huang only fired the Chinese staff who had colluded with Zi-bin. As for Zi-bin, Shin Huang
decided to increase his share of the profits, thus not only satisfying his personal quest for wealth
but also removing key reasons for his initial plotting, or so it would seem.188
In truth, Shin Huang’s pacification policy did not work as intended. Zi-bin Zheng again
colluded with the fired Chinese staff to gain control over the Dadong Ice-making Company. Shin
Huang grew aware of this second round of plotting and requested that Chief Chen, who headed
the Investigation−&−Detention Team at the Shantou City Government’s Bureau of Public Safety,
negotiate with Zheng; however, this effort came to nothing. Meanwhile, Zi-bin published an
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announcement in Shanbao

and Qiaoshengbao

, two major local newspapers in

Shantou, proclaiming himself the general manager of the company and declaring that the
property of the Dadong Ice-making Company should belong to him (and by extension, to the
Chinese) rather than to the Taiwanese, who were willing subjects of Japanese imperialism. He
attempted to channel public anti-Japanese emotion by manipulating local Chinese newspapers.189
Facing Zheng’s second wave of maneuvering, Taiwanese shareholders decided to fight back
to protect the company. Right around the corner was the summer season, which was the Dadong
Ice-making Company’s most profitable period; moreover, the company’s property was valued at
approximately 160,000 yuan, of which only 4,000 yuan came from Chinese investors. Taiwanese
shareholders, hoping to retain their majority control over these current and future assets, took
two steps. First, they published an announcement in local newspapers, clarifying that most of the
Dadong Ice-making Company’s shares belonged to Taiwanese shareholders. Second, they
registered the Dadong Ice-making Company with the Japanese Consulate in Shantou. Thus, as a
Japanese company, the Dadong Ice-making Company could receive protection from Japan. In
addition to these two actions, Shin Huang returned to Tainan to hold emergency meetings (on
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May 2 and 6), discussing with Taiwan−based shareholders how they could best settle this
matter.190
During Shin Huang’s return to Taiwan, Taiwanese shareholders in Shantou negotiated with
Zi-bin Zheng and his “Chinese” partner Chang-sheng Chen, the former Taiwanese executive
director of the Dadong Ice-making Company who had renounced his Japanese nationality in
1931 in order to avoid Consul Befu’s obstructions. Zheng and Chen proposed multiple
conditions, including the dismissal of the board of directors and the appointment of Zi-bin Zheng
as general manager and Chang-sheng Chen as general supervisor. They further proposed that
they should sell their own shares to Taiwanese shareholders at the price of 190 yuan per share
(original price: 100 yuan), and meanwhile, Zheng and Chen should be able to buy shares from
other shareholders at price of 80 yuan (original price: 100 yuan). All these conditions were
unreasonable to and rejected by the Taiwanese shareholders.191
Zi-ben Zheng and Chang-sheng Chen took further action. They forced the Shantou
Ice-making Company (

) to terminate its “co-sell contract” (

) with the

Dadong Ice-making Company. Being the only two ice-making companies in Shantou, they had
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perceived the competition between them as disadvantageous to each company. Thus, under
negotiations, the two companies had entered into a co-sell contract to share the profits equally.
When the dispute between the Taiwanese and Chinese shareholders arose, Zi-bin Zheng, being
the registered owner of the Dadong Ice-making Company, withdrew 2,000 yuan from the Co-sell
Office without other shareholders’ consent. He further requested that the Co-sell Office regard
him as the only legal representative of the Dadong Ice-making Company. Once aware of these
events, Shin Huang and other Taiwanese shareholders went to the Co-sell Office to stop the
withdrawal of money undertaken by Zi-ben Zheng. The Co-sell Office was annoyed with all of
these back-and-forth-maneuvers and decided not to hand out money to each side until a solid
resolution to the dispute was reached.
Later, Zheng and Chang-sheng Chen forced the Co-sell Office to accept a plan: on May 1,
1933, the side able to deliver ice would be the only legal representative of the Dadong
Ice-making Company and would, thus, have the right to acquire 10,000 yuan from the Co-sell
Office. Zheng and Chen provided this condition because they controlled the company’s Chinese
drivers and workers and was confident that they could win over Shin Huang. Under this situation,
Taiwanese shareholders held an emergency meeting in Yamato Hospital. Then, with the
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assistance of the President Takahayashi
Shantou, Consul Tonegi

of the Association of Japanese Residents in

of the Japanese consulate in Shantou, and Chief Iwada

of the Japanese Police Force in Shantou, Taiwanese shareholders visited the Shantou City
Government’s Bureau of Public Safety, asking for Chinese officials’ assistance. On May 1 (the
day the competition for supremacy at the company was to have been decided) and on May 2,
both Japanese consulate officials and armed Chinese police officers closed and garrisoned the
Dadong Ice-making Company. On May 3, the company factory re-opened as usual.192
Zheng and Chen, despite the setbacks, did not give up their goal of monopolizing the
Dadong Ice-making Company. This time, they manipulated specific anti-Japan associations
(

) to disrupt the company’s operations, and even employed lawyers to harass the

company’s Taiwanese shareholders. Moreover, Zheng and Chen pushed the Shantou City
Government’s Bureau of Sanitation to check the sanitation at the company’s facilities. It seems
that the investigators found no evidence of wrongdoing, but on May 20, 1933, local newspapers
published several unfavorable articles with such titles as “The Dadong Ice-making Company’s
Ice Has Bacteria— Sales Banned by the City Government,” and “The Bureau of Public Safety
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Bans Sales of Dadong Ice, and Will Crack Down on Buyers.” The news reports prompted many
customers to stop purchasing ice from the Dadong Ice-making Company, and the slowdown
forced operations to terminate for several days. Zi-bin Zheng’s disruptive tactics convinced
Taiwanese shareholders to dismiss Zheng from his position, and the registered owner of the
Dadong Ice-making Company was changed to Bao-zhi Luo

, the head of the Chinese

Association in Tainan. The Shantou City Government approved the new personnel change on
June 7, 1933.193 At this point, Zheng was formally expelled from the Dadong Ice-making
Company.
Why did Bao-zhi Luo choose to be the new registered owner of the Dadong Ice-making
Company? Luo was Chinese, born in Guangdong Province in 1880. Later, he moved to Tainan
and operated a company called Shunji

, conducting medical business between Taiwan and

China.194 In March 1926, he established the Chinese Association in Tainan and was elected to
the position of chairman. Tainan was an important city in colonial Taiwan, and by 1926, the
members of the Chinese Association in Tainan reached eighty, as many member as could be
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found in the Chinese Association in Taipei.195 As the leader of Tainan’s sojourning Chinese,
Luo was active in the city. Luo’s close relationships with Taiwanese made Shin Huang and other
Taiwanese shareholders regard him as an adequate choice for the position of registered owner of
the Dadong Ice-making Company. According to one news report on the personnel change, “Luo
has been a shareholder in the Dadong Ice-making Company. He has lived in Taiwan for a long
time and has earned the trust of every shareholder. The obstacles recently afflicting company
operations have been overcome, and prospects are good for strong business growth in the
future.”196
The problem with Zi-bin Zheng was settled. How about the problem with Chang-sheng
Chen? A news report suggested that the dispute between Chen and Dadong had finally been
settled by February 1937. According to this report, Shin Huang and other Taiwanese
shareholders had held a meeting in Tainan, discussing the lawsuit between Chang-sheng Chen
and the Dadong Ice-making Company. Chen had long been strongly opposed to the company,
accusing it of wrongdoing several times. Finally, with the assistance and conciliatory
dispositions of both Bing-shen Hu

and Bao-zong Chen

, Dadong bought back
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all the company’s shares from Chen and the longstanding dispute was settled.197 Like
Chang-sheng Chen, both Bing-shen Hu and Bao-zong Chen were graduates of the Taiwan
General Government’s Japanese Language School (

). Bao-zong Chen and

Chang-sheng Chen had been in the same class, and Bing-shen Hu had been in a class several
years up.198 Probably the friendship among these three men facilitated Shin Huang’s request that
Bing-shen and Bao-zong help mediate the dispute between the Dadong Ice-making Company
and Chang-sheng Chen.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
197

Taiwan nichi nichi shinpō
, no. 13249, evening news 4 (February 12, 1937).
Taiwan shinminpōsha
, Taiwan jinji kan
(Directory of Taiwanese People). Taihoku:
Taiwan shinminpōsha, 1934, p. 135; Taiwan Sōtokufu shokuinroku
(The staff listing of the
Taiwan General Government), p. 255 (1913); pp. 309, 311 (1918).
198

!

130!

Fig. 3-6 News Report on the Chinese Version of the Taiwan Nichi Nichi Shinpō.
[Illustration] This news report states that the Taiwanese shareholders of the Dadong Ice-making Company
were risking significant losses stemming from Shantou’s severe anti-Japanese atmosphere. (Source:
Taiwan nichi nichi shinpō, Chinese version, May 6, 1933.)

!

131!

3.5 Brief Conclusion
Over its history, the Dadong Ice-making Company faced at least two big crises: the first big
crisis was brought on by the obstructionist actions of Consul Befu, and the second one took place
in the severely anti-Japanese atmosphere of Shantou, where the Chinese businessman Zi-bin
Zheng attempted to expel Taiwanese shareholders from the Dadong Ice-making Company. The
company passed through these crises safely and business grew prosperous. In 1936, the company
expanded to Chaozhou, a nearby city where they bought Chaozhou’s Huiqun Ice-making
Company (

) and renamed it the Chaoan Ice-making Company (

).199

With the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in July 1937, the Dadong Ice-making
Company was forced to close. Its facilities were severely damaged during the fighting, and on
June 21, 1939, Japanese forces formal occupied Shantou; thereafter, the Japanese authority in
Shantou made efforts to reestablish the Dadong Ice-making Company. On July 5, 1939, the
headquarters of the East Guangdong Expeditionary Army (

) granted the Dadong

Ice-making Company a permit for establishing factory facilities in the area. On July 16, 1939,
Shin Huang and shareholders in Taiwan held a meeting in Tainan. Shin Huang reported on the
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situation in Shantou, to which he had paid a recent visit after the Japanese occupation, and he
suggested a plan for revival, including collecting funds for immediate purchase of machines to
deal with the summer season’s high demand.200 With Shin Huang’s efforts and the assistance of
the Japanese authority in Shantou, the Dadong Ice-making Company reopened and operated
smoothly during the Japanese occupation of the city.
The story of the Dadong Ice-making Company brings to light several interesting issues. First,
although Taiwanese were Japanese subjects, it was not necessarily the case that Japanese
authorities overseas would protect these Taiwanese. On some occasions, the Japanese authority
was the origin of conflicts and obstacles besetting Taiwanese interests in China. Consul Befu
exemplifies this pattern. As the preeminent representative of Japanese authority in Shantou, he
chose to not to protect Dadong’s interests and, indeed, exerted his power to expel Taiwanese
shareholders from China. Acting on a personal vendetta, he even tried to terminate the Dadong
Ice-making Company’s operations.
A second interesting issue brought to light here is the fact that the Dadong Ice-making
Company exposed the discord between the Taiwan General Government and the Japanese
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs. When Shin Huang and later, Chang-sheng Chen asked officials of
the Taiwan General Government for help, the officials sympathized with the Taiwanese’
situation and attempted to negotiate with the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, the
Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not react to the request from the Taiwan General
Government for a cancellation of the deportation orders targeting Chang-sheng Chen and Mu-yi
Huang. It seems that the two institutions lacked a mechanism of coordination.
Third, the case of the Dadong Ice-making Company emphasizes the important role that
nationality played in conducting business in Chinese treaty ports, in this case, the treaty port of
Shantou. In the initial stage of the company’s operations, Consul Befu’s oppressive actions
resulted in the Dadong Ice-making Company’s decision to register as a Chinese company by
taking Zi-bin Zheng as its registered owner. Later, in 1933, Zi-bin Zheng’s own strategic
maneuvering led the company to register with the Japanese consulate in Shantou as a Japanese
company, which afforded the company a degree of Japanese protection. In other words, both
Japanese and Chinese nationals protected the Dadong Ice-making Company’s interests at
different times. By way of example, Chang-sheng Chen renounced his Japanese nationality and
registered as Chinese to avoid the stream of obstacles erected by Consul Befu. In Chang-sheng
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Chen’s case, his Chinese nationality protected his interests in Shantou. Both the Dadong
Ice-making Company and Chang-sheng Chen exemplify the importance of nationality to
Taiwanese interests in Shantou.
Fourth, the dispute between Taiwanese and Chinese shareholders in 1933 manifested the
ambivalence of Taiwanese who lived in China. Taiwanese who lived in Shantou had similar
languages, ethnic backgrounds, and customs, and cooperated with local Chinese in business and
in local civic matters. However, the situation of Taiwanese was strongly influenced by the local
atmosphere, that is, by anti-Japanese sentiment. Compared with Xiamen (Amoy) and Fuzhou, the
other two treaty ports in southern China, Shantou had been famous for its anti-foreign
atmosphere, especially when it came to Japan. When anti-Japan movements were active in
Shantou, Taiwanese found themselves personally in very real danger as their business would
often experience significant losses. Therefore, how Taiwanese sojourners in Shantou protected
themselves and their interests in an atmosphere of pronounced anti-Japanese sentiment is an
issue of great importance here.
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Fig. 3-7 Taiwan You Xiang

(Taiwan Right Lane)

(Source:!http://stu.dahuawang.com/?p=11611)

Fig. 3-8 Taiwan Zuo Xiang

(Taiwan Left Lane).

[Illustraiton] Shantou city still uses the names “Taiwan Left Lane” and “Taiwan Right Lane” in the old
city area. The two lanes were located at the intersection of Wai ma lu
(Wai Road) and Guo-ping
lu
(Guo-ping Road). The names of these two lanes suggest that this area was a central site where
Taiwanese sekimin lived and conducted business in Shantou during the Japanese colonial period in
Taiwan. (Source: Photo by Lin-Yi Tseng, 2013.)
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Chapter 4: The Educational Network Encompassing the Japanese Homeland,
Colonial Taiwan, and the Shantou Treaty Port

the Tōē School in Shantou

4.1 Prelude
Focusing on the Tōē School in Shantou, this chapter explores the transnational network
characterizing the relationships among the Japanese homeland, colonial Taiwan, and the treaty
port of Shantou. The word ‘tōē’

literarily means “the sea in the East,” and has long been

an alternative name for Japan. In this sense, the Tōē School means “the school of Japan.” In 1914,
the Japanese Association in Shantou submitted a petition to the Taiwan General Government,
requesting that it establish Japanese educational institutions in Shantou. In the next year, in 1915,
with the assistance of the Taiwan General Government, the Japanese Association in Shantou
established two schools: the Japanese Elementary School and the Tōē gakkō (the Tōē School) in
Shantou. The former accommodated children of Japanese residents in Shantou with a clear
purpose of providing Japanese-style education to the Japanese children while the latter
accommodated both children of Taiwanese residents in Shantou and local Chinese children.
Through this offering of Japanese-style education to Taiwanese and Chinese children, Japan
aimed both to cultivate Taiwanese colonial subjects’ loyalty to the Japanese empire by granting
!
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them its academic privileges and to enlarge Japan’s influence in Shantou by immersing Chinese
students in all things Japanese, including the Japanese language. In other words, the
establishment of the Tōē School was closely related to both colonial consciousness and Japan’s
ambitions for expansion in China.
In this chapter, I will explore two aspects of the Tōē School in Shantou: (1) the “network of
human resources,” regarding which I will discuss some Japanese and Taiwanese teachers whom
the Taiwan General Government assigned to the Tōē School in Shantou; and (2) the “network of
words,” regarding which I will analyze teachers’ travel writings and reports published in colonial
Taiwanese periodicals, including Taiwan kyōiku

(Taiwan Education). By analyzing

their words, I will explore these teachers’ perceptions of the educational affairs in Shantou, and
specifically the perceptions of European- and American-funded schools in the city. In sum, from
both the network of human resources and the network of words in this particular setting, we will
see how an educational network established itself among the Japanese homeland, colonial
Taiwan, and the Chinese treaty port of Shantou.
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4.2 The Establishment of the Tōē School in Shantou and Its Contributors

The establishment of Shantou’s Tōē School was closely related to Japan’s southward policy
(

, nanshin). Japan developed the southward policy in the early Taishō period (1912-1926),

which thus historically was called “Taishō nanshin ki”

(the Taishō southward

period). Taiwan was Japan’s most important outpost of the southward movement, and Japan’s
Taiwan General Government established companies like the Sango Company (
the Taiwan Takushoku Company (

) and

), whose function was to pursue development in

southern China and the South Seas. Japan aimed to enlarge its influences in the south by means
of economic expansion. In addition to economic penetration, Japan’s southward policy sought to
establish cultural facilities in the south. And in association with the increasing number of both
Japanese and Taiwanese residents in southern China during the Taishō period, the Taiwan
General Government established schools in Chinese treaty ports. Among these schools were
schools serving the needs of young Japanese residents and schools for Taiwanese sekimin
residents. By establishing these schools, the Taiwan General Government aimed to strengthen
the relationship between Taiwan and southern China.
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Before the establishment of Shantou’s Tōē School, two other schools in southern China had
been accommodating Taiwanese sekimin: Amoy’s Tōa shoin

(the Tōa Academy)201

(the Tōē School).202 Two members of the Taiwan General

and Fuzhou’s Tōē gakudō

Government were crucial in pushing for the establishment of Shantou’s Tōē School: Hankichi
Kumamoto

, who was the chief of School Affairs Ministry (

Yoshikichi Uchida
(

), and

(1866−1933), who was the chief of Civil Administration

) and later became the ninth Taiwan General Governor.
Kumamoto was born in Fukuoka, Japan. After graduating from Tokyo Imperial University,

he worked at Japan’s Department of Education (

, monbushō). In 1908, Kumamoto went

to work for the Korean General Government, and during his stay in Korea, he devoted himself to
popularizing the Japanese language on the peninsula. In March 1911, he was assigned to a
position in the Taiwan General Government, where he was responsible for educational affairs.
During his term in office, Kumamoto earned the trust of the Civil Administration chief,
Yoshikichi Uchida

, who was enthusiastic about the southern expedition. Uchida was
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born in Tokyo, Japan. After graduating from Tokyo Imperial University, he served as the chief of
Civil Administration in Taiwan from August 1910 to October 1915.203 Uchida then became a
crucial assistant to Taiwan’s sixth General Governor, Sadayoshi Andō

(1853−1932),

who governed Taiwan between May 1915 and June 1918 and who worked to implement the
southward policy. Uchida was deeply concerned about southern China’s Japanese-funded
educational institutions, and under his assignment, Kumamoto paid an inspection visit to
southern China, including Fuzhou, Amoy, Shantou, and Hong Kong during the period between
December 11, 1912 and January 8, 1913. While staying in Shantou, Kumamoto visited
Chinese-funded schools as Zhong deng shang ye xui xiao

(the secondary

commercial school) and British-funded Presbyterian boys’ school as Anglo Chinese College (
). He met members of Shantou’s Japanese consulate and of Shantou’s Japanese Residents
Association, and discussed the possibility of establishing schools to accommodate the children of
Shantou’s Japanese and Taiwanese sekimin residents.204
With the support of Kumamoto, Etsuji Yanagi

, who headed the Japanese

Association of Shantou, persuaded Shantou’s Taiwanese residents to donate money for
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establishing a Taiwanese-oriented school in the city and successfully collected 700 USD.
Shantou’s Japanese Residents Association donated 100 USD, and thus 800 USD were in hand.
Having solved the school-funding problem, Yanagi and others dealt with related issues,
including naming the school ‘Tōē,’ renting a local house for the schooling to take place in, and
hiring a Chinese teacher.205
In February 1914, Shantou’s Japanese Residents Association submitted a petition to Taiwan
General Governor Yoshikichi Uchida
Nobu Kasai

through Shantou’s Japanese consul deputy

, asking for the Taiwan General Government to assign a teacher to the new

established Shantou’s Tōē School. The petition first declared that there was no local
Taiwanese-oriented school serving the school-age children of Taiwanese residents in Shantou;
thus, Taiwanese parents either would send their children to Chinese schools or, if money was
readily available, would hire Chinese tutors for home schooling. Both of these choices centered
on Chinese-style education, which the petitioners considered inadequate for cultivating the
character of prospective imperial subjects.206 In other words, the reason for Japan’s
establishment of a Taiwanese-oriented school in Shantou was closely related to Japan’s colonial
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(The collection of official documents of Taiwan

perspectives regarding the cultivation of Taiwanese subjects’ loyalty to the Japanese empire. The
abovementioned analysis may reflect Patricia Tsurumi’s study, which examines the Taiwan
General Government’s educational policies and the teaching materials of public schools in
Taiwan, and which argues that Japan’s main purpose for installing a system of education in
Taiwan was not to develop academic studies but to transform Taiwanese into docile followers of
Japanese governance.207
Further, the petition declared that with the assistance of Kumamoto, who was the chief of
the Taiwan General Government’s School Affairs Ministry, and Yangi, who was the chief of
Shantou’s Japanese Association, the Tōē School had finally opened its door to students in early
February of 1915, and thus the school had an immediate need for the Taiwan General
Government to assign Japanese or Taiwanese teachers to the school. In response to the petition,
several days later, the Taiwan General Government decided to assign Shizuo Muraoka
and his wife, Sen, to the new Tōē School located in the city’s Qilu

area.208 It

was at this point that the educational network comprising Japan, Taiwan, and Shantou formally
got underway.
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Shantou’s Tōē school accommodated two kinds of students: Taiwanese students and local
Chinese students. For the former subjects, Japan aimed to provide them with a Japanese-style
education to cultivate loyal subjects of the Japanese empire; for the latter subjects, the Taiwan
General Government presumed that the Chinese students who attended Shantou’s Tōē School
and who learned Japanese would become pro-Japan in their outlook. In other words, the function
of Shantou’s Tōē School addressed not only the imperial responsibilities of Taiwanese residents
there but also nishi shinzen

(Japan-China friendship). Japan regarded its schools and

hospitals in China as “cultural institutions” that could strengthen this Sino-Japanese friendship,
chiefly by winning over the minds and hearts of Chinese people. Imperial Japan’s project of
enlarging Japanese influence in China through the establishment of Japan-approved education
for Chinese was influenced by similar projects undertaken by Western powers.
After Shantou opened as a treaty port, the British and the Americans established
Shantou-based Christian schools accommodating Chinese students. Japan entered Shantou much
later than these Western powers and, in many ways, imitated them. The nominal founders and
managers of Tōē School and the Japanese Elementary School in Shantou were members of
Shantou’s Japanese Residents Association, but it was the Taiwan General Government that
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provided most of the assistance and direction, including assigning teachers to these schools and
financing them.209
The first principal of the school, Shizuo Muraoka

(1872−1919), was born in

Gunma Prefecture in Japan. He graduated from the Taiwan General Government’s Japanese
Language School (

) in 1898 and, later that year, joined the staff at Kokugo denshūjō

(Japanese Short Course)210 in Yilan, Taiwan. In October 1898, he received a
teaching license for public schools,211 permitting him to teach at public schools accommodating
Taiwanese students. From 1905 to 1914, he taught at several public schools, including Touwei
and Luodong

in the Yilan area of Taiwan. Because of Muraoka’s prestige as a

teacher, in 1915, the Taiwan General Government assigned him to be the first principal of
Shantou’s Tōē School. His wife, Sen, was assigned to teach at the Japanese Elementary School
in the same city

she had previously been teaching at public schools in the Yilan area.212
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The Muraoka couple, as the first Japanese teachers to Shantou, contributed greatly to the
establishment of Shantou’s Japanese educational institutions. And specifically, as the first
principal of Tōē School, Muraoka worked tirelessly in his position. At first, he and other staff
would hold classes at local people’s houses in the Qilu area, where the attending students
numbered only about twenty. In 1917, Muraoka opened new classes on Shantou’s Fu-an Street
(

), resulting in growing enrollment of students. In the same year, the Taiwan General

Government granted the school significant funds for the purchase of land and for the
construction of a new building, and Muraoka was the main supervisor of this project. During the
construction phase, there were several setbacks from natural and human disasters, including a
tremendous earthquake in February 1918, a storm in June 1918, and the Constitutional Protection
War (1917−1922).213 After the earthquake, Muraoka sent an update report entitled “Shantou
Earthquake Report” to the Taiwan General Government, reporting the damage to the school.
This report was published in Taiwan kyōiku, the most important periodical about education in
colonial Taiwan.214 In 1918, during the Constitutional Protection War, Taiwan kyōiku published
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Muraoka’s article “Swatō tsūshin” (News from Shantou), mentioning that with the geographical
shift in fighting to Amoy, the markets in Shantou were stabilizing and the attendance of students
was getting back to usual.215 In June 1919, Muraoka died from cholera. The Japanese
government named him a recipient of the Order of the Sacred Treasure for his contributions in
education.216
After Muraoka’s death, the Taiwan General Government named Kamesaburō Anjū
(1882−1924) the second principal of Tōē School. Anjū was born in Ibaraki
Prefecture, Japan. He graduated from Waseda University and came to Taiwan, teaching at
several public schools in central Taiwan, including Lugang
Shetou

, Erlin

, Beidou

, and

. Because of his prestige in teaching, in 1915, he was assigned to a teaching position

at the Kyokuei Shoin in Amoy, a Japanese-funded school for accommodating children of
Taiwanese sekimin and local Chinese. At that time, the school had plans for the construction of a
new building. Anjū helped the principal Yōhachirō Okamoto

purchase the

necessary land and oversee all the construction work. When the new building

Dairei was
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completed in 1917, Anjū’s reputation soared. In addition to this construction project, Anjū
compiled two books: Kyokuei shoin yōran (Handbook of Kyokuei School) and Kamon jijō (The
circumstances of Amoy). The former presented the school’s basic features, and the latter
provided a contextualized introduction to Amoy. These two books helped disseminate important
information about Japan’s expanding reach both to people in colonial Taiwan and to people in
the Japanese homeland.217
Anjū brought his talents into full play at Shantou’s Tōē School. During his term of service,
he contended with an anti-foreigner movement (the May−Fourth Movement) and the
Constitutional Protection War. Even when circumstances were baleful, he tried to expand the
school’s program, successfully attracting more Chinese students to the institution of learning. In
1920, he established yagaku bu

(night school), and tokusetsu ka

(special

courses), which was a Japanese-language course for Chinese students wanting to study in Taiwan
or in the Japanese homeland. In 1922, Anjū established hoshū ka
courses), and in 1924, he changed “supplementary courses” to jimuka

(supplementary
(practical

business courses), providing education for those who were going to engage in practical business
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affairs. All these offerings were practical, aiming to propagate the Japanese language in Shantou
and to provide Chinese students a practical means for studying in Taiwan or in the Japanese
homeland.
In addition to making the courses in Shantou more substantive, Anjū conducted an intensive
survey of Shantou and communicated the information to people in colonial Taiwan. For example,
in February 1920, Taiwan kyōiku published a report from Anjū,

“Swatō annai”

(An

introduction to Shantou), which presented a useful outline of the city, including the city’s
historical background, the characteristics of the port, the foreign settlements there, and the city’s
commerce, transportation, and diverse facilities, such as hospitals, schools, temples, churches,
hotels, and tea houses.218
Moreover, Anjū compiled two books about Shantou: Swatō shōfu
port of Shantou) and Nichiswago shōkei

(The treaty

(Transnational shortcuts between the

Japanese language and the Shantou dialect). The former book provided comprehensive
information about Shantou’s many features, including local customs, markets, and perhaps most
important for the current study, the Japanese community there; the latter book helped Japanese
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learn the Shantou dialect quickly. These books not only influenced Japanese readers, but also
greatly influenced the local Chinese community. In 1933, eleven years after Swotō shōfu was
published, the Chinese journalist Xue-ying Xie
Shantou zhinan

published a guidebook of the city,

(An introduction to Shantou). Xie greatly contributed to a

Chinese-language guidebook about Shantou, noting that until then, there had been no accurate
and detailed publication on Shantou’s sites and institutions. One of the prefaces of this book was
by Jia-lan Zhang

(1888−1958), a Shantou-based educator, who suggested that Shantou

had changed significantly since the early 1900s and which, in fact, had become a prosperous city.
The Chinese government had experienced serious problems in preserving historically and
culturally relevant documents, and when Zhang served in the Bureau of Education, he could find
almost no documents about educational affairs. A similar situation beset other bureaus, like the
Bureau of Hygiene and the Bureau of Construction. The city mayor Yu-ruo Wang

tried

to compile a new gazetteer of the city; however, he failed owing to a lack of both sufficient funds
and relevant documents. In the final part of the preface, Zhang wrote,

One day I accidentally saw a Shantou guidebook in Japanese on my friend’s desk. It
had been compiled by the principal of Shantou’s Tōē School (I forget the title of the
book). I read the catalogue and the figures, and soon I realized that the work rested
!
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on an extensive survey. It was a pity that foreigners had come to know our city
much better than we had!219

The abovementioned book was Anjū’s Swotō shōfu. Zhang’s preface, itself, reveals two
important facts. First, the lack of relevant documents obstructed the efforts of Chinese
researchers to compile a comprehensive city guide, whereas Anjū proved to be a marvelous
researcher insofar as he overcame this obstacle and gathered significant relevant information,
ultimately compiling a formidable city guidebook. Second, Swotō shōfu encouraged local
Chinese to compile a guidebook about the city. The perception that Japanese knew Shantou
better than Chinese themselves probably made local Chinese, like Zhang and Xie, feel
disempowered.
Anjū was very active in the local Japanese community. In addition to helping manage Tōē
School, he served as the vice president of the Japanese Residents Association and participated in
the association’s Committee on School Affairs. During the last part of his life, he contributed to
the establishment of Shantou’s largest Japanese hospital, the Hakuaikai Hospital (
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) established in 1924, and served on the hospital’s governing council. Furthermore, it seems
that Anjū had a good relationship with local Chinese leaders in Shantou. For example, the leader
of the Guangdong Army, General Jiong-ming Chen

(1878−1933) asked Anjū to

exercise his influence so that seven Chinese literati could safely arrive in Japan for their own
studies. In November 1924, Anjū died at the young age of 43. In December, Taiwan kyōiku
published an article by Yōhachirō Okamoto, Anjū’s previous superior at the Tōē School in
Amoy, to mourn Anjū’s death.220
After Anjū’s death, the Taiwan General Government named Kinosuke Ishii
the third principal of Tōē School. Ishii was born in Nara Prefecture, Japan. He graduated from
the Japanese Language School (

) under the Taiwan General Government in 1908 and,

later that year, received a public-school teaching license.221 From 1909 to 1920, he taught at
several public schools in southern Taiwan (Bingdong). In 1920, he became the supervisor of the
General Affairs Section for the local government in Hualian, a port area in southeast Taiwan.
Five years later, in 1925, the Taiwan General Government assigned Ishii to Shantou, where he
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spent four years at Tōē School. At the end of his stay there, the Taiwan General Government
assigned Ishii to Tōē School in Fuzhou, a city in Fujian Province, where he stayed from 1929
until 1936. Because of his long residence in southern China, Ishii was familiar with local patterns
of life and local current events. On the basis of his familiarity with the region, he published
several articles such as “Swatō wo kataru” (A discourse on Shantou) and “Fuken shō no kyōiku
wo ronji” (The debate surrounding education in Fujian Province).
The fourth principal was Kishio Kitahara

. Kitahara was born in Saga, Japan.

Before his assignment to Shantou, he taught at Keelung’s Japanese Elementary School for one
year. In 1922, Kitahara was assigned to Shantou’s Japanese Elementary School. His wife,
Kitahara Fuji had a similar experience with Kisho. Fuji taught at schools in the Keelung area and
later, in 1922, went to teach at Shantou’s Japanese Elementary School. When the third principal
of Shantou’s Tōē School, Kinosuke Ishii, transferred from Shantou to Fuzhou in 1929, Kitahara
was assigned to the concurrent post of principal of the Tōē School in Shantou. Kitahara
essentially spent eighteen years in Shantou, where he was the principal of Shantou’s two
Japanese educational institutions from 1930 to 1937, when he was transferred to Fuzhou.222 The
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Kitaharas, succeeding the Muraokas, contributed greatly to Shantou’s Japanese educational
affair.
The abovementioned principals

Muraoka, Anjū, Ishii, and Kitahara

were important

contributors to the operation of the Tōē School in Shantou during the period between its
establishment in 1915 and the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937.

4.3 The Profile of Taiwanese Teachers at the Tōē School in Shantou
The network of human resources between colonial Taiwan and Shantou was exemplified by
important figures above and beyond these four prestigious Japanese principals. Unlike the
situation of Shantou’s Japanese Elementary School, which employed no Taiwanese teachers,
many Taiwanese teachers taught at Shantou’s Tōē School. During the period between 1915 and
1945, the Taiwan General Government assigned multiple Taiwanese teachers to Tōē School in
Shantou. Some of these Taiwanese teachers were couples. The first couple was Zhao-xing Zhong
and his wife Feng-jiao Lin Zhong

. Zhao-xing Zhong came from a rich family

in southern Taiwan’s Bingdong area. As a child, he expressed enthusiasm for learning. When
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growing up, he taught at a public school in his hometown, and enjoyed a good reputation as an
educator. His wife, Feng-jiao taught in the Bingdong area, as well. In 1918, the Taiwan General
Government assigned the Zhong couple to Shantou’s Tōē School. The couple stayed on at Tōē
School only for one year before being reassigned to Taiwan for the fulfillment of teaching duties
at the public schools in the Bingdong area.223
The second couple was Feng-zhang Xu

and his wife Bao-zhu Ye Xu

.

Feng-zhang Xu was from Taipei. In 1916, he received a teaching license for public schools, and
then taught at a public girls school in Dadaocheng

in the Taipei area. In 1919, the

Taiwan General Government assigned Xu to Tōē School in Shantou. Xu’s wife, Bao-zhu was
assigned to the same school in 1920. They worked there until 1921, when a reassignment led
them back to Taiwan, teaching at public schools in Taipei.224
The third couple was Chang-sheng Chen

and his wife Yin-zhi Zheng Chen

. The famous Taiwanese anthropologist Chi-lu Chen’ s
Chang-sheng Chen and Yin-zhi Zheng Chen

parents

received assignments to teach at Tōē School in
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Shantou. Chang-sheng Chen was born in Tainan. He graduated from Kokugo Gakkō
in 1918. Later, he taught at Jalixing Public School in his hometown. Yin-zhi Zheng Chen was
from Tainan, as well. She graduated from Kokugo gakkō daisan fuzoku gakkō (the Affiliated
Third School of the National Language School).225 It was the most prestigious educational
institution that Taiwanese girls could attend during the Japanese colonial period. After
graduation, she taught at Xuejia Public School in Tainan.226
In 1921, the Taiwan General Government assigned the Chens to educational positions in
Shantou. The Chens worked at Shantou Tōē School from 1921 to 1927. Chi-lu Chen’s memoir
states that his parents later resigned their teaching jobs and started their own business. They still
lived in Shantou until the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937, when the situation
for Taiwanese in Shantou was worsening, thus compelling the Chen family to flee to Hong Kong.
Here, an interesting question arises: why had the Chens discarded their teaching jobs and
launched their own business in Shantou? The records show that, in general, the Japanese in
Shantou were “people living on salary” (
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governmental institutions like the consulate and schools, while most Taiwanese sekimin were
merchants and shop clerks.227 I think that the Chens’ change of jobs might have been
attributable to such factors as the commercial network of Taiwanese in Shantou and the
competition between Japanese and Taiwanese teachers.
The fourth couple was Jia-chang Zheng

and his wife Jin Pan Zheng

Jia-chang Zheng graduated from Kokugo gakkō

.

in 1923 and taught at several public

schools in the Yilan area. Toward the end of 1927, the Taiwan General Government issued an
order assigning Zheng to Tōē School in Shantou. His wife, Jin Pan, was from a rich mining
family in Pingchi

. In 1926, she graduated from the Taipei Third Girls High School, the

prestigious educational institution for Taiwanese girls. In the following year, when she taught at
the public school in Taipei, she met Jia-chang Zheng. After marrying Zheng, Jin Pan went to
teach at Shantou Tōē School. The Zheng couple stayed in Shantou for five years, and in 1933, he
returned to Taiwan, where he taught at a public school.228
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In addition to the abovementioned Taiwanese couples, some Taiwanese whose hometown
was Taipei taught at Tōē School in Shantou. These individuals include Shang-zhou He
Shui-sheng Yang

, and Shui-chun Ji

,

. Shang-zhou graduated from Kokugo gakkō

in 1918, and went on to teach at Shantou Tōē School for fourteen years (1925−1939).229
Shui-sheng Yang graduated from Kukugo gakkō in 1923, and after teaching at Banquio Public
School in Taipei for several years, he was assigned to Shantou at the end of 1927. He taught at
Tōē School in Shantou for another four years and then transferred to Kyokuei shoin

,

an important Japanese-funded school in Amoy. He left Amoy and returned to Taiwan before the
outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War, and taught at Banquio public school again. In 1940,
Yang resigned from the teaching position and became a businessman. Later, he was elected to
the directorship position at the Banquio Industrial Union.230
Shui-chuan Ji graduated from Kokugo Gakkō in 1926 and, before taking up a teaching in
Shantou, taught at Dalongtong

, Beitou

, and Laosong

public schools in the
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Taipei area. He was interested in teaching music, and published several articles about ways of
combining music and play for students. He stayed in Shantou from 1933 to 1936, and then
returned to Taipei, where he continued to work as a teacher.231 It is interesting to note that all
three teachers—He, Yang, and Ji—were from Taipei, taught at Tōē School in Shantou, and were
assigned by the Taiwan General Government’s Bureau of Education to interpreter positions for
the Japanese military during the Second Sino-Japanese War.232 Yang served as an interpreter for
the Japanese troops from 1938 to 1939, and he published an article entitled “With Brave Soldiers”
describing his experiences during the war.233 During their tours of duty, both He and Ji were
photographed on warships, and the caption under the photos read “Active in the Navy,
Shang-zhou He from Shantou Tōē School” and “Teacher at Miyamae Public School, Shui-chun
Ji.”234
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Shantou Tōē School was the workplace for several Xinzhou-based Taiwanese teachers,
including Qi-rui Jian
Zheng

, A-sheng Guan

and Jing-hua Liu

, Zhang-mei Rao

, Shu-zhun

. Of these teachers, Rao was the only female. Also of

note is Jian, who was unique regarding the longevity of his thirteen-year stay at Shantou’s Tōē
School (1917−1930).235 Indeed, Liu’s stay at Shantou Tōē School covered the whole period of
the Second Sino-Japanese War and permitted him to observe the turbulent situation in Shantou
during the wartime period.236
In addition to Japanese and Taiwanese teachers, Shantou’s Tōē School employed a Chinese
teacher, Fen-sheng Lin

who worked at the school from 1917 to 1930. He was the only

Chinese teacher at any Japanese educational institution in Shantou.
The majority of the abovementioned Japanese and Taiwanese teachers graduated from the
Taiwan General Government’s Japanese Language School, and, after graduation, taught at
schools in Taiwan before being assigned to teaching positions at the Japanese Elementary School
and Tōē School, which constituted the educational beachhead of the Japanese empire in southern
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China. The Japanese government thoroughly navigated this flow of humans, and in particular,
the Taiwan General Government determined the precise contours of these teachers’ stays in
Japan’s informal empire in China.

4.4 Network of Words: Teachers’ Writings about Shantou
Colonial Taiwan and Shantou were connected to each other by more than just
human-resource networks: networks of words brought the two regions closer together. For
example, Japanese and Taiwanese teachers who had been assigned to Shantou and the staff
working at the Taiwan General Government’s Bureau of Education would submit their
documents

in the form of travel writings and reports to periodicals in Taiwan. Through these

“words,” readers in Taiwan, most of whom worked in the field of education, would attain
information and knowledge not only about Tōē School but also about Shantou at large. This
information was comprehensive, covering political and economic matters, both the Chinese-run
schools and the Western-run schools in Shantou, local customs, and the social atmosphere there.
Using these “words,” researchers today can explore the teachers’ perceptions of the city.
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In this section, I will analyze articles published in one of the most important educational
periodicals in colonial Taiwan

Taiwan kyōiku

to explore teachers’ perceptions of Shantou.

The magazine was the publication of Taiwan kyōikukai (the Taiwan Education Association),237
and was in operation for a long period, from 1900 to 1943. It was a first-hand source for
educators seeking to explore the educational history of Taiwan during the Japanese colonial
period. In addition to this magazine, I examined the topic by analyzing some supplementary
periodicals: one was Taichūshū kyōiku

, a publication of Taichū kyōikukai

(the Taizhong Education Association); and another was Reisei

, a publication

oriented toward the alumni hailing from the Taipei First High School, which had been
established in 1898 and which presently is known as Taipei Municipal Jianguo High School, the
best boys school in Taiwan. The writings in the abovementioned periodicals expressed at least
two kinds of perceptions that Japanese and Taiwanese educators had of Shantou: (1) the
perception that Shantou was a dangerous place, exemplified by Chinese civil wars and
anti-Japanese activities (see chapter five for a more detailed discussion of this perception); and (2)
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the perception that comparisons of Chinese schools and Western schools should yield important
information helpful to the Japanese and Taiwanese educators. In the following, I will focus my
discussion on the second perception.
Both Japanese and Taiwanese teachers in Shantou paid much attention to Shantou’s local
educational affairs. In their reports to the Taiwan General Government, in addition to reporting
on the situation of Shantou’s Japanese Elementary School and Tōē School, many writings
reported on Shantou’s Western-funded schools, especially the American- and British-funded
schools. In general, the writings expressed a strong sense of competition with Western powers
regarding the establishment of schools in Shantou. Both Japanese and Taiwanese teachers
reminded the Japanese authority to monitor the Western strategy of establishing schools in
China a strategy intended to expand Western influence there.
It is understandable that these Japanese and Taiwanese teachers had a distinct sense of
competition with Western powers. In contrast to Western powers’ mid-nineteenth century
entrance into Shantou, Japan entered Shantou only after emerging victorious from the First
Sino-Japanese War in 1895. Among the pre-WWI foreign powers in Shantou, Germany
exercised the greatest influence over the port city; and in Shantou’s immediate post-WWI
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circumstances, Britain was the most influential power there. During these years, Japanese reports
about Shantou came from such sources as the city’s Japanese Consuls and from the Taiwan
General Government’s visiting officials, and one common characteristic of these reports was the
Japanese authors’ consciousness of competing Western powers. In general, the Japanese reports
described Western powers’ presence in Shantou and how Japan should learn from its Western
competitors in terms of conducting commercial business and establishing “cultural institutions”
(namely schools and hospitals). Regarding commercial business, the Japanese reports recorded
the number of foreign companies in Shantou, the value of trade (between Shantou and individual
foreign powers), and the number and tonnage of foreign steamships. Regarding “cultural
institutions,” Japanese reports recorded the number and size of foreigner-run schools and
hospitals in Shantou. The authors of these Japanese reports expressed their belief that the
Western powers were essentially buying Chinese people’s hearts and minds by bestowing on
Chinese communities a host of impressive schools and hospitals. The authors further noted that
this strategy seemed to be working quite well. For example, Kiwata Ishii

, a tariff

officer in the Taiwan General Government submitted a report in the early 1920s containing the
following passage:
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Why did Japanese merchants lack commercial power [in Shantou]? The essential
reason lay in Japan’s national character. Generally speaking, Japanese neither had
faith in Chinese nor cooperated with or shared gains and losses with Chinese.
[Japanese] did not have plans to expand and manage sustainable development [in
China], and thus, a severe anti-Japanese atmosphere easily took hold [in Shantou].
Moreover, Japan lacked both experience in managing local institutions and the spirit
of taking up permanent residence in a place for such managerial activities. In
contrast, the British and Americans possessed the equipment for developing
maritime trade, and invested in social and cultural facilities, like schools and
hospitals, to buy Chinese people’s allegiance and to cultivate [their] strength.238

Ishii’s repot directly pointed out the problem of Japanese management in Shantou and why
Japanese influence was inferior to that of British and American powers.
These same reports, when addressing British investment in Chinese cultural matters,
focused on two aspects, religious education and higher education. The British established many
high schools in China, and the graduates were accommodated in Hong Kong University, where
they submitted to strict educational discipline. Moreover, the very best graduates would have a
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chance to pursue higher education in Great Britain. In the 1920s, Chinese students in Shantou
had access to about ten British-run schools, such as the Bethel Christian Church Elementary
School (
(

), Anglo Chinese College (

), and Shude Feminine School

). Most of the British-run schools were located on Wai-ma Road and in the

neighboring area. American investment in China’s cultural business was similar to British
investment insofar as the Americans developed a diverse portfolio covering education, medical
treatment, and religion. In the 1920s, about eight American-run schools in Shantou
accommodated Chinese students, and included the True Light Elementary School (
Baptist Academy (

), and Baptist Girls’ Academy (

were located in the Queshi

),

). Most of these schools

area, an island located opposite the Shantou port. Regardless

of whether these foreign schools were run by British or American, most were Christian and had
been established by Western missionaries.239
Facing so many British-run and American-run Christian schools, the Japanese teachers in
Shantou had ambiguous responses. On the one hand, Japanese teachers admired Western powers’

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
239

Gorō Uchida
, Shin Swatō
(New Shantou). Taihoku: Nanyō kyōkai Taiwan shibu
, 1927, p. 35; Taiwan sōtokufu bunkyō kyoku
(Education Section of Taiwan General
Government), Nanshi nanyō no kyōiku shisetsu
(The educational facilities in southern China
and the South Seas). Taikoku: Taiwan sōtokufu bunkyō kyoku, 1935, pp. 64−65.
!

166!

well-founded plans and generous financial support to these schools, and on the other hand,
Japanese teachers grew convinced that Japan should compete with these Western powers.
Since the British-funded and American-funded schools had been established in Shantou
much earlier than the Japanese-funded schools, local Chinese people tended to experience a
greater sense of awe and wonderment at Europe and America than at Japan. In order to
demonstrate the educational achievements of the Japanese empire to local Chinese residents in
Shantou, the Tōē School held a three-day exhibition of educational works (

,

kyōikuhin tenrankai) in January 1919. The exhibition collected students’ works from multiple
schools, including the Tōē School in Shantou, the Tōē School in Fuzhou, Kyokuei shoin in
Amoy, and many schools in Taiwan. To popularize the exhibition, the Taiwan General
Government had documentary films shown during the exhibition period. The documentaries
presented the streets of Taipei City, the beautiful campuses, and the well-behaved school
children in Taiwan. Owing to the limited number of available seats, Shantou’s Tōē School issued
only seven hundred tickets for showings of the documentaries, but so many people expressed
interest in the films that the school eventually tripled the number of tickets. The Chinese
audience was most impressed with the films depicting Taiwanese students’ handicrafts and the
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Maruyama Zoo. One Japanese teacher

Hiroshi Katase

recorded the event.

Katase was born in Kumamoto Japan. Before acquiring his teaching position in Shantou, he
taught at public schools in Taizhong, Taiwan (1915−1917). In 1918, Katase was assigned to a
teaching position at Tōē School, where he stayed for seven years until 1924. At the end of his
report recording the educational exhibition in January 1919, he wrote, “The exhibition and the
films enabled the Chinese audiences to experience the greatness of Japan; otherwise, they would
have continued to assume that only Britain and the United States were great.”240 (

).
In the same report, Hiroshi Katase stated that visible on the streets of Shantou were
Western-operated schools’ advertisements aimed at recruiting Chinese students. In his report to
the Taiwan General Government, he wrote,

Local schools run by European, Americans, and Chinese used the month of
December in the Lunar Calendar to mark the end of a semester. Many schools held
graduation ceremonies during this month, and around the same time, the streets
everywhere were flooded with leaflets declaring “such-and-such a school is now
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accepting applications from prospective students.” This is the season for recruiting
new children. I heard that the American-run school Zhen-guang Elementary School
had delivered three thousand leaflets!”241

At the end of the above passage, Katase seems to have been expressing
explicitly

whether implicitly or

a sense of competition with the Americans.

The second principal at the Tōē School, Anjū, suggested that the most attractive aspect of
education in Shantou was the marvelous collection of British and American schools there.
Through carefully constructed programs and English-language lessons, the schools attracted
Chinese students. Moreover, the schools, which tended to include Western religious curricula,
served as forums where students could discuss current events, organize boycotts, and win over
local people’s hearts through the presentation of popular dramas and films. Anjū wrote,

Recently, I heard that American Baptist churches are planning to establish an
architecturally magnificent stone-made girls school in Kakuseki. Moreover, they are
planning to invest 50−60 thousand fu in establishing more junior high schools in
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Shantou. I heard that they already bought a vast swath of land along the Han River
[for the construction of the schools].242

.

The description expresses Anjū’s strong sense of wonder at and perhaps an equally strong
sense of competition with the Western powers.
Regarding this competition with Western-funded schools, the Japanese teacher of the Tōē
School in Shantou, Matsugorō Okabe

, offered some telling comments. Okabe was

born in Kumamoto, Japan. He taught at public schools in Tainan beginning in 1913. Between
October 1924 and March 1925, the Taiwan General Government assigned him to a position at
the Tōē School in Shantou. During his stay in Shantou, he visited other cities in Guangdong
Province, and even Hong Kong. The section of Okabe’s report addressing the recruitment of
Chinese students asserted that the Shantou’s Tōē School faced two problems in competing with
Shantou’s American- and British-funded schools: problem one was the practicability of the
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Japanese language; and problem two was continuity of education. The number of students at the
Tōē School was declining. Every year about one hundred students would enter the school, but
when these one hundred students would move up one grade, many of them would drop out. What
accounted for this phenomenon? Okabe contended that in addition to the anti-Japanese
atmosphere in Shantou, the practicability of the Japanese language was an important reason for
students’ decision to transfer from the Tōē School to non-Japanese schools in the area. For
Chinese students studying either in the Japanese homeland or in colonial Taiwan and hoping to
maintain contact with Japanese society following the completion of their education, learning
Japanese was practical. But for Chinese students who wanted to work locally in China, English
typically proved to be more useful than Japanese. Most students who dropped out of the Tōē
School transferred to Western schools. If the Japanese language was not indispensable to
Chinese students, why did Chinese parents send their children to Shantou’s Tōē School to learn
Japanese? Okabe attributed this behavior to two factors, one being psychological and the other
economic. As for the psychological factor, the Chinese parents believed that sending their
children to attend a Japanese-funded school would make them more competitive in the future and,
meanwhile, granted the parents an opportunity to express their tastes in education. As for the
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economic factor, the Tōē School’s tuition was more affordable than the Chinese-run and
Westerner-run schools’ tuitions in Shantou.243
In addition to the issue of the practicability of the Japanese language, a significant problem
besetting Shantou’s Tōē School as it competed with Western-funded schools for Chinese
students was “continuity of education.” Okabe asserted that to influence development in China,
Europeans and American had established extensive educational institutions in various parts of
the country. He noted that the mission schools were built in grand architectural styles and
boasted dormitories and sports grounds. He went on to note that Western powers had thus
skillfully combined mission work with education and attracted the attention of many Chinese
children and their families: these academic strongholds in the centers of big cities and branch
schools in neighboring suburbs even included kindergartens. Okabe’s assertions seem to be
consistent with the facts. Indeed, Chinese students who finished their junior-high courses at the
schools could earn eligibility to enroll in a senior high school or a college in Western countries.
Thus, it was popular for Chinese students to study abroad in the West. Moreover, missionaries at
Western-oriented schools based in China would help Chinese students search for work
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(2)
, vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 39−41

opportunities upon graduation. At the end of his report, Okabe wrote, “It is a great pity that,
despite Shantou’s proximity to our country [Japan], our educational system in China was so
inferior to that of the Western powers.”244 (

).
As an educator concerned about Japan’s educational management in Shantou, Okabe
commented that it was a pity to see Japan investing large amounts of money and human
resources in students who would eventually drop out of Shantou’s Tōē School at the half-way
mark. In order to fulfill the mission of these Japanese-funded schools (which was essentially to
earn the admiration of Chinese students and to expand Japanese influence in China), Okabe
argued that there was an urgent need to establish an overall program of Shantou-based vocational
schools capable of accommodating not only Chinese but also Japanese and other foreign students
there schools similar to Taiwan’s vocational school directly under the jurisdiction of the
Taiwan General Government.245
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The abovementioned writings expressed Japanese teachers’ ambiguous emotions toward
many Christian schools established by Western powers in Shantou. As noted previously
regarding a similar context, on the one hand, Japanese teachers admired Western powers’
generous financing of educational institutions; and on the other hand, Japanese teachers
expressed their strong sense of competition between Japan and the Western powers.
In general, Shantou’s Japanese and Taiwanese teachers observed that Western powers,
especially the Americans and British, had been skillfully expanding their influence in Shantou by
establishing grand mission schools and by providing comprehensive long-term curricula to
Chinese students.
Concerning Shantou’s Chinese-funded schools, Japanese and Taiwanese teachers pointed to
myriad problems, including unstable finances and low teacher salaries. Kinosuke Ishii, serving as
the third principal of Shantou’s Tōē School, suggested that the development of the Chinese
educational program in Shantou faced many disturbances, including the region’s unstable
political situation and local government’s disproportionate funding of military affairs among
total expenditure. Compared with the Chinese schools in Shantou, the city’s foreigner-operated
schools had stable finances and sufficient facilities, which attracted students and which, thus,
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made these schools’ enrollment much greater than the corresponding numbers for Chinese
schools. The faculty in foreigner-operated schools enjoyed a relatively stable life, too. In these
senses, the faculty and staff in Shantou’s Chinese schools would have been envious of the city’s
foreigner-operated schools.246
Moreover, some Japanese teachers

like the third principal of the Tōē School in Shantou,

Kinosuke Ishii criticized Chinese political parties’ excessive influence on education in China.
Ishii noted, for example, that after the Guangdong Army took control of Shantou, the nature of
schools’ commencements changed for political reasons. Previously, the five color flag (the flag
of the Beiyang Government) had been on display during commencements, but now, the flag on
display was that of the Republic of China. In addition, students were now to bow to the iconic
image of Sun Yat-sen during commencements, and then were to read his testament out loud, sing
songs of the Chinese Civil Revolution, and shout slogans in praise of the Guangdong Nationalist
Government. Ishii’s observation indicates the instability of Chinese schools in Shantou at that
time. Changes in local leaders and in the dominant ideology triggered changes in school events
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4 (One year in Shantou, part four), Taiwan

like commencements. These changes reflected the overall turbulence gripping Shantou.247
At Shantou’s Tōē School, the Taiwanese teacher Jia-chang Zheng

pointed out that

although Shantou had made great progress recently in the realm of material life, spiritual life in
the city was poor and its cultural industry was underdeveloped. According to Zheng’s report, the
Chinese schools there were suffering from two problems: First, the number of schools was not
small, but the quality of these establishments’ curriculum and instruction was disappointing.
Some of these establishments actually were small-scale tutoring centers even though they bore
the title of “school.” Second, most of the schools were private: only five of the thirty-seven
elementary schools and two of the twenty junior high schools were public. Also, most of the
schools had been established by private entities, including (1) native place associations, (2)
benevolent groups, (3) labor unions, (4) teachers overseeing for-profit private schools, (5) and
Christian churches. Zheng added that in Shantou’s Chinese schools, full-time jobs for teachers
were rare. The Chinese society did not consider women capable of being top teachers. Regarding
salary, the earnings of a male teacher in the Chinese countryside could cover just one single
person’s living expenses. Compared with teachers’ salaries in Taiwan, those earned by Chinese
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teachers in Shantou were paltry. The size of a profession’s typical salary can powerfully
influence people’s perception of the profession: in colonial Taiwan, teachers were held in high
esteem, but in Shantou, teachers’ worth was associated with their poor remuneration.248
Moreover, Japanese teacher Matsugorō Okabe pointed out that although Chinese schools
throughout the country were managed by the new Chinese government’s educational system,
established in 1912, Chinese schools remained primitive. The underdevelopment of education in
China was closely related to China’s tumultuous political conditions. Most schools lacked money
and could not sustain themselves satisfactorily. Lacking sufficient financial support from the
government, schools had to impose high tuitions (15 to 20 yuan annually), which accounted for
the better part of schools’ incomes. However, even high tuitions could not erase the difficulties
in maintaining the schools, and thus the principals sought to pad these incomes with funds raised
from individual Chinese, including those living overseas, particularly those in Southeast Asia.249
According to Chi-lu Chen’s memoirs, he traveled to Shantou with his parents, who had been
assigned by the Taiwan General Government to teaching positions at Tōē School. For one year,
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Chen studied at Tōē School, which accommodated the children of Taiwanese sekimin. Later, his
parents decided to transfer him to a local public school because they frowned upon the idea of
teaching their own son. In this situation, Chen spent six years at First Elementary School in
Shantou. Chen recollected, “As for my six years in a Chinese elementary school, I don’t have
any special memory. The only thing I remember is the school’s old and shabby condition.”250
The abovementioned writings strongly suggest that many Japanese teachers, Taiwanese
teachers, and even Taiwanese students like Chi-lu Chen observed dreadful conditions in Chinese
schools.

4.5 A 2013 Interview with 83-year-old Ms. Mei-hua Zheng
Mei-hua Zheng

is the daughter of Jia-chang Zheng

and Jin Pan Zheng

, both of whom were teachers at Shantou’s Tōē School during the period between the
late 1920s and the early 1930s. Mei-hua was born in Shantou in July 1930, and her two brothers
were born in Shantou, as well. The Zheng family lived in the Tōē School’s teachers dormitory.
In September 1931, the Manchurian Incident occurred (Mei-hua was 14 months old), and in
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January of the following year, the Shanghai Incident occurred. The two incidents reflected the
deeply troubled Sino-Japanese relations at the time, and the Zheng family, like many Taiwanese
and Japanese families in China, repatriated to Taiwan as a consequence. Both Jia-chang Zheng
and Jin Pan continued their teaching professions at schools in Taiwan.
However, the relationship between the Zheng family and Shantou did not end with this
repatriation. In July 1941, the Zheng family again moved to Shantou because Taiwan General
Government had assigned Jia-chang Zheng to an interpreter position in Shantou, which had been
under Japanese occupation since June 1939. Mei-hua enrolled in Shantou’s Tōē School as a
fifth-grade student. This time, she stayed in Shantou for one and a half years until her graduation
from the Tōē School in February 1943. Because Jia-chang Zheng was no longer a member of
Tōē School’s faculty at this time, the Zheng family were unable to reside in the teachers
dormitory, and they thus opted for a four-floor rented townhouse located in the city’s Tongyi
houlu (

) neighborhood. The owner of the townhouse was a successful Shantou-based

businessman in Southeast Asia. The townhouse itself was well designed, and even in the more
than a half century that has passed since Mei-hua left the house, she still vividly remembers its
layout. During the interview, she recalled a small court-yard with landscape gardening just inside
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the entrance. The original arrangement of the house was such that the first floor was for the host,
the second floor was for the legal wife, the third floor was for the concubine, and the fourth floor
was the balcony. In the backyard was a beautiful old well. Because the structure’s owner and his
family had left for Southeast Asia, Mei-hua and her family could live comfortably in this
perfectly acceptable residence.
Regarding school life in Shantou, Mei-hua’s recollections reveal that there were thirty some
students in her class. All were Taiwanese, though some had been born to Shantou-based mothers.
Each grade had only one class, and Mei-hua’s teacher was Kazuhiko Era

, who was

responsible for the fifth and sixth grades. Mr. Era was very young and just married. His wife,
remembered as a great beauty, gave birth to a baby boy for him. Not only was Mei-hua a student
at Shantou’s Tōē School but so too were both of her younger brothers. One brother was in Mr.
Shirō Inokuchi’s

class, and the other brother was in Mr. Kido Morikazu’s

class. Mei-hua was most impressed with her teacher Fujie Tajima

, who was

responsible for home economics. Ms. Tajima was friendly and earnest as she instructed students
on the finer points of such activities as sewing. She also taught at Shantou’s Japanese Elementary
School, and on some occasions, Ms. Tajima—if she were too busy to make the trip to the Tōē
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School—would ask Mei-hua and her classmates to go to the Japanese Elementary School for
class there. Mei-hua recorded that the relationships between students and teachers were close.
After class, they often went to teachers’ homes (i.e., the dormitories) to play and found the
premises very clean and well designed.
Sometimes, the Tōē School would hold field trips in Shantou city. Students would tour the
city in Japanese military vehicles with one soldier as the driver and one soldier as a guard. After
the field trips, school teachers would ask Mei-hua and her classmates to record their thoughts on
the events of the day, and she even submitted one of her papers to a Shantou-based newspaper
company.
Among the Taiwanese teachers at Tōē School, Shui-sheng Yang

was the Zheng

family’s best friend. Jia-chang visited Shui-sheng’s home almost every night for a chat and he
told Mei-hua and his other children that Yang was a respected senior. Moreover, the Chens
Chang-sheng Chen

and Yin-zhi Zheng Chen

were familiar with

Jia-chang’s family. Because Yin-zhi and Jia-chang had the same surname, Zheng, Jia-chang
regarded Yin-zhi as his sister and the two families were close. Yin-zhi would bring his son Qi-lu
Chen, who became a famous international anthropologist, to Mei-hua’s home and Mei-hua’s
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mother, Jin Pan was responsible for his preschool teaching. Furthermore, Zhang-mei Rao
visited Zheng’s family often because Rao and Jin Pan had graduated from the same
girls school in Taiwan.
On weekends, Mei-hua’s family would go to Shantou’s largest park, Zhong-shan Park,
where she saw many local people wearing Chinese-style robes while playing soccer. Mei-hua’s
parents would bring her and her siblings to restaurants near the port to enjoy Chaozhou cuisine
(

).251 Her favorite dish was crispy crab, a delicacy for which crabs were coated in batter

and deep-fried. Zheng’s family hired a local Chinese female as a helpmate, who happened to be
good at making Shantou-style soy-sauce pickles. First, she would stir-fry raw olives and Chinese
pickled vegetables in peanut oil. Then she would place the cooked ingredients in a pot and store
them there for one year, until the olives had turned a purplish color. Shantou people were used to
eating these Shantou-style pickles with porridge for their breakfast.
The local markets would sell various kinds of fruits, soft Japanese sweets, and kasutera, a
Nagasaki-style honey cake. Mei-hua’s mother sometimes brought her to a pastry shop named Tai
yang guan
, where shoppers could purchase refined candies. Moreover, professional
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dressmaking activities in Shantou were very progressive. Mei-hua’s parents would occasionally
take her to a local dressmaker for new tailored clothes. Sometimes, Mei-hua’s mother would
bring her to the Nan Sheng Department Store (

), a seven-floor magnificently laid

out building constructed in 1932 and featuring Shantou’s earliest usable elevator. There, the
mother and daughter would shop for daily-use articles.
When Shantou was under Japanese occupation, the city’s Japanese and Taiwanese residents
received “military tickets,” a kind of money that buyers and sellers could use for daily-use
articles. One military ticket equaled one hundred yuan. Mei-hua and her classmates at Tōē
School would tear military tickets in half and declare each half equal to fifty yuan. With this
currency, they were actually able to rent comic books; in fact, half a ticket could rent about ten
comic books. According to Mei-hua, her friends and she would sit in the shade of trees and read
comic books, which tended to be quite different from comic books today: back then, each page
of a comic book would present only one square, in contrast to post-war comic books, with each
page presenting multiple squares.
Mei-hua sometimes went to Kakuseki

, an island across from Shantou Port, to her

classmate’s home for playtime. Kakuseki was a British settlement and had many Western-style
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houses and gardens. The classmate’s father had already passed away and her mother, who hailed
from Shantou, worked at an American Baptist Church in Kakuseki as a cleaner. As recollected
by Mei-hua, the church was very clean and the sounds of piano playing could be heard from
somewhere inside.
In February 1942, Mr. Era brought Mei-hua and other students back to Taiwan by the
Japanese steamship Hongkong Maru

. Their purpose was to participate in the entrance

examinations for junior high school in Taiwan, held in March. After arriving in Taipei, Mr. Era
and the students stayed at the Hikōya Hotel near the Imperial Taipei University Affiliated
Hospital. In the morning, Era gave students lessons for preparing for the entrance examinations,
and in the afternoon, students undertook further preparations. In early March, students were
dismissed from their preparatory studies and went back to their hometowns to take the entrance
examinations. Mr. Era returned to Shantou at that time, as well.
Later, Mei-hua entered a junior high school, the same school that her mother Jin Pan had
attended. When Mei-hua started her new life as a junior high school student in Taiwan, Jia-chang
Zheng still lived in Shantou, but he was working no longer as an interpreter for the Japanese
Army, but as a businessman helping to oversee the operations of the Yoshimura Company (
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), a rice-and-grains business centered in Shantou’s suburbs. Before the end of the Second
World War, Jia-Chang decided to return to Taiwan, but chose to make the trip by a private
fishing boat rather than by a Japanese steamship, which would have been a likely target for
Allied forces. Of course, it was an extremely dangerous voyage one way or the other. Before his
departure for Taiwan, Jia-chang attended Shantou’s Mazu Temple, where he prayed for safety.
Luck turned out to be on his side, as he arrived safely in Taiwan.
In conclusion, Mei-hua’s recollections of this period in her life provide us with precious
records of Taiwanese students who attended Shantou’s Tōē School between 1941 and 1943. For
Mei-hua, it was a precious time, which she spent with her parents, siblings, classmates, and
teachers in Shantou, a beautiful port city with many Westerners, Japanese, and Taiwanese
residents.
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4.6 Brief Conclusion
Regarding Japanese imperialism, Peter Duus reminds us that we should consider both the
formal empire and the informal empire of Japan to understand Japan’s influence on wider East
Asia. The scope of Japan’s informal empire sometimes may not have been as clear as Japan’s
formal empire. This chapter reflects an attempt to explore, from a transnational framework, some
of the connections between one of Japan’s formal territories (here, colonial Taiwan) and one of
Japan’s informal territories (here, the treaty port of Shantou). I have focused on a group of
“Japanese” teachers (including Taiwanese) whom the Taiwan General Government assigned to
teaching positions at Tōē School in Shantou. I have analyzed their stories and writings in order to
explore Japanese imperial formations in colonial Taiwan and in Shantou. It is clear that the
Taiwan General Government was the main organization responsible for the connection between
colonial Taiwan and Shantou, at least in the field of education. In addition to assigning teachers
and financing schools, the Taiwan General Government published teachers’ reports and travel
writings in periodicals, such as Taiwan kyōiku. By means of these periodicals, people in the field
of education in colonial Taiwan attained information about Shantou. To varying degrees, readers
in Taiwan shared Japanese teachers’ perceptions of Shantou, including perceptions of Chinese
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schools’ status in Shantou, of Western-based schools in Shantou, and of Japanese teachers’
self-examination stemming from Japan’s management of education in Shantou. My examination
of Japanese teachers’ writings specifically reveals these teachers’ strong sense of competition
with Western-funded schools in Shantou. In sum, these travelers under the blanket of Japanese
imperialism

the teachers at Tōē School in Shantou

reflect the significant transnational

connection among imperial Japan, colonial Taiwan, and the treaty port of Shantou.
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Table 4-1 Japanese Teachers at Shantou’s Tōē School (1915−1944)
Name

Native place

Period of designation

Shizuo Muraoka

Gunma

1915−1919

Kamesaburō Anjū

Ibaraki

1920−1924

Kinosuke Ishii

Nara

1925−1928

Hiroshi Katase

Kumamoto

1918−1924

Masaru Wada

Kagawa

1925−1934

Kishio Kitahara

Saga

1930−1936

Shirō Inokuchi

Hiroshima

1928−1929; 1940−1944

Noboru Kawasaki

Fukushima

1930

Masaichi Kubo

Nagasaki

1931−1935

Morikazu Kido

Hiroshima

1936−1944

Fujie Tajima

Hiroshima

1940−1941;1943−1944

Tsuruji Gondō

Fukuoka

1941

Tokuji Nakashima

Nagasaki

1941−1944

Kazuhiko Era

Yamaguchi

1941−1944

Toshie Nakashima

Nagano

1942−1944
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Table 4-2 Taiwanese Teachers at Shantou’s Tōē School (1915−1944)
Name

Native place

Period of designation

Qi-rui Jian

Xinzhu

1917−1930

Zhao-xing Zhong

Bingdong

1918

Feng-jiao Lin Zhong

Bingdong

1918

A-sheng Guan

Xinzhu

1919−1924

Feng-zhang Xu

Taipei

1919−1920

Bao-zhu Ye Xu

Taipei

1919−1920

Chang-sheng Chen

Tainan

1921−1927

Yin-zhi Zheng Chen

Tainan

1921−1926

Shu-zhun Zheng

Xinzhu

1921−1927

Shang-zhou He

Taipei

1925−1939

Zhang-mei Rao

Xinzhu

1928−1931

Jia-chang Zheng

Taipei

1928−1932

Jin Pan Zheng

Taipei

1930

Shui-sheng Yang

Taipei

1928−1931

Shui-chuan Ji

Taipei

1933−1935

Shu-zhi Yu

Taipei

1935

Jing-hua Liu

Xinzhu

1937−1944
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Fig. 4-1 Teachers at Shantou’s Tōē School. (Source: Mei-hua Zheng.)
[Illustration] In the front line on the far left was Inokuchi Shirō and on the far right was the Chinese teacher
Fen-sheng Lin, who taught the Chinese language. In the back line on the far left was Jia-chang Zheng, third from the
left was Qi-rui Jian, on the far right was Shang-zhou He, and third from the right was Zhang-mei Rao.

Fig. 4-2 Teachers and Guests at Shantou’s Tōē School. (Source: Mei-Hua Zheng.)
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Fig. 4-3 Teachers at Shantou’s Tōē School. (Source: Mei-hua Zheng.)
[Illustration] On the far left was Jia-chang Zheng, second from the left was Inokuchi Shirō, third from the
left was Shang-zhou He, in the middle was Zheng-mei Rao, and on the far right was Qi-rui Jian.

Fig. 4-4 Teachers and Students at Shantou’s Tōē School. (Source: Mei-Hua Zheng.)
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Fig. 4-5 Jia-Chang Zheng in Shantou. (Source: Mei-Hua Zheng.)

Fig. 4-6. Jin Pan Zheng in Shantou. (Source: Mei-Hua Zheng.)
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Fig. 4-7 Wedding photo of Jia-chang Zheng and Jin Pan Zheng in Shantou.
(Source: Mei-hua Zheng.)

Fig. 4-8 The Yoshimura Company in Shantou. (Source: Mei-hua Zheng.)
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Fig. 4-9 Nan Sheng Department Store. (Source: Photo by Lin-Yi Tseng, 2013.)

Fig. 4-10 Mazu Temple in Shantou. (Source: Photo by Lin-Yi Tseng, 2013.)
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Chapter 5: The Image of Shantou in Japanese Writings from the 1910s to the
Outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937

Anti-Japanese boycotts occurred frequently in many Chinese ports.
However, Shantou was the site of the most pronounced ones.

Kiwata Ide

, 1922

5.1 Anti-Foreign Sentiment: The Character of Shantou’s Native Residents

Since the 1910s, the Japanese government had been carrying out the “nanshin” (Southward
Advance) policy, and thus, the Taishō period (1912−1926) was called “the period of the Taishō
Southward Advance.” During this period, the Taiwan General Government sent a great number
of Japanese (and some Taiwanese) to southern China, where they collected information and
explored business opportunities. Meanwhile, large Japanese enterprises like Mitsui and the
Osaka Shipping Company

in cooperation with the government’s Southward Advance policy

established branch offices in southern China and assigned staff to local branch offices. Moreover,
the Taiwan General Government assigned a group of Japanese and Taiwanese teachers to
!
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Japanese-financed schools in southern China. As one of the treaty ports in southern China,
Shantou was the destination of many Japanese travelers and all these officials, businessmen, and
teachers produced reams of reports and travelogues about Shantou.
As citizens who enjoyed most-favored nation treatment in China, Japanese were, if not
colonizers, at least “semi-colonizers” benefiting from diverse privileges in Chinese treaty ports.
This chapter raises the question of how Japanese travel writings depicted Shantou, which was an
important part of Japan’s informal empire in China. Did these writings present unique features of
Shantou that differentiated the site from other southern Chinese treaty ports, such as Xiamen
(Amoy)? In responding to these questions, my approach has been to analyze writings, including
travelogues, official reports, and news reports authored by Japanese who had travelled and
resided in Shantou, and in this way, I have reconstructed these communities’ perceptions of
Shantou. Concerning my approach to these topics, I have been inspired by Emma Teng, who
used travel writings, pictures, and maps to discuss the evolution of sovereignty and territorial
concepts that existed between the non-Western Qing empire and peripheral Taiwan.252 By
analyzing the writings of Japanese about Shantou, I will explore Japanese perceptions of Shantou.
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This chapter illuminates

in Pratt’s words253 how the Japanese used imperial gaze to see

Shantou, an important contact zone for Chinese, Japanese, Taiwanese sekimin, and other
foreigners. This chapter shows that Japanese writings reflected the experiences of Japanese in
Shantou, and the most powerful of these many experiences were of Shantou’s strident
anti-Japanese atmosphere and political instability.
Kiwata Ide

, a revenue officer in the Taiwan General Government, was one of

many Japanese travelers who visited Shantou during the Japanese colonial period in Taiwan, and
his writings reflected many Japanese perceptions of Shantou—the young treaty port in southern
China. Ide was born in Nagano Prefecture, Japan, in 1880. In 1909, he received a degree from
the Department of Politics at Imperial Tokyo University. In 1915, when he was 35 years old, he
served in the Taiwan General Government’s Bureau of Financial Affairs. In the following years,
he headed customs offices in Danshui, Keelung, Kaohsiung, and Taipei.254 In March 1921, Ide
was assigned by the Taiwan General Government to a one-month-long sojourn in southern China.
He went to Xiamen (Amoy), Shantou, Guangzhou, and Hong Kong. In December 1922, the
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widely read newspaper Taiwan jihō in colonial Taiwan published one of Ide Kiwata’s articles
entitled “Trade in Shantou,” an investigative report based on his visits in 1921. A paragraph of
this article suggested, “Anti-Japanese boycotts occurred frequently in many Chinese ports.
However, Shantou was the site of the most pronounced ones.”255 (

Many Japanese travelogues and reports noted intense anti-Japanese sentiment and activities
in Shantou. Tokusaburō Ida

, a former head of the Shantou branch office of the

Osaka Shipping Company (Ōsaka Shosen Kaisha) suggested that, before the Japanese occupation
of Shantou in June 1939, two main reasons explain the feeble connection between Shantou and
Japan. First, Shantou exhibited the most pronounced anti-Japanese sentiment of any city in China.
Every two or three years, the city would be the site of a significant anti-Japanese movement.
Second, Shantou had been under British control since the latter half of the nineteenth century,
which rendered Shantou an extension of Hong Kong. These two reasons underlie the difficulties
experienced by Japanese seeking to expand in Shantou.256
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As the head of the branch office of the Osaka Shipping Company in Shantou, Ida’s
comments are pertinent. We might pose the question: What made Shantou the site of the most
pronounced anti-Japanese sentiment of any city in China? Some Japanese travelers suggested
that the native residents of Shantou possessed a pronounced anti-foreigner streak. For example,
Kiwata Ide

pointed out,

Shantou’s native residents are ungrateful, suspicious, and stubborn. They have had
xenophobic tendencies since ancient times, and they are utilitarian and ruthless. On
the other hand, they are easy to unite on the basis of local community and have
exhibited the virtues of diligence and thriftiness. I heard from those who had lived
there that the diligence of local farmers far surpasses that of Japanese farmers.257

This passage expresses Ida’s perception of the character of Shantou’s native residents.
Kinosuke Ishii

, the third president of the Tōē School in Shantou, a

Japanese-financed school in the city catering chiefly to Taiwanese and local Chinese children,
expressed opinions similar to those of Kiwata Ide concerning the character of Shantou’s native
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, p. 86

residents. Ishii was born in Nara Prefecture, Japan in 1880. In 1908, he graduated from the
Taiwan General Government’s affiliated Kokugo Gakkō (Japanese Language School). From
1909 to 1920, he taught several public schools in southern Taiwan. In 1925, when the principal
of the Tōē School in Shantou died, the Taiwan General Government took note of Ishii’s prior
experience running schools and, on this basis, selected him to be the third principal of the Tōē
School, prompting his four-year stay in Shantou.258 As a sojourning Japanese in Shantou, Ishii
observed the local people close up, he commented that Shantou’s native residents were naturally
“brave, aggressive, and good at exploring overseas. Many residents had relocated to Siam and
Singapore at a young age.” (
). Shantou indeed was the
hometown of millions of Chinese workers in Southeast Asia, especially in Siam. Ishii further
commented that these people’s aptitude at relocating in far-flung areas while preserving a
cultural heritage was probably “due to their possession of strong self-awareness, and violent
infiltrations by foreigners have sunk deep into their frame of mind, resulting in deeply set
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anti-foreign sentiment.”259 (
). Ishii’s comments specifically on the xenophobic tendencies of Shantou’s native
residents can prove useful in the context of the current study’s discussions.
The abovementioned writings imply that many Japanese perceptions of Shantou were of an
uninviting place, since the city’s native residents were allegedly anti-foreign. According to a
principal of the Japanese Elementary School in Shantou, Japanese citizens sojourning or residing
in Shantou faced four principal difficulties: bad sanitation, an intense anti-Japanese atmosphere,
an unstable political situation, and a lack of educational institutions for Japanese children.260
After examining a good number of Japanese writings, I can state with a considerable degree of
certainty that most Japanese sojourners who traveled to Shantou observed an intense
anti-Japanese atmosphere and political instability there.
Shantou was not the only Chinese city noted for its anti-Japanese atmosphere in the first
half of the twentieth century. Since Japan’s victory over China in the First Sino-Japanese War in
1895, the incursion of Japanese imperialism infuriated Chinese people, who organized strikes
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, no. 44, p.165 (July

,

and boycotts of Japanese goods in protest. Many other Chinese cities registered anti-Japanese
movements. Anyone familiar with early Republican history would agree that its tale includes
numerous Chinese civil wars among warlords in the first half of the twentieth century. For
example, in the Constitutional Protection Movement (1917-1922), war broken out between Qirui
Duan’s

Beiyang Government and Sun Yat-sen, and Shantou became a battlefield fought

over by various warlords. The subsequent changes in Shantou’s ruling government made the
local residents and Japanese sojourners uneasy. In the following, I will examine Japanese
writings in different time periods from about the 1910s through the 1930s to explore in greater
detail Japanese perceptions of Shantou.
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5.2 Japanese Writings on Shantou’s Reaction to the May Fourth Movement

Japanese writings about Shantou in the 1910s show that the two greatest threats besetting
most Japanese living in Shantou were political instability and intense anti-Japanese sentiment.
Hiroshi Katase

, a teacher at a Japanese-financed Tōē School in Shantou, observed

the situation at that time. Born in Japan’s Kumamoto Prefecture, Katase had taught from 1915 to
1917 at a public school in Taizhong, which is located in central Taiwan. In 1918, the Taiwan
General Government had assigned Katase to a teaching position at the Tōē School in Shantou,
where he stayed until 1924.261 During his stay in Shantou, he submitted reports about the local
situation to the Taiwan General Government’s Bureau of Education, and some of his reports
were published in Taiwan kyōiku

(Taiwan Education), a publication overseen by

Taiwan Kyōikukai (the Taiwan Education Association). In October 1919, a report entitled
“Newsletter from Shantou” by Katase was published in Taiwan kyōiku. The article suggested that
at the start of the second semester in August, only thirty some students attended classes owing to
widespread anti-Japanese sentiment and to a lingering cholera epidemic. The anti-Japan
demonstrations made Japanese goods unsalable, and Japanese businessmen were at a loss as to
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how they should respond. Katase wrote, “The anti-Japanese [activities] at this time taught the
egoistic Japanese businessmen a lesson.”262 (

These activities were Shantou’s response to the May Fourth Movement. The May Fourth
Movement was an anti-imperialist uprising that initially took the form of student demonstrations
in Beijing on May 4, 1919, protesting the Chinese government’s weak response to the Treaty of
Versailles, especially the transfer of advantage in Shandong from Germany to Japan. The May
Fourth Movement provoked many responses nationwide, including in the treaty port of Shantou.
On May 6, 1919, the local Shantou newspaper Gongyan ribao
on May Fourth (

issued an extra edition

), and many Shantou students publicly voiced their support of the

student movement in Beijing. On May 14, students established the Ling Dong Student Union
(

) at Huaying School (

) and, through the union, called for a

demonstration and for the cessation of economic relations with Japan. On September 13, masses
of Chinese in Shantou publicly burned Japanese goods for the first time.263
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Katase stated that Shantou’s participatory response to the May Fourth Movement sharply
reduced the number of students (including Chinese as well as Japanese and Taiwanese) attending
classes in the city’s Japanese schools and obstructed the sale of Japanese goods there. Regarding
specifically the issue of school attendance, parents dared not let their children attend
Japanese-financed schools for fear that they would make easy targets. And regarding the boycott,
the issue was clear cut: Japanese goods were simply unmarketable in the heated atmosphere, and
Japanese businessmen subsequently and unavoidably suffered severe economic losses.
In another article, Katase depicted Shantou’s response to the Fuzhou Incident (

),

an event related to the May Fourth Movement. On November 16, 1919, some Chinese students in
Fuzhou got into an altercation with Japanese and Taiwanese residents in Fuzhou while the
students were boycotting Japanese goods as part of the May Fourth Movement. The conflict left
one student dead and five injured. Katase wrote,

Because of the Fuzhou Incident in November, students in Shantou carried out a
week-long strike. During the week, students held daily conventions and carried out
demonstrations. The telegraph poles were covered with posters describing the
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Fuzhou Incident in exaggerated detail. The posters specifically stated, “In front of
the youth assembly hall, heavily armed Japanese killed Chinese and fired their
weapons into the crowds.”264

Katase further stated that the stores in Shantou had started labeling their wares “Japanese
goods” or “native goods,” thus helping consumers to distinguish between tarnished imports and
preferable domestic articles of commerce. Because of the prohibition on imports of Japanese
goods, the price of commodities generally rose, and people from all walks of life suffered
accordingly.265
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Fig. 5-1 Hiroshi Katase’s “Newsletter from Shantou.”
[Illustration] The words in the red frame suggest that the anti-Japanese demonstrations made Japanese
goods unsalable, and that Japanese businessmen suffered subsequent financial losses. (Source: Taiwan
kyōiku, October 1, 1919.)
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The city’s Chinese residents as well as local Japanese and Taiwanese businessmen suffered
from the aforementioned inflation because many Japanese goods were in fact considered
daily-life necessities in Shantou. Among Shantou’s many imported goods were coal, matches,
silk, and seafood (like dried abalone and salted trout) from Japan and alcohol from Taiwan.
Shantou merchants mixed Taiwanese alcohol with local waters to make Shantou wine, and
exported it to Southeast Asia for consumption by overseas Chinese. Shantou merchants mixed
sorghum liquor from Tianjin with Taiwanese alcohol for Shantou residents’ consumption.266 In
this sense, the boycott of Japanese goods forced Shantou residents to seek substitutes, thus
driving up the prices of commodities in general.
The boycott was not a unique phenomenon in Shantou. In other treaty ports in southern
China, like Xiamen and Fuzhou, boycotts took root. However, the boycott in Shantou was
different from those in Fuzhou and Xiamen. A report by Chinzō Kondō

, the head of

the branch office of the Mitsui Corporation in Fuzhou and Xiamen, commented on differences
among the three locations’ respective dispositions and boycotts.
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(Shantou’s

First, Kondō suggested that native people’s dispositions in Fuzhou were similar to those in
Kyoto, that is, the two communities were typically gentle and agreeable. He further noted that
the native residents in Fuzhou were not good at conducting overseas explorations and that almost
none of Fuzhou’s native residents went overseas to earn money. He asserted, in contrast, that
native residents in Xiamen and Shantou were very aggressive and particularly apt at exploring
overseas sites. Java and Manila were destinations preferred by most Xiamen workers, and Siam
was the chief destination of Shantou migrants.267
Kondō then analyzed differences among the three locations’ respective anti-Japanese
activities. In Xiamen, the boycott was not successful and he predicted that the market would
soon right itself because, first, many Taiwanese sekimin who were powerful businessmen lived
in the city; second, Xiamen was not a city known for possessing excellent and comprehensive
administrative functions, and indeed only a few high-ranking Chinese officials lived there; and
third, the percentage of Xiamen’s population accounting for students, the main force supporting
the boycott, was not high, thus restricting the boycott’s influence. About Fuzhou, Kondō
suggested that the boycott manifested a straightforward conflict between students and
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(The recent

businessmen. The students wanted to boycott Japanese goods, whereas businessmen wanted to
trade. The businessmen ended up on the losing side in this conflict, in no small part because they
feared being attacked by students. Kondō regarded the native residents in Fuzhou as neither
aggressive nor creative, preferring to characterize them as followers. Thus, Kondō promoted the
idea that Japanese merchants should strategically entice local Chinese businessmen in Fuzhou to
trade in Japanese goods. He predicted that once some Chinese merchants started to trade in
Japanese goods, other Chinese merchants might follow, as would be their tendency. He also
predicted that the boycott in Fuzhou would gradually lessen in intensity. In general, businessmen
in Xiamen and Fuzhou put a halt to their trade in Japanese goods for fear of being attacked by
students, not out of patriotism.268
Different from the situation in the abovementioned two cities, the boycott in Shantou was
noticeably severe. In general, businessmen in Shantou tended to exclude foreign businessmen
and, thus, were more likely to manage business matters by themselves than to import foreign
goods through foreign agencies. Thus, the foreign presence in Shantou was less influential than
in Xiamen and Fuzhou. During the May Fourth Movement, businessmen in Shantou
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“automatically” quit trading in Japanese goods and found substitutes from Chinese suppliers
farther inland. However, during the boycott in Shantou, the city continued to import coal from
Japan because local businessmen encountered difficulties finding substitute suppliers outside
Japan. In addition, there was some speculation that a number of grocery items were Japanese
imports that, through a change in labels, were masquerading as non-Japanese goods. In sum, the
anti-Japanese movement in Shantou was consolidated and, according to Kondō’s prediction, the
city had only a slim opportunity to restore its market in the near future.269
The abovementioned facts suggest that Shantou was quite different from the treaty ports of
Xiamen and Fuzhou regarding the personalities of native residents, the power of student unions,
and the tendencies of merchants. Thus, the boycott in Shantou was much severer than in the
other two locations, despite Shantou’s continued import of Japanese coal.
We might be surprised to learn that, at least according to Kondō’s writings, the student
unions in Shantou played an important role in Chinese boycotts of Japanese goods. Concerning
this point, Kiwata Ide

recorded a detailed description of student unions’ prominent

role in Shantou’s boycott. Ide suggested that student unions were the main force in the
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anti-Japanese movement in many cities, and such was decidedly the case in Shantou. Students
used groups of music performers to promote an anti-Japanese atmosphere, kept a watchful eye
on Japanese goods passing through customs, and checked every dock in the port city. Students
who found suspicious goods, whether at docks or on store shelves, would sometimes hand them
over to Chinese authorities or simply burn the confiscated goods and fine the offending
businessmen arbitrarily. Over time, the student unions grew more and more radical, with the
students themselves sometimes acting, in essence, like thugs.270
Ide cited some cases exemplifying the students’ wild and violent actions. In late 1920,
students got into a dispute with a Chinese owner of a pharmacy who had been retailing Japanese
dyes, and the event evolved into an intense court case. During the judicial process, the pharmacy
owner fled to Hong Kong and students burst into his Chinese lawyer’s home, forced the lawyer
out, and paraded him through the streets as a traitor. Another case took place in the spring of
1921: a Chinese businessman who had British citizenship was importing Hong Kong silk, which
students confiscated on the grounds that the silk might be a Japanese import. The event wound
up in the courts, where it was left pending for a long time. Finally, the Chinese government
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demanded that the businessman pay a fine of 3,500 fu

to the student unions. It was said that

the student unions had asked for 35,000 fu. At about the same time, a Chinese merchant named
Wen-kou Yang

imported Java sugar from Chun-yang Guo

(1859−1935), a

famous Chinese Indonesian entrepreneur who possessed Japanese citizenship. The student
unions regarded the sugar as Japanese goods and fined the businessman 1,500 fu.271
It is worth noting that the Java sugar from Chun-yang Guo was regarded by the student
unions as Japanese goods because Guo possessed Japanese citizenship (i.e., he was a Taiwanese
sekimin). Born in Fujian Province, Guo had travelled to Dutch Indonesia to operate a sugar
company, eventually becoming a millionaire in the process. His company, the Hedong Company
(

), established factories and branch offices in Java, Surabaja, Hong Kong, and

Shanghai. Later, he registered as Japanese, and operated a tea business in Taiwan successfully.
He even received awards from the Dutch and Japanese Governments.272 For example, in 1928,
the Japanese government granted Guo membership in the Order of the Sacred Treasure, Gold
Rays with Rosette

, and praised him for having “devoted all his efforts, publicly

or privately, to Japan on behalf of Sino-Japanese trade and diplomacy, and in response to
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Southeast Asia’s boycott of Japanese goods. In short, he has been a superlative overseas
entrepreneur representing Taiwan.”273 (

).
In addition to detailing the violence of student unions in Shantou, Ide suggested that,

Because of the boycott of [Japanese] goods, Chinese merchants suffered greatly, as
did local prosperity, which was inextricably linked to domestic and international
trade. Why did local officers permit the boycott to persist? The reasons centered on
the frequent political turmoil, which was threatening the officers’ own positions. In
essence, the officers and politicians alike were secretly acting in their own best
interest when dealing with students.274
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Ide’s writings expressed Shantou’s political instability. Those who possessed power today might
be unseated tomorrow.
We might be curious to know why the student union participated so actively in such
political movements as the boycott of Japanese goods. The organization of the General
Conference of the Student Unions of Lingdong Union (

) was composed of all

regional student unions in Shantou and its hinterlands, as well as those in the Hakka region, and
it was largely dominated by the English-educated Christian students from the Anglo-Chinese
School. Concerning mission students’ political psychology, Susan Rigdon suggested that the
majority of Christian educators in China saw themselves as on a mission of “nation salvation”
and exhibited a keen desire to train civil leaders in order to save China from chaos. By 1930,
under the control of the Guomindang, Christian schools could no longer control their curricula,
and the Guomindang integrated Christian schools into the National Salvation program. Under
this circumstance, students from mission schools in China were encouraged to participate in
political movements that declared national salvation their main objective.275
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Moreover, the abovementioned Japanese records suggest that student unions in Shantou
were more active than those in Fuzhou and Amoy. This situation is perhaps attributable to
Shantou’s political fluidity, the activism of Hakka politicians, and the relative inaction of British
and Japanese consuls. The changes in Shantou’s local regimes were very complex, especially in
the 1910s and 1920s. Local warlords and municipal governments came and went. Further, many
Hakka revolutionaries were in control of Shantou after the 1910s and were often in conflict with
the Shantou Chinese Chamber of Commerce. In addition, local warlords in Shantou often turned
to British and Japanese consuls for help: Jiong-ming Chen

exemplifies this trend,

insofar as he cooperated with the Japanese consul there in the early 1920s. In sum, the rivalries
between Hakka revolutionaries and Shantou merchants, between local warlords and Shantou
merchants, and among various consuls made it difficult for any of them to form a united front
against the Soviet-supported Guomindang and other communist-organized anti-foreign activists
in the mid-1920s.
How unstable was Shantou’s political situation? Matsugorō Okabe

, a Japanese

teacher who taught at Tōē School in Shantou from October 1924 to March 1925 provided his
observations on the matter. According to Okabe, the Guangdong Army under Chong-zhi Hsu
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(1886-1965) fired on parts of Shantou in March 1925 and the Japanese Consulate in
Shantou issued an emergency notice, warning Japanese residents to practice extreme caution.
The emergency situation manifested itself in the form of fluctuating commodity prices. As
Shantou appeared to be on the verge of becoming a battlefield, many residents fled to Hong
Kong and Shanghai. Later, the Guangdong Army occupied Shantou and began plundering the
city. Okabe wrote, “The Chinese proverb ‘The army is the thief, and the thief is the army’
(

) described the situation.”276
Okabe’s recorded observations describe the Guangdong Army’s lack of military discipline

and, specifically, the situation at Tōē School: many Chinese refugees had crowded into the
school because the school had received permission from the Japanese Consulate in Shantou to
provide asylum to refugees in an emergency. The entrances to the school were closed and locked,
as passing Chinese soldiers glared at the building from the street. The Hinomaru, or the Japanese
flag, remained perched atop the school’s roof, serving as a warning to the Chinese soldiers that
the building was off limits. When the turmoil passed, the Chinese refugees quickly withdrew
from the place of sanctuary, which they had praised only moments earlier. Okabe’s writings state
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that none of the refugees expressed their gratitude to him or to the other Japanese who had
attended to the building during the crisis; that is, Okabe apparently observed ingratitude on the
part of Chinese citizens.277
Further, Okabe’s recollections describe the hardships experienced by the teachers who
stayed at Tōē School during the crisis. According to his writings, Japanese residents in Shantou
faced severe material conditions at the outset of the war. Sometimes the Guangdong Army would
fire their guns indiscriminately on Shantou, and the school itself suffered damages in this way. It
was impossible to venture out on the streets to buy anything. Sometimes the situation outside the
school was so dangerous that the teachers had to remain sequestered in the school for a whole
week. Although experienced teachers might not have been surprised at such periodic dangers in
Shantou, newcomers like Okabe were astonished. Okabe recorded his overall assessment of the
visit: “The crisis went on and on. It is not an overstatement that I went without a single peaceful
day during my stay in Shantou.”
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In sum, the writings and reports of Katase, Okabe, Kondō, and Ide constitute evidence that
Shantou’s response to the May Fourth Movement was strong, and that Japanese residents in
Shantou were disturbed by both the strong anti-Japanese sentiment and the political instability
there.
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5.3 Japanese Writings about Shantou’s Reaction to the May Thirtieth
Incident

Tokusaburō Ida

, the head of the Osaka Shipping Company’s branch office in

Shantou, offered this revealing commentary:

The stubborn degree of anti-Japanese sentiment in Shantou was unequaled
elsewhere in China. Once [the Chinese government] essentially authorized
anti-Japanese activities, the end result was a movement of violence, which
proceeded for between half a year and an entire year. It [anti-Japanese sentiment]
would boil over every two or three years, which grew wearying for [Japanese]. Any
kind of Japanese business that has just taken off immediately gets cut to the ground
by the [anti-Japanese] movement. How could Japanese put up with such situation?279

In the mid-1920s, an important anti-Japanese boycott occurred in China, the “May Thirtieth
Incident” (

). On May 30, 1925, a British Municipal Police officer in Shanghai gave the

order to open fire on Chinese protesters who had gathered in Shanghai's International Settlement
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to protest the actions of Japanese-owned Shanghai-based cotton factories, which had illegally
laid off and beat up Chinese workers. The shootings sparked nation-wide anti-foreign
demonstrations. The anti-foreign atmosphere, especially the anti-Japanese and anti-British
movements, reached their peak during the period from July to October in 1925. Maids, rickshaw
pullers, and boatmen called a strike, and food supplies to foreign residents stopped. Most
Japanese residents in Shantou, including about 170 Japanese and 380 Taiwanese, went back to
Japan or Taiwan, except for some staff at the consulate and at schools.280
Katayose Gunji

, who was born in Miyazaki Prefecture, Japan in 1897, and

started to work at the Archives Section at the Taiwan General Government in 1921,281
commented that “the Chinese are people who like turmoil. Without turmoil, it seems that [the
Chinese people] wouldn’t be able to distinguish day from night. It is a nation that manages to
maintain year-round turmoil.” Katayose named the turmoil “Shina sō”

, Chinese-style

turmoil. He suggested that many Chinese people tended to linger around the turmoil but failed to
grasp the meaning and purpose of the demonstrations. Katase regarded it as a “kūsō”

,

turmoil in vain. For example, Chinese people repeatedly distributed anti-Japan leaflets and
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waved flags appealing for the abolishment of imperial Japan’s Twenty-One Demands on
National Humiliation Day (May Fourth) every year, and yet many of these activists lacked even
a rudimentary understanding of these events. In fact, a surprising number of activists regarded
the turmoil as a festival (

) and regarded National Humiliation Day as a sanctioned

opportunity to plunder Japanese goods.282
Katayose further depicted the turmoil of Shantou’s response to the May Thirtieth Incident.
According to his observations, a 10,000-person demonstration took place on June 8, 1925, and
consisted of students, Guomindang supporters, members of sailors unions, and average citizens.
The General Conference of the Student Unions of Lingdong Union (

) issued

several appeals in the demonstration, including the following six: (1) a call for ending both the
collection of excrement and the provision of food for Japanese and British residents in Shantou;
(2) a call for a boycott of Japanese and British goods; (3) a call for Shantou’s ports to refuse
harbor to Japanese and British ships; (4) a call for a general boycott of foreign paper money; (5)
a call for a boycott of hotels and theaters run by foreigners; and (6) a call for citizen-organized
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donations and citizen-organized militias.283
The National Diplomacy Supporters’ Association (

) in Shantou made a

host of announcements, including the following five demands: (1) a call for the breaking off of
economic relations with Japan and Britain; (2) a call for a citywide strike on June 15; (3) a call
for every household’s display of a white flag with the words “Support Fellow Shanghai Martyrs!
Overthrow British and Japanese Imperialism!” and for fines to be levied on any household not
hanging the flag; (4) a call for strikes among workers like excrement collectors and cooks, whose
labor typically catered to foreigners; and (5) a call for labor unions to help the abovementioned
workers during the strike.284
Katase’s writings vividly describe the anti-Japanese atmosphere in Shantou in the aftermath
of the May Thirtieth Incident.
In September 1925, four months after the May Thirtieth Incident, Mitsumasa Kobayashi
(1892−1962), a high-ranking police officer, visited southern China’s treaty ports,
including Xiamen, Shantou, and Guangzhou. Kobayashi’s report published in Taiwan keisatsu
kyōkai zasshi

(Taiwan Police Association Magazine) in February 1926,
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paints a detailed picture of the anti-Japanese atmosphere in Shantou. Kobayashi was born in
Tochigi Prefecture, Japan in 1892. When he was still a student at Tokyo Imperial University, he
passed the advanced civil-office examination and worked at the Police Agency immediately after
graduation. In 1919, he served as secretary at the Korea General Government, and two years later,
he transferred back to the Police Agency. Kobayashi enjoyed a sterling reputation in the field of
law enforcement, and was regarded as “a new favorite son in police circles. Clear-headed, with
excellent ability, he has none of the taint so often attributed to police.”285 (
)
In the travelogue, a passage by Kobayashi depicts Shantou port as strikingly different from
the scene at Xiamen. When first setting eyes on Shantou port, he saw no sampans, which were
used for disembarking both passengers and luggage. The wild port looked very lonesome, as
only a few steamships were anchored there, including the Japanese warship Yūbari

, one

Chinese steamship, and two other foreign steamships. The lonesome scene was certainly the
result of anti-foreign activities. The travelogue then states that a coup against Sun Yat-sen had
taken place in Shantou just several days earlier and that Shantou now was occupied by an army
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under Zho-lin Hong

(1872−1925) who served Jiong-ming Chen

to fight Sun

Yat-sen. It seems that the boycott in Shantou became much more moderate under Hong’s (and
Chen’s) governance and it is said that the sampan operators gradually returned to work.286 Later,
Kobayashi boarded a small yacht belonging to the Osaka Shipping Company and because the
passengers were still not allowed to enter Shantou through normal customs posts, Kobayashi and
other passengers disembarked from the Asian Oil Company’s private passageway. After landing,
Kobayashi planned to visit the Japanese consulate, but his entourage and he had no luck securing
rickshaws, as the runners refused to pick up Japanese passengers. In the end, the Japanese group
had to walk to the Japanese consulate in the oppressive heat and humidity.287
After meeting with the vice consul, Kobayashi visited the Tōē School, a Japanese-financed
school near the consulate. Because of the anti-Japanese movement, the number of students at the
school had dropped dramatically to between 140 and 150. After noting this effect of the turmoil,
he visited the Japanese-financed Hakuai Hospital, which was still under construction. When the
entourage walked out to the street listlessly (probably because of the heat), a young Chinese man
approached them and asked them something. The administrator of the hospital who had walked
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out with Kobayashi answered with several sentences in Chinese. Kobayashi could not understand
Chinese and, after the Chinese man’s departure, asked what had just transpired. The
administrator told Kobayashi that the young man had suspected them of being Japanese

a

suspicion that the administrator had denied. Kobayashi wrote, “I wonder what he would have
done had we admitted to being Japanese.”288 (

)

Later, Kobayashi tried to buy cigarettes on the street, but the vendor refused to sell them to
him. Finally, Kobayashi went back to the Asian Oil Company complex and waited to reboard the
ship. Most of the passengers appeared to be officials of the former government who were going
into exile. Among them were two Chinese women. A Japanese-consulate staffer told Kobayashi
that these two women were family members of the head of the former government’s Negotiation
Bureau (

)289. They had all escaped to another consulate the previous night and were now

seeking passage to Hong Kong, which might offer them protection. Regarding some
heavy-looking bags placed on the deck, Kobayashi heard that they contained silver brought by
these passengers, who intended to be as financially prepared as possible when going into exile.
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Kobayashi wrote, “It is ironic that these people [Chinese officials of the former government and
their families] put the boycott of Japanese goods and of British goods aside thoroughly, boarding
a Japanese steamship to British Hong Kong, where exile awaited.”290 (

)
Aboard the steamship, Kobayashi asked for some bread and beer, but the server said that the
ship carried neither beer nor Japanese sake. Kobayashi wrote, “This has resulted from the
boycott, which even affects the ship!” (

)

Finally, Kobayashi could eat only bread and waited for dinner. He commented, “My impressions
of Shantou are getting worse and worse!”291 (

)

Kobayashi’s writings provide us a vivid picture of the anti-Japanese (and anti-British)
atmosphere in Shantou in the latter half of 1925. Indeed, throughout the latter half of the 1920s,
anti-Japanese sentiments simmered. For example, On January 4, 1926, two crew members of the
Japanese steamship Kenkon

hired four sampans in Shantou, and a conflict arose stemming

from the payment for services. The conflict eventually resulted in physical confrontation and two
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Chinese workers, A-ding Zheng

and A-zao Zheng

suffered severely injuries.

The action provoked Chinese anger, and on January 6, angry Chinese sampan workers initiated a
strike targeting all Japanese steamships in Shantou. On the same day, Wen-Dong Ma

,

the chief negotiator for Shantou’s Negotiation Bureau sent a letter to Shantou’s Japanese consul,
Gorō Uchida

, requesting the following actions: (1) detention of suspected criminals,

(2) prompt trials of suspects charged with crimes in Shantou, (3) an apology from the Japanese
government to the Nationalist Government and Shantou citizens, (4) compensation, (5) and
assurances that similar incidents would not happen again.
On January 7, the labor union of sampan workers formally accused Japanese crew members
of violence and two hundred sampan workers petitioned the Negotiation Bureau in Shantou for
justice, forcing the Japanese consul Uchida to accept the five requests. Later, on January 16, the
workers in Shantou called a demonstration to protest both Japan’s dispatching of troops to
Manchuria and the injuries sustained by the sampan workers in Shantou.292 In the following year,
on July 7, 1927, a large-scale boycott of Japanese goods took place in Shantou and many
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Japanese goods were confiscated.293
In fact, anti-Japanese sentiment continued into the late 1920s. The experiences of Tairiku
Munetō

attest to the lingering resentment. Munetō was born in Okayama Prefecture,

Japan in 1893. He worked for the police department in Japan’s Hyogo Prefecture for several
years. In 1924, he traveled to Taiwan, where he initially worked for the police force under the
Taiwan General Government and, later (in 1927), transferred to the Department of Education. In
January 1929, Munetō started off on a journey with other colleges, including the head of the
Department of Education, Hidehiko Ishiguro

, to southern China, where they would

inspect the regions’ educational institutions. They visited Xiamen, Fuzhou, and Shantou. In
Munetō’s report, he wrote,

When deciding to go to China, the first thing that came to my mind was the
anti-Japanese situation. Upon arriving in China, I didn’t feel the severity of it
[anti-Japanese situation]. However, Japanese officials and residents there [in
Shantou] told me that the boycott was indeed significant… I did see slogans and
graffiti of ‘Down with imperialism!’ and ‘Down with the Japanese bastards!’
everywhere.

294
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(The thinking of traveling southern

Munetō’s worries reflected concerns of most Japanese travelers en route to China at that
time.
In May 1929, Taiwan zhi chaye

(Taiwan’s tea), a periodical in colonial

Taiwan, published a report entitled “The Current Status of Shantou’s Importation of Japanese
Goods” noted,

[Shantou’s] boycott of Japanese goods, though still active, was showing signs of
dissipating. [Japanese and Taiwanese] merchants had waited for the storm to pass.
From the start of the anti-Japanese movement, Shantou had been regarded as the
most intensive site of the boycott. In fact, Shantou’s boycott was not restricted to
Shantou. The boycotts in Vietnam and Siam, which were closely connected with
Shantou’s economy, were intensive, as well. According to telegrams from Shantou
yesterday and today, some wealthy merchants in Shantou recently started importing
Japanese goods, and the overall importation of Japanese goods into the city has
become noticeably smoother and less impeded than it was. Businessmen predicted
that these improvements have grown visible not only in Shantou, but in Vietnam and
Siam, as well.295
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In sum, the writings and reports of Katayose, Kobayashi, and Munetō constitute evidence
that Shantou’s response to the May Thirtieth Movement was strong, and that Japanese travellers
and residents in Shantou were annoyed by the strong anti-Japanese sentiment there.
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Fig. 5-2 Tokusaburō Ida’s “Nighttime Discussion in Shantou.”
[Illustration] The words in the red frame suggest that significant anti4Japanese!sentiment!in!Shantou!
was!unequaled!elsewhere!in!China.!(Source: Taiwan jihō, July, 1939.)
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5.4 Japanese Writings about Shantou in the Turbulent 1930s
In the early 1930s, Sino-Japanese relations reached a breaking point with the outbreak of
the Manchu Incident in 1931 and the Shanghai Incident in 1932.296
How did Japanese travelers in Shantou perceive the port city in the early 1930s? Shunsuke
Morida

, who headed the Taiwan General Government’s Section of Hyginen depicted

Shantou as he saw it in the early 1930s. Born in Fukuoka, Japan in1900, Morida had graduated
from Tokyo Imperial University and then, in 1924, had traveled to Taiwan, working at the
Bureau of Domestic Affairs and, later, at the Bureau of Police Affairs.297 In March 1932, when
Morida was working at the Section of Hygiene, Bureau of Police Affairs, he visited branches of
Hakuai Hospital in Fuzhou, Xiamen, Shantou, and Guangdong. In his travel report, he stated that
the Japanese-financed Hakuai Hospitals were the targets of angry crowds of Chinese. In some
instances, windows at the branches had been shattered by stone- throwing crowds. When Morida
arrived in Shantou, he was surprised by the messages written in enormous letters on wall skirting
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the coastline: “Expelling imperialism!” “Japanese Dogs.”298
Morida wrote,
It is said that Shantou is a unique community of 120 thousand people with a toxic
anti-Japanese atmosphere. While I was aboard the vessel Kōdōmaru as it entered
Shantou’s port, no single sampan appeared to unload our cargo; in fact, only a
launch carrying customs and quarantine officials came to us. The scene was
lonesome and unsettling.
I boarded the Japanese Consulate’s launch and set off for land with the welcome of
Mr. Nagashima, the head of the Hakuai Hospital at that time. [We] avoided landing
at customs, instead making our way to a dock behind the Japanese Consulate. There,
[we] visited the consulate deputy, Mr. Tonegi.299

Morida’s recollections of reaching Shantou’s ports was similar to those of Kobayashi
Mitsumasa, who had traveled to Shantou in September 1925. Both Morida and Kobayashi
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perceived Shantou’s ports as desolate (e.g., the absence of sampans). Both Morida and
Kobayashi avoided landing at a normal customs post, preferring the private trestle belonging to
the Japanese consulate.
After depicting the experience of landing Shantou, Morida then depicted the scene inside
Shantou city, where many Chinese soldiers were stationed. He wrote,

I went to the Hakuai Hospital located in Waimalu

Soldiers were stationed

on the roofs of tall buildings, apparently keeping a watchful eye on the foreign
warships anchored in the port. The soldiers on the streets were armed, and most
were slim youths, wearing uniforms like those of Taiwanese able-bodied men.300
[The Chinese soldiers] carried guns and umbrellas on their backs, which make the
soldiers look peculiar. I heard that Chinese soldiers’ equipment later improved, so
that one would no longer see soldiers carrying umbrellas on their backs.301
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Morida depicted another episode. When he tried to buy a cigarette, the vendor—perceiving
Morida was Japanese—refused to make the sale. Later, Morida and his entourage entered a
Chinese restaurant for lunch, where the waitstaff grew openly sullen after noting that the
customers were Japanese. However, one waiter at the restaurant was Taiwanese and treated the
Japanese group kindly while serving them food.302 It is interesting to note that, regarding
attitudes toward Japanese, there were a significant difference between Taiwanese and local
Chinese in Shantou: the former were hospitable whereas the latter expressed antipathy,
indicating different points of views about the presence of Japanese in Shantou.
At the end of his stay in the city, Morida wrote, “When I left Shantou, it was engulfed in an
anti-Japanese atmosphere. I felt it difficult to anticipate any kind of lasting peace among people.”
303

The Sino-Japanese relations in Shantou deteriorated in May 1932 because of the occurrence
of “Shantou Incident.” Huai-zhen Zhang
editor of Shan bao

(1871−1941), the president and the chief

, a major local Chinese newspaper in Shantou, published an editorial
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praising Bong-gil Yoon

(1908−1932), the Korean independence activist best known for

orchestrating the bombing of a Japanese gathering in Shanghai on April 29, 1932. Zhang argued
that Yoon’s activities were proof of the Korean people’s enduring nationalist spirit and that the
Chinese people should follow Yoon’s example. By way of a memorandum, the Japanese consul
in Shantou informed the Shantou City Government that Zhang’s activity was an insult to the
Japanese emperor and asked the Shantou City Government to close Shan bao and arrest
Huai-zhen Zhang immediately because he had insulted the Japanese emperor. The Shantou City
Government refused the Japanese consul’s request.
Several days later, twenty Japanese warships arrived in Shantou. Seven of the warships
entered the Shantou port with uncovered cannons, clearly issuing the threat that military action
was pending. Meanwhile, the Japanese consul issued an ultimatum, demanding that the Shantou
City Government implement the following actions within forty-eight hours: (1) close Shan bao,
(2) arrest Huai-Zhen Zhang and send him to a designated Japanese warship to await punishment,
(3) compensate Japan for the expense of the warships’ unscheduled stop in Shantou, (4) ensure
the safety of Japanese citizens in Shantou, and (5) prohibit any further public displays of

!
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anti-Japanese sentiment in the city.304
Facing such threats, the Shantou mayor Zi-xin Huang
Zhang

went into hiding. Rui-gui

(1891−1977) was the director of the Chinese army garrisoned in Shantou at that

time. He openly supported Shan bao and Huai-Zhen Zhang. Facing Japan’s ultimatum, Rui-gui
Zhang took the following actions: (1) he declared that Shantou City was under martial law; (2)
he evacuated Shantou’s citizens to the suburbs, such as Chaoan, Chaoyang, and Jieyang,
essentially turning Shantou City into a ghost town; (3) he ordered that Chinese army units
surround Japanese citizens’ residences in Shantou, supervising their actions and prohibiting them
from stepping outside; (4) he ordered that fortifications made from sandbags and other materials
be built at strategic points along the coast; and (5) he ordered the port be closed. Rui-gui Zhang,
on the one hand, diplomatically refused Japan’s ultimatum and, on the other hand, strongly
implied that if the Japanese warships dared to open fire, the Chinese military might impose harm
on—Shanotu’s Japanese citizens. Finally, Japan conceded and the two sides declared that the
entire sequence of events had stemmed from a misunderstanding. The so-called Shantou Incident
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resolved itself peacefully.305
Kameyuki Katayama

, a staffer in the Taiwan General Government, described the

situation in Shantou around 1935. Born in Japan’s Kumamoto Prefecture, Katayama had worked
at a radio station in Keelung.306 In 1935, he visited Shantou and described the port as
captivatingly quiet. The tension in the air, however, was electric. Probably because the
Sino-Japanese tensions at that time were explosive, Katayama and his fellow passengers did not
disembark from their steamship until receiving some kind of confirmation that their safety could
be ensured. Shortly, they received a telegram from a local agent at the Osaka Shipping Company
in Shantou, stating that Japanese would be safe from harm in Shantou but that the boycott of
Japanese goods was growing in intensity.307
After setting foot in Shantou, Katayama wrote,

“There were armed soldiers stationed at strategic point on the street and it looked
like the city was under martial law. In any case, almost no Japanese were visiting the
area. Certainly, I didn’t see any sumptuously clad ladies like those in Xiamen. The
scene before me was that of a dead port.”308
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In this passage, it is interesting to note that Katayama’s comparison of Shantou and Xiamen
points to Xiamen’s far superior circumstances. Indeed, most port cities would garner a more
favorable assessment than, as Katayama put it, a “dead port.” (

)

In early 1936, a significant Sino-Japanese conflict occurred in Shantou. On January 21,
1936, Susumu Kakuda

, who was a member of the Japanese consulate’s security detail in

Shantou was found dead in the street. The Japanese consul in Shantou, Harada , reported to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Japan that Kakuda had died from gunshot wounds and that
Chinese anti-Japanese activists had perpetrated the murder; furthermore, Harada requested
compensation from the Shantou mayor Yuan-he Li

for the brutal act. However, the

Chinese version of Kakuda’s death was starkly different from the Japanese version. According to
Chinese sources, Kakuda had been sick for a long time and had died from natural causes. On
January 22, the Japanese warship Yūbari

entered Shantou port, outfitted to open fire if the

order came. Noting that only six staffers were in Shantou’s Japanese consulate at that time, the
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chief of staff of the Taiwanese Army (

), Rippei Ogisu

(1884−1949),

took the following actions: (1) Ogisu asked Yamada, the consul general of Xiamen (Amoy), to
send officials to Shantou, where they would assist Japanese citizens residing in the area; (2) he
ordered the Japanese steamships Gotake

and Sanae

to make haste for Shantou,

where they would be ready to open fire; and (3) he asked the special investigator of the
Guangdong Government, Zhong-hui Zhang

, to investigate the alleged crime and to

arrest the criminals responsible.
On January 23, Ogisu had talks with Jitang Chen, the director of the Guangdong
Government, in an effort to settle the dispute. Whether the truth of Kakuda’s death resembled the
Japanese or Chinese version mattered little in terms of the incident’s effects on Shantou’s
residents: both the Japanese and Chinese there grew distinctly uneasy. Under the city’s strong
anti-Japanese atmosphere, Japanese citizens in Shantou worried about their safety; likewise,
Chinese residents were scared that the Japanese warship would open fire on them.309 Three
months and half after Kakuda’s death, on May 1, 1936, Japanese Consul Harada sent an
ultimatum to the Shantou Government, requesting compensation. In response, the Guangdong
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government accepted a compromise: they agreed to compensate Kakuda’s family in the sum of
five thousand Chinese yuan in the name of the Cunxin Charitable Society

the largest

benevolent society in Shantou.310

Fig. 5-3 News Report about Kakuda’s Death. (Source: Taiwan nichi nichi shinpō, January 27, 1936.)
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Concerning Shantou’s Sino-Japanese relations in 1936, the article “Notes on Shantou”
written by Seijiuemon Ōkubo
in Shantou

a teacher at the Japanese Elementary School
), provides us some revealing information. Ōkubo was born in

Ibaraki Prefecture in Japan. In 1933, he worked at a public school in Taitung (in eastern Taiwan),
and later, in 1936, he was assigned to the Japanese Elementary School in Shantou. He stayed
there until 1940, when he returned to Taipei to fill a teaching position at an elementary school.311
Ōkubo’s report declares that the slogan “Down with imperialism!”

) was on

display, in written form, on many streets throughout Shantou. In Zhongshan Park (which was
named in memory of Sun Yat-sen), people had etched onto various surfaces not only the slogan
“Down with imperialism!” but also the slogan “Praise the three principles of the people!” (
) On the front doors of Japanese residents’ homes were scrawled “Down with
imperialism!” and “Japanese dog!” among other epithetic exclamations. Ōkubo commented,
“ Anti-Japanese thought permeated Chinese people’s thought.”312
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Ōkubo’s notes further declare it a pity that many native residents in Guangdong Province
went to Japan for their studies, while anti-Japanese thought in Guangdong was practically
feverish. On the one hand, ethnic Chinese from Guangdong were absorbing Japanese culture, and
on the other hand, they were enthusiastically resisting Japan. From these complex, if not
inconsistent phenomena, one can appreciate Ōkubo’s comment that “China was a mysterious
country and the Chinese were mysterious men!” (
) Ōkubo criticized Chinese people’s anti-Japanese attitudes but posed a
question about the matter: “ Should Japanese not conduct a self-examination about their general
attitudes toward China and Chinese?”313

Ōkubo’s writings indicate that Japanese residents of Shantou faced hardship stemming from
the city’s anti-Japanese atmosphere. Kobayashi, an officer serving aboard the Fukkenmaru
steamship suggested that, because anti-Japanese sentiment and activity were thriving in Shantou,
Taiwanese sekimin would regularly pretend to be Chinese in everyday life. Only when they
faced oppression by the Chinese government or some other similarly insurmountable danger
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would the Taiwanese hoist the hinomaru flag (the Flag of Japan) in an opposite strategy of
self-protection.314
In March, 1937, some four months before the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War, a
group of Japanese and Taiwanese students published their travelogues in Reisei

,a

publication of Taipei First Junior High School. Some of the students expressed their keen
awareness of Shantou’s tense atmosphere. For example, Saburō Watanabe

noted that

the entrances of many large stores in downtown Shantou were embanked with barbed wire
nettings and fences. The explanation for these security measures was that if something untoward
were to occur, the stores could immediately shut down to avoid looting. The blue-uniformed
Chinese soldiers of the Guangdong Faction (

) kept a watchful, resentful eye on them.

Finally, they arrived in front of the Japanese Elementary School and observed the sun-mark flag
(i.e., the flag of Japan) waving in the breeze atop the school.
Then, Watanabe wrote,

“When I witnessed the sun-mark flag waving vigorously, I felt a surge of strength.
When I thought of the stance being taken by this group of young fellow countrymen,
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who had been persistently bearing on their backs Chinese people’s revilement but
had still behaved in a manly way, my face grew hot spontaneously.”315

5.5 Brief Conclusion
In this chapter, I examine Japanese texts describing Shantou during the period from the
1910s to the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in July 1937. I find substantial evidence
that Japanese travelers and residents’ most striking impression of Shantou was of the city’s
strident anti-Japanese climate, which would take such forms as restrictions on Japanese citizens’
movements and boycotts on Japanese goods. My paper in some degree responds to Karl Gerth’s
research about the relationship between Chinese nationalism and the culture of consumption
prevalent during the National Products Movement from 1900 to 1937. He argues that by
promoting the purchase of national products as opposed to foreign products, the movement
offered people of all classes an opportunity to resist imperialism and express nationalist
sentiments. Boycotts of foreign goods took place mainly during the period extending from 1905
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to the 1930s, and most of the boycotts during the movement targeted Japanese products.
Boycotts contributed to the growth and proliferation of movement organizations.316
When we examine Japanese texts describing Shantou during the period from the 1910s to
the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in July 1937, we find substantial evidence that
Japanese travelers and residents’ most striking impression of Shantou was of the city’s strident
anti-Japanese climate, which would take such forms as restrictions on Japanese citizens’
movements and boycotts on Japanese goods. In the late 1910s and the early 1920s, many
Japanese writings focused on Shantou’s reaction to the May Fourth Movement (1919).
For example, Hiroshi Katase, a teacher at Shantou’s Tōē School, and Chinzō Kondō, chief
of the Mitusi Bussan’s Amoy and Fuzhou Branch Office, depicted the severity of Shantou’s
response. Thereafter, between the mid- and late 1920s, officials of the Taiwan General
Government, including Gunji Katayose, Mitsumasa Kobayashi, Tairiku Munetō, separately
testified to Shantou’s pronounced opposition to both Japanese goods and Japanese activities in
the city. Subsequently, the Manchuria Incident and the Shanghai Incident, which occurred
respectively in September 1931 and January 1932, further deteriorated the Sino-Japanese
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relations in Shantou. Shunsuke Morida and Kameo Katayama, who worked in the Taiwan
General Government, vividly described the worsening relations on the basis of their travels in the
area.
These and other writings expressed the intense anxiety felt by Japanese people staying in
Shantou, a city that went through turbulent political change during this period. Shantou was
essentially a battlefield where chaotic military conflicts among various warlords played
themselves out in the first half of the twentieth century. Indeed, Shantou underwent much more
political turbulence than its counterpart Amoy, another Chinese treaty port in southern China.
Matsugorō Okabe, a teacher briefly at Shantou’s Tōē School, expressed his fear and anxiety
about living in such a turbulent city under different warlords.
In sum, these Japanese writings constitute compelling evidence that neither native
Japanese nor Taiwanese possessing Japanese citizenship could easily subsist in Shantou. These
individuals—whether they were businessman contending with the Chinese boycott movement,
teachers struggling to prevent the dissolution of Japanese-funded schools, or officials of the
Taiwan General Government inspecting the city in the midst of myriad hostilities—would find it
necessary either to presevere or flee in the face of mounting hostilities.
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CONCLUSION

My dissertation has focused on a group of Japanese and Taiwanese people who lived in the
Chinese treaty port —Shantou —during the period between 1895 and 1937. The starting time
point (i.e., 1895) corresponds to the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, by which Japan
acquired informal privileges in Chinese treaty ports. The ending time point (i.e., 1937)
corresponds to the decline that Shantou’s Japanese community experienced owing to the
outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War on July 7, 1937. Given the tense Sino-Japanese
relationships that accompanied these open military hostilities, many Japanese who had resided in
Shantou fled to Hong Kong, to Taiwan, and even back to the Japanese homeland. These
Shantou-based Japanese and Taiwanese people, including merchants, teachers, officials of the
Taiwan General Government, and officials of Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, were
cross-boundary people: they traversed geographical, national, and ethnic frontiers, migrating
from either the Japanese homeland or colonial Taiwan to their new homeland

Shantou. By

examining the activities of these cross-boundary people, I have explored the networks
connecting the Japanese homeland, colonial Taiwan, and Shantou treaty port to one another; and
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in this way, I have contributed to a new understanding of Japanese imperial expansion in East
Asia.
For the conceptual framework of this dissertation, I drew inspiration from a group of
scholars. First of all, I was inspired by Peter Duus, Ramon Myers, and Mark Peattie, who remind
us that we should consider both the formal empire (the colonies) and the informal empire (the
Chinese treaty ports) of Japan to understand Japan’s influence on wider East Asia and the
importance of the connection between Japan’s formal and informal empires in East Asia. These
scholars have suggested that Japan was interested in China in terms of trade rather than territory
and that, thus, Japan’s informal empire in China enabled Japan to acquire economic benefits
while tamping down on the costs of formal colonization.317 Second, I was inspired by Ann
Stoler, Carole McGranahan, and Peter Perdue, who argued that we should turn our attention to
imperial actors—to “people on the fringes of empires as well as at their centers, to designated
subjects as well as colonial administrators, to those with companion and countervailing
motivations to empire and to those who reside at the categorical edges of the imperial.”318 In
other words, we should turn our attention to peripheral people and the colonized.
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Inspired by the abovementioned scholars and their studies, my dissertation focuses on, first,
the connection between Japan’s informal empire in China (in this case, the Shantou treaty port)
and Japan’s formal empire (in this case, Taiwan) in terms of commercial activities, educational
activities, and the perceptions of Shantou articulated in Japanese travel writings published in
Taiwan; second, the dissertation illustrates the ambiguous, complex interactions of Japanese,
Taiwanese, and local Chinese in Shantou by exploring the Japan−China co-investment Dadong
Ice-making Company. In order to clarify the two abovementioned issues, I have examined a
great many Japanese sources, including official records of the Taiwan General Government,
commercial and diplomatic reports of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Japan, major
newspapers and periodicals in colonial Taiwan, and travel writings. In previous research
concerning Japanese imperial expansion in East Asia, we seldom see studies exploring imperial
Japanese influence on Shantou, and thus, my dissertation delineates imperial Japanese history
from a new perspective.

!

251!

1. The Commercial and Educational Network among the Japanese Homeland,
Colonial Taiwan, and Shantou Treaty Port

Concerning the network of commerce in these circumstances, the early twentieth century
saw Japan establish closer commercial relations with Shantou. Shantou was an important market
for both Japanese and Taiwanese goods, including coal, seafood, molasses, and alcohol. The
Japanese and Taiwanese goods served not only Shantou’s local needs but also those of other
Chinese cities and of various regions in Southeast Asia. In Shantou, three major Japanese
companies (the Mitsui Company, Taiwan Bank, and the Osaka Shipping Company) received a
certain degree of governmental sponsorship; however, beyond them was a group of
medium-sized companies that, without much public-sector assistance, successfully established
their trade in Shantou. Moreover, Taiwanese merchants who established tea shops, textile
companies, mining companies, pharmacies, and groceries played a crucial role in Shantou’s
business circles. In examining these Japanese and Taiwanese companies and merchants, I have
argued that a cross-boundary commercial network emerged among the Japanese homeland,
colonial Taiwan, and Shantou treaty port.
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Concerning educational networks and activities, I have focused on the Tōē School in
Shantou (

) and a group of Japanese and Taiwanese teachers whom the Taiwan

General Government assigned to teaching positions in Shantou. It is clear that the Taiwan
General Government was the main organization responsible for the connection between colonial
Taiwan and Shantou in the field of education. In addition to assigning teachers and financing
schools, the Taiwan General Government published teachers’ reports and travel writings in
periodicals, such as Taiwan kyōiku

. By means of these periodicals, people in the field

of education in colonial Taiwan attained information about Shantou. To varying degrees, readers
in Taiwan shared Japanese teachers’ perceptions of Shantou, including perceptions of Chinese
schools’ status in Shantou, of Western-based schools in Shantou, and of Japanese teachers’
self-examination stemming from Japan’s management of education in Shantou. These
cross-boundary travelers at Shantou’s Tōē School reflect the significant transnational
connections among the Japanese homeland, colonial Taiwan, and the treaty port of Shantou.
Concerning travel writings, I have examined relevant Japanese texts describing Shantou
during the period from the 1910s to the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in July 1937,
and it is obvious from these texts that Japanese travelers and residents’ most striking impression
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of Shantou was of the city’s strident anti-Japanese climate, which would take such forms as
restrictions on Japanese citizens’ movements and boycotts on Japanese goods. These Japanese
writings constitute compelling evidence that neither native Japanese nor Taiwanese possessing
Japanese citizenship could easily subsist in Shantou. These individuals—whether they were
businessman contending with the Chinese boycott movement, teachers struggling to prevent the
dissolution of Japan-funded schools, or officials of the Taiwan General Government inspecting
the city in the midst of myriad hostilities—preserved or fled in the face of mounting hostilities.

2. The Ambiguity and Complexity of the Interactions among Japanese,
Taiwanese, and local Chinese in Shantou Treaty Port

The social position and the legal status of Taiwanese sekimin in the Japanese empire’s
hierarchy constitute an interesting issue that reaps great insights upon close examination. Barbara
Brooks argued that colonial citizenship, which spanned multiple imperial fields, serves as a way
for historians to explore the issue of identity in the Japanese empire. Meanwhile, imperial
Japan’s policies concerning ethnicity and nationality demonstrate the different positions of
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colonized peoples (e.g., Taiwanese and Koreans) within the empire.319 Some Japanese and
Taiwanese scholars have demonstrated that Japan’s passport-control policies for Taiwanese
subjects differed substantively from those for Japanese subjects. Moreover, Taiwanese sekimin
who stayed in China didn’t enjoy exactly the same rights as Japanese who stayed in China.320 In
this sense, although Taiwanese were Japanese subjects during the Japanese colonial period in
Taiwan, Taiwanese were ultimately “sekimin” unable to benefit from the same set of rights as
“Japanese” who hailed from the Japanese homeland. My dissertation explores the cooperation
and competition, the conflict and compromise among Shantou’s Taiwanese sekimin merchants,
local Chinese merchants, and the Japanese imperial consulate in Shantou by examining the
Sino-Japanese co-investment Dadong Ice-making Company in Shantou, as previously
mentioned.
The story of the Dadong Ice-making Company brings to light several interesting issues. First,
although Taiwanese were Japanese subjects, it was not necessarily the case that Japanese
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authorities overseas would protect these Taiwanese. On some occasions, the Japanese authority
was the origin of conflicts and obstacles besetting Taiwanese interests in China. An example of
these marginalizing tendencies can be found in the actions undertaken by Shantou’s Japanese
Consul Kumakichi Befu

, who chose to protect the interests of a “real Japanese”

individual, Riichirō Taenaka

, by expelling Taiwanese shareholders from China.

Second, the case of the Dadong Ice-making Company emphasizes the important role that
nationality (

) played in business activities in the treaty port of Shantou. In the initial stage of

the company’s operations, Consul Befu’s oppressive actions resulted in the Dadong Ice-making
Company’s decision to register as a Chinese company by identifying Zi-bin Zheng

as

its registered owner. Later, in 1933, Zheng’s own strategic maneuvering led the company to
register with the Japanese consulate in Shantou as a Japanese company, which afforded the
company a degree of Japanese protection. In other words, both Japanese and Chinese nationals
protected the Dadong Ice-making Company’s interests at different times. By way of example, the
Taiwanese sekimin Chang-sheng Chen

renounced his Japanese nationality and

registered as Chinese to avoid the stream of obstacles erected by Consul Befu. This action by
Chen was welcomed by the Republican Government of China, which regarded the
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transformation as a kind of expansion of power. In Chen’s case, his Chinese nationality protected
his interests in Shantou. Both the Dadong Ice-making Company and Chang-sheng Chen
exemplify the importance of nationality to Taiwanese interests in Shantou.
Third, the dispute between Taiwanese and Chinese shareholders in 1933 manifested the
ambivalence of Taiwanese who lived in China. Taiwanese who lived in Shantou had similar
languages, ethnic backgrounds, and customs, and cooperated with each other in business and in
local civic matters. However, the situation of Taiwanese was strongly influenced by the local
atmosphere, that is, by anti-Japanese sentiment. As I have explored in Chapter Five, many
Japanese travelers, like Kiwata Ide

, a revenue officer in the Taiwan General

Government, have suggested that Shantou was the site of the most pronounced anti-Japanese
atmosphere in China. In this sense, we can speculate that when anti-Japanese movements were
active in Shantou, Taiwanese found themselves personally in very real danger and found that
their businesses would often experience significant financial losses. Therefore, how Taiwanese
sojourners in Shantou protected themselves and their interests in an atmosphere of pronounced
anti-Japanese sentiment is an issue of great importance here.
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In conclusion, I have conducted a trans-national and cross-area study, combining theories
and materials from across the board, and in this effort, I have provided a platform for dialogue
among researchers in the fields of imperial Japanese history, colonial Taiwanese history, and
local Chinese studies of Shantou.
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